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Showing posts with label G-d's incorporeality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label G-d's incorporeality. Show all posts

Monday, 10 June 2019

229) READING TALMUDIC TEXTS THROUGH MODERN ‘FILTERS’:



INTRODUCTION:

In this article, we examine how the later scholars often view the theological teachings of the early Talmudic rabbis through various lenses. These lenses are either their own, or as is often the case, they are the filters created by a previous generation of scholars. In both instances though, the original Talmudic teachings, particularly those dealing with less tangible, non-Halachic and theological matters, run the risk of being distorted.

This distortion, however, would not necessarily apply to the Talmudic pronouncements and discussions on practical Halacha as by their very nature, they are more concrete, clear and less prone to misrepresentation.

I draw from a technical but fascinating scholarly paper[1] by Yeshiva University graduate, Professor Dov Weiss, who writes:

[Some modern][2] scholars of Judaism...typically read statements about God in the classical sources of Judaism - Mishna, Midrash and the Talmuds - with a mediaeval philosophical lens. By doing so, they sought to demonstrate the essential unity and continuity between rabbinic Judaism, later mediaeval Jewish philosophy and modern Judaism.”

In other words, the more modern scholars were happy to read Talmudic statements about theology through the ‘more sophisticated’ philosophical lenses of mediaeval rationalists like Rambam. This made such teachings seem more acceptable to the modern mind.

THE VARIOUS FILTERS:

Weiss points out a common mistake that many of us make when we read the classical Talmudic texts: Depending on which side of the fence we sit - we read the Talmud through the filters either of the philosophical/rational views of Rambam, or the mystical views of the mediaeval Kabbalists (both of which emerged during the mediaeval period around the 1200’s).

And when we do this, our understanding of the original classical Talmudic texts (particularly on theological matters) is often distorted.

CONFRONTING THE TALMUDIC THEOLOGICAL TEXTS ‘ON THEIR OWN TERMS’:   

Weiss proposes, therefore, that:

 “[W]e should confront the theological rabbinic texts on their own terms, without the guiding hand of either [rational or mystical][3] mediaeval Jewish framework.”

In other words, we need to look at Talmudic perceptions of divinity as if there were no rational Rambam nor mystical Kabbalah vying for our attention and colouring our interpretation of early rabbinic (Talmudic) theology.

PERCEPTIONS OF G-D IN THE ‘RAW’ TALMUD:

Let us now turn to some ‘raw’ Talmudic statements on the nature of G-d, without the hindsight of  1,500 years of interpretation and explanation:

Weiss cites R. Dr Alon Goshen-Gottstein who notices that:

“[I]n all of rabbinic [i.e. Talmudic][4] literature there is not a single statement that categorically denies that God has body or form.”

Of course, this does not mean that the Talmudic Sages all believed that G-d has some ‘form’, but the fact that a corporeal G-d was not specifically outlawed somewhere within the vast expanses of Talmudic literature, is significant.

The notion that G-d may have been understood by some Talmudic sages as possessing some ‘form’ or corporeality is astounding but not unusual. [See The Notion that G-d has a ‘Body’, and The Tosafists[5].]

Weiss puts it a little more directly:

“[W]e seem to have full acceptance - at least on a straightforward reading – that the rabbinic God, much like the biblical G-d, should be viewed as embodying a human-like personality.”

Ironically, “as further evidence”, Weiss cites Professor Guy Gedalyah Stroumsa, who shows how early Christian thinkers from the same time as the Talmudic period, like Origen (184-253), Justin Martyr (100-165) and Basil the Great (330-379) “criticised the Jewish belief in the corporeality of God.”[6]

Were these sources mistaken or were they able to base themselves on something more substantial?

RABBINIC ANTHROPOMORPHISMS EXCEED THOSE OF THE TORAH:

Weiss continues:

“Posing a problem for later Jewish philosophers, some [Talmudic][7] rabbis anthropomorphize God in ways that outdo anything we encounter in the Hebrew Bible...

 Although in Scripture, God is conceived as having humanlike limbs and organs such as arms, eyes, and legs, and humanlike emotions such as love, anger, regret, and jealousy, rabbinic literature expands the anthropomorphic...field by having God assume humanlike roles and features never entertained by biblical authors.”

What follows are some examples of this rabbinic “intensification” of the corporeality of G-d: - Remember, we are reading the ‘raw’ Talmudic and Midrashic texts without the aid of any later Kabbalistic or rationalist filters, explanations or interpretations:

The 3rd-century Amora, Rav, described  G-d as using His finger (to burn angels who opposed man's creation) and His hand (to diminish the size of Adam after he sinned).  [San. 38a]

R. Akiva (50-135) and others suggest that G-d went into ‘exile’, implying a type of physical bondage with the Jewish people after the Temple was destroyed.

R. Akiva and R. Yishmael debate [Mechilta de'R. Yishmael on Shemot 12:2] how the calculation for the new month was explained to the people.  R. Yishmael says Moshe showed them the new moon, while R. Akiva says the "G-d pointed out with his finger", as He did in three other instances when Moshe found something difficult to understand.

Regarding this particular Mechilta, Professor Meir Bar Ilan points out that in some copies the manuscripts were altered and "corrected" by "scribes who preferred not to relate anthropomorphic ideas to God."
In some instances, the phrase "G-d's finger" was purified to read "a finger" and in other instances, it was omitted entirely.  
Then, in Midrash haGadol, R. Yishmael says that on various occasions, G-d used different fingers to achieve different ends. [ See link to his paper at the end of this article.]

The ‘vertical hierarchy’ of G-d’s relationship with man is downplayed, whereas the ‘horizontal relationship’ is emphasized. Thus G-d is depicted as a ‘friend’ or ‘brother’ – and “the rabbinic God at times assumes a weaker position in the human-divine metaphor.” I would assume that this refers to instances in the Talmud where G-d is happily ‘defeated’ by the scholarly debates of the Sages.

Sometimes G-d is depicted as laughing and dancing with the rabbis, studying and teaching Torah in the study hall, and “spending His free time playing with mythic sea-monsters”. G-d is described as a sage who wears Talit and Tefillin.

There are also dozens of Midrashic references to G-d’s clothing and crown. G-d is depicted as riding on a horse and kissing the walls of the Temple as well as some of “His most beloved human followers”.

G-d is also depicted as suffering alongside the suffering Jews.

These examples portray G-d in a far more corporeal manner than the Torah itself.

MEDIAEVAL RESPONSES TO THE TALMUDIC MODEL OF G-D:

These corporeal depictions of G-d posed some serious questions for some of the more rationalist schools of rabbinic thought which followed during the post-Talmudic and Gaonic period and which eventually culminated with the Rambam in the late 1100s.

The rationalist schools felt the need to ‘neutralize’ the Talmudic and Midrashic literature which dealt with corporeality:

“[T]hese apologetic manoeuvres included decanonizing or devaluing the non-legal sections of the Talmud and Midrash...seeing these strange divine images as ‘poetic conceits’ for the uneducated masses.”

THE ‘MAIMONIDEAN STRANGLEHOLD’:

Then Weiss, citing Yair Lorberbaum makes the point that it was Rambam who:

...created a virtual stranglehold on Jewish theology – even for later academic scholars.
From Maimonides onward, rabbinic texts concerning God were typically read through mediaeval philosophical lens...

To buttress their view, these scholars typically argued that the rabbis used the phrase ‘as it were’ [keveyachol][8] as a method to signal their lack of seriousness or literalness in what was being said...

In short rabbinic theology was not read on its own terms. ”[9]

EXAMPLES OF CONTEMPORARY ‘APOLOGIST’ LITERATURE:

This apologetic trend of the rationalists continued for centuries where explanations were given for some of the “most daring” corporeal descriptions of G-d in the Talmud as simply being expressions of “the consciousness of the presence of G-d”.[10]

The Midrashic idea that after the destruction of the Temple, G-d suffers with His people, is now described allegorically as an “intimate bond between God and his people”.[11]

And Louis Ginsberg, writing in 1901 states rather categorically that:

“Sa’adia [tenth century] is in full harmony with Rabbinical Judaism when he maintains that the corporeality of God is contrary both to reason and Scripture”.

Weiss refers to these examples as being a result of a:

“...Maimonidean hijacking of classic rabbinic thought...which...imposes abstract mediaeval categories and conceptions retroactively onto rabbinic material.”

BREAKING ‘THE MAIMONIDEAN STRANGLEHOLD - THE EVOLUTION OF REVISIONIST SCHOLARSHIP:

THE 1940s:

Weiss goes on to explain that one of the first scholars to break with this ‘Maimonidean stranglehold’ was  Arthur Marmorstein (d. 1946) who made a distinction between the two Talmudic schools of R. Akiva and R. Yishmael. R. Akiva takes the Torah more literally and “affirms a corporeal God” – while R. Yishmael adopts a non-literal approach on these matters and “rejects divine corporeality”.

By pointing out that there were two very different Talmudic schools within the early rabbinic era, Marmorstein shows that the matter of corporeality was actually debated at that time, and that the school of R. Akiva did indeed maintain the notion of divine corporeality (having authored the Shiur Komah - a work which claimed to give precise measurements of the Divine Being). [18]

THE 1960s:

Later, in 1962, Abraham Joshua Heschel took this a step further when he suggested we reject the Maimonidean tendency to rationalize away the strong corporealism of the Talmudic sages, and stop downplaying and minimizing the rabbinic anthropomorphic tradition.

As Weis emphasizes:

“For him [Heschel][12], when the Akivan school describes God as suffering with His people, for example, it means just that.”

THE 1980s:

Then in 1988, Moshe Idel[13] took this rejection of Maimonidean philosophy even one step further. Idel disputed his teacher, Gershom Scholem’s premise that Kabbalah was an alien and non-Jewish transplantation of other mystical traditions based on Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism. 

Instead, Idel argued that its origins were indeed intrinsically Jewish and very Talmudic. Kabbalistic theurgy, claimed Idel:

 “...already occupied a central place in [Talmudic][14] rabbinic thought.”

This being the case:

“Idel reads anthropormorphic [and corporeal][15] rabbinic texts literally, thereby refusing to adopt a metaphoric reading as Scholem had done.”

THE 1990s:

And finally - in the 1990s - Michael Fishbane did not mince his words after he examined, sans Maimonidean filters, dozens of early rabbinic statements about G-d and declared that according to Midrashic texts, G-d was conceived of as sometimes being a ‘vulnerable’ and ‘limited’ being!

And not only were the Jewish people in need of redemption, but so was G-d who also experienced destruction and was also in Exile![16]

In accordance with this view, Fishbane explained that the expression ‘keveyachol’ or ‘as it were’ (which often followed these expressions of corporeality) was not used to imply an allegorical interpretation as it did in the Maimonidean sense - but rather to show that the Talmudic view of G-d was so literally radical, that they could not even find accurate sources for it within the Torah text itself!

As Weiss puts it, the use of the expression of ‘keveyachol’:

“...signalled the rabbinic self-awareness that their theological claims had a tenuous link to Scripture.”

Interestingly, Weiss makes the point that Fishbane’s position was adopted by “leading rabbinics scholars of the day, such as Daniel Boyarin...Meir Bar-Illan...and Alon Goshen-Gottstein...


ANALYSIS:

This has only been a limited presentation of Professor Weiss’ research on how various historical schools have tried to understand and (re?)read the classical Talmudic and Midrashic texts dealing with G-d.

Whether one chooses to agree or disagree with the conclusions of the scholars he cites, I believe Weiss touches a nerve concerning one of the most fundamental issues of Hashkafa (Jewish worldview) that is often overlooked.

Thus, for example, were one to have been schooled in Chassidic theology, it is very likely that one would view theological[17] Talmudic literature through that filter and read Chassidic nuances into the ancient text.  On the other hand, were one to have been schooled in the Lithuanian style of study, one might view theological Talmudic literature as being an extension of the Lithuanian worldview and unconsciously interpolate that view within the text.

The Chassid may consider a Talmudic sage to be like a Rebbe - while the Lithuanian might view the same individual as a Lithuanian scholar. And to compound matters even further, a Rambamist rationalist might frame the theological Talmudic texts more allegorically than literally - while a mystical Kabbalist might read something a little closer to the plain meaning of the original theological text.

Unless we are prepared to remove the filters, it is very difficult to accept that in all probability, the same Talmudic sage may actually have been in an entirely different category altogether!

I believe this holds true not only of the way we filter the classical texts, but it also applies to how we choose (or are told) to relate to every single text and even to ideas we come across.

We are always hearing explanations that amount to:  What it says is not really what it means.

We stop listening to a text or an idea but immediately engage the ‘correct’ filters before that text or idea has a chance to express itself.

Sadly, so many ideas and concepts in Judaism get lost, suppressed, redefined and bent by filters which silence the intention of the original text.




[1] The Rabbinic God and Mediaeval Judaism, by Dov Weiss.
[2] Parenthesis mine. Weiss is referring particularly to the more modern scholars from the time of the Wissenschaft des Judentums (1819) until the late 1980s.
[3] Parenthesis mine. (Weiss refers to the difference between mediaeval philosophical and mystical schools as opposed to rational and mystical schools.)
[4] Parenthesis mine.
[5] Both these links deal with some post-Talmudic rabbinic views of a corporeal G-d. Our focus in this article is on a possible Talmudic view of a corporeal G-d.
[6] For a more thorough examination of this issue, see The Body of God in Ancient Rabbinic Judaism: Problems of Interpretation, by Jose Costa.
[7] Parenthesis mine.
[8] Parenthesis mine.
[9] I would add that this was indeed the case with regard to the religious rationalists and the (often secular) academic scholars who followed after Rambam. However, this was not always the case with the Kabbalists (and many Tosafists) who were often known to have taken Midrashic literature quite literally. And it should be pointed out that to a large extent the Kabbalistic view did, in fact, become the de facto worldview of mainstream Judaism despite the influence of the anti-mystical views of Rambam.
[10] Philosophies of Judaism: The History of Jewish Philosophy from Biblical Times to Franz Rosenzweig, by Julius Guttmann (1966) 34.
[11] Ibid. 35.
[12] Parenthesis mine.
[13] Kabbalah: New Perspectives, Moshe Idel.
[14] Parenthesis mine.
[15] Parenthesis mine.
[16] The Kotzker Rebbe is said to have made a similar statement. While the rest of the Jewish world believed in Tikkun Olam (rectifying the world), in Kotzk they had the audacity to believe in rectifying G-d (so to speak?).
[17] As opposed to Halachic.
[18] Not everyone agrees with this distinction between R. Akiva and R. Yishmael, as we saw earlier with Midrash haGadol where R. Yishmael is also described as a corporealist. Furthermore, both R. Yishmael and R. Akiva are said to have authored Shiur Komah.  
Meir Bar-Ilan shows that it is possible that the Midrash haGadol version, quoting R. Yishmael, and which has no parallel in other rabbinic sources, may have been "due to some kind of interior censorship" by scribes unhappy with some of these anthropomorphic depictions of G-d.



DIGEST OF  SOME KNOWN CORPOREALISTS:

The following is a list of some references to Magshimim (corporealists) from around the time of Rambam:


Abraham Ibn Daud reports that masses of Jews believed God to be a material being.1

Maimonides, who argues so forcefully against the corporealists, himself speaks of numerous people, including "the majority" of the ignorant, who held to anthropomorphic views. He also mentions meeting a talmudic scholar who was unsure if God had a body.2

Yedaiah Bedershi writes how it is well known that the belief in God's corporeality was spread throughout virtually all Israel in "previous generations" (i. e. before Maimonides was able to reverse matters).3

Other scholars who testify to anthropomorphic views being held by Jews include R. David Abudarham,4 the anonymous author of Ma'amar ba-Sekhel, 5 R. Isaac ben Yedaiah,6 R. Moses of Salerno,4 and R. Shem Tov ben Joseph ibn Shem Tov, the well known commentator on the Guide. 8

In addition, R. Moses Nahmanides,9 R. David Kimhi,10 R. Abraham Maimonides,11 R. Solomon ben Meshullam da Piera,12 R. Samuel Sapurto,13 R. Shem Tov Falaquera,14 R. Isaac ben Latif,15 and R. Moses Alashkar16 all speak of anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars.17

Although it was difficult for post-medieval scholars to sympathize with the anthropomorphist position, this was not the case for R. Samuel David Luzzatto.18 Although he obviously did not subscribe to this belief, he nevertheless defended it with all his vigor, for, in his opinion, it was all that the masses were able to grasp. Because of this, he maintained that it was proper for the Sages to ascribe corporeality to God. However, sensitive to the implication of what he was saying, he added that this was not a base corporeality, but a perfected corporeality. "The early ones ascribed to God and the angels and the souls a very fine spiritual essence, more subtle than any body known to us but nevertheless characterized by form and build."19 Rather than this being heresy, Luzzatto claimed that it is the doctrine of incorporeality which, through its association with philosophy, leads to heresy. He felt that it would be infinitely better if Jews were to return to the simple belief in a corporeal God.20

4. Ha-Emunah ba-Ramah (Frankfurt, 1853), 47, 91.
2. Guide I: 1; A. Lichtenberg, Kovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam ve-Iggerotav (Leipzig, 1859), II, 8a, 8c; Yizhak Shailat, Iggerot ha-Rambam (Ma'aleh Adumim, 1987), I, 320, 322 (Arabic), 341, 346 (Hebrew).
3 . Sbe'elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba (Lvov, 1811), "418 (p. 47b). Cf. R. Yom Tov Ishbili, Sefer ha-Zikkaron, ed. Kalman Kahana (Jerusalem, 1959), 59. See also R. Elijah Delmedigo, Behinat ha-Dat (Vienna, 1833), 25, who, entirely ignoring R. Sa'adah Gaon, gives Maimonides all the credit for discrediting the anthropomorphists.
4. Abudarham ha-Shalem, ed. S. A. Wertheimer (Jerusalem, 1957), 362.
5. (Vienna, 1816), 14a.
6. See M. Saperstein, op. cit., 185-86. R. Isaac refers to "faithless 'Sadducees' who say that God is [composed of] a matter which is finer, purer, and more transparent than the matter of any shining star."
7. See J. L. Teicher, op. cit., 84-85.
8. See his commentary to Maimonides' Introduction to the Guide (p. 10a in the standard edition.)
9 . A. Lichtenberg, op. oil., III, 9d; Kitvei Ramban, ed. Chavel (Jerusalem, 1963), I, 345.
10. Lichtenberg, ibid., III, 3c.
11. Ibid., 16ff.                         
12. See the poems published by Hayyim Brody, Yedi'ot ha-Makhon le-Heker haShirah ha-'Ivrit 4 (1938): 102: האומרים כבוד והחשבים דמות / דעות חלוקים הם ולא אל תנאף באומרים גשמות ואם /לא-ל תמונת האנוש צירו העובדים צורם ופיו לא מרו / כפרו/ כמה חכמים אמרו שעור והם Ibid., 34: .אך האמן / ואמור אמן כי יש מנהיג יושב חביון / ובסוד גשמות / אם הוא בדמות / לדעת זאת אין לך רישיון See also Ibid., 91, for another defense of the anthropomorphists and Ozar Nehmad 2 (1851): 85.
13 . See Kerem Hemed 5 (1841): 12. He is apparently the author of this letter directed to the French rabbis, in which he writes: ככם מגשימים הגויים בהבלי היש .See also Sapurto's letter published in Ginze Nistarot 4 (1818): 44ff. (Halberstamm, who edited this letter, does not believe that the letter published in Kerem Hemed was authored by Sapurto; see ibid., 37.)
14. See his letter in A. Lichtenberg, op. cit. III 23ff (lIt also is found in R. Abba Mari Astruc, Minhat Kena'ot [Pressburg, 1838L 183ff.) The letter is anonymous but there is reason to assume that Falaquera is the author; see Heinrich Graetz, Geschichte der Juden (Leipzig, 1863), VII 474. In reference to Rabad's assertion that there were people "greater and superior" to Maimonides who believed in God's corporeality, .(bגדולים ממנו בקומתם וטובי מראה ובריאי בשר (23 ויתכן שהיו :sarcastically responds Falaquera
15. See He-Haluz 7 (1865): 91-92.
16 . She'elot u-Teshuvot Maharam Alashkar (Jerusalem, 1988), #117 (p. 312). Alashkar singles out the French sages. In his words, they were guilty of מגשימים בפרהסיא , a phrase which actually appears in Bedershi's apology. Alashkar further notes that it was due to Maimonides' works that this widespread anthropomorphism was uprooted.
17. I have deliberately avoided mention of evidence that appears in non-Jewish sources. As is well known, Jewish anthropomorphism was also a common accusation of Muslim polemicists.
18 . See Monford Harris, "The Theologico-Historical Thinking of Samuel David Luzzatto," Jewish Quarterly Review 52 (1962): 317ff.
19. Peninei Sbadal (Przenlysl, 1888), 274. See also R. Judah Aryeh Modena, Magen ve-Herev, ed. Shlomo Simonsohn (Jerusalem, 1960), 40.
20. Iggerot ShadaI (Cracow, 1891), 1195-97.


[Extracted from: Maimonides' Thirteen Principles: The Last Word in Jewish Theology?  By Marc B. Shapiro.]

Sunday, 6 May 2018

175) RABBEINU NISSIM OF MARSEILLES – ONE OF THE MOST RADICAL OF ALL THE COMMENTATORS:

THE EXTREME THEOLOGY OF THE MEDIEVAL[1] RATIONALISTS:


Ma'aseh Nissim Torah Commentary by Rabbeinu Nissim of Marseilles (1304).


NOTE: To be absolutely clear, the purpose of this article is to neither endorse nor criticise R. Nissim of Marseilles’ approach to Torah commentary but simply to share some of his interesting views.

I have drawn extensively from the academic writings of Professor Howard (Chaim) Kreisel[2] who has researched this commentator extensively. 

Readers who are theologically conservative and sensitive would be advised - even by Rabbeinu Nissim himself - not to read the views of Rabbeinu Nissim of Marseilles.

INTRODUCTION:

Rabbeinu Nissim ben Moshe of Marseilles lived sometime around the 1300’s. This places him historically about one hundred years after Rambam. The exact dates of his birth and passing, however, are unknown.

He has remained rather obscure over the years, either by accident or by design, and only merited a small entry in Encyclopaedia Judaica in the 1960’s. About seven manuscripts of his Torah commentary are known to exist in various libraries. Another manuscript was in a private collection, dated 1304, but has somehow vanished.

He is best known for his Torah commentary, Ma’aseh Nissim[3] which departs significantly from many of the other traditional commentaries in that it steers absolutely clear of miraculous and supernatural interpretations.

What is fascinating about R. Nissim of Marseilles is just how far he was able to push the envelope of Torah commentary yet still remain within the parameters of rabbinic Judaism.

'INTELLECTUAL ELITISM’:

In keeping with the views of Ibn Kaspi, Rambam and others, R. Nissim similarly believed that the Torah was written for two streams of readers: the Simple (or as Rambam often calls them, ‘Ignorant’) Masses (Hamon Am), and the Intellectually Elite (Yechidei Segulah).

And like these other rationalists, R. Nissim also suggests that many of the accounts recorded in the Torah were directed toward the simple category of readers - as a kind of dispensation if you like - but that the real intent was on a far higher level only to be perceived by the intellectually elite. In this sense, the original Torah was ‘playing to its base’ which demanded of it certain practices at that time as that was the only way the popular masses could perceive of religion and ritual. See Outspoken Rabbinical Views Claiming That The Torah Recorded Superstitions Of Its Day.


According to Professor Kreisel; “The Torah, in his (R. Nissim’s)[4] view, speaks differently to each class of reader; only upon the elite does it shine its deeper truths...The accounts it presents are not all literally true but nevertheless necessary in order to be effective in impressing upon the average reader the most basic truths.”

And as much as R. Nissim of Marseilles believed that the masses were within their rights to interpret the Torah literally in all its expressions – so too were the elite equally within their rights to apply their minds to deeper interpretations.

R. Nissim was thus well schooled in Rambam’s approach to Torah interpretation but, as we shall see he went much further than Rambam was ever prepared to go.

G-D’S INCORPOREALITY:

While it may appear surprising to many, our rabbis have not always believed that G-d is incorporeal (i.e. that G-d has no bodily form). Many of our early Sages believed that G-d did have some form of ‘bodily form’ or corporeality. See The Notion That G-d Has A ‘Body’.

Starting with Rav Saadiah Gaon (882-942), many rabbis began to speak out against the notion that G-d had a ‘body’, even though the Torah, taken literally, refers to G-d’s ‘hand’ and ‘anger’ etc. which had often been taken on face value till then.

Ravad’s comment on Rambam makes it clear that it was not just the ignorant masses who believed in G-d’s corporeality, but even the Sages clung to such a belief. Rabbi  Avraham ben David, or Raavad, was a famous Talmudic commentator and father of Kabbalah who frequently argued with Rambam. 

He disagreed with Rambam’s position that believing in a form of corporeality was against the Torah, because ‘many people even greater and better than Rambam’ did espouse of some form of corporeality.[5]

As is well known, Rambam (1135-1204) advocated vociferously against believing in any form of corporeality relating to G-d - yet he makes the point that we do not consider the earlier Sages who held those beliefs to be heretics. In the same way, Rambam continues, we should not have to hold on to the literal interpretation that, for example, the world was created in just six days - and we too should not be considered to be heretical if we believe the time frame was far wider.

Rambam writes: “Nor are the gates of figurative interpretation shut in our faces or impossible of access to us regarding the subject of the creation of the world in time (i.e. more than six literal days)[6]. For we could interpret them as figurative, as we have done while denying His corporeality.[7]

For more on Rambam's views on figurative interpretation see KOTZK BLOG 146.

SOME OF R. NISSIM OF MARSEILLES’ VIEWS ON POPULAR TORAH CONCEPTS:

CREATION:

R. Nissim, in keeping with many other Sages, certainly does not believe in the literal interpretation of the universe being created in 144 hours.

ADAM AND EVE:

He believes that the story of Adam and Eve and that of Cain and Abel are also not to be taken literally but are instead ‘philosophic parables’.

LIVES EXTENDING TO HUNDREDS OF YEARS:

He interprets the long lives of many of the Torah personalities as being correct in terms of time spans – not for the individual himself, but rather for his descendants who are called after their particular forbearers.

PATRIARCHS:

He accepts the historicity of the Patriarchs but interprets the miraculous aspects of their lives figuratively.

SODOM AND GEMORRA:

The destruction of Sodom and Gomorra was the result of an earthquake.

PLAGUES:

The plagues of Egypt and the parting of the sea were natural events, foreseen or brought about by Moshe and Aharon, due to their knowledge of the natural order, for their strategic purposes.

BURNING BUSH:

Some of the other miracles, such as the talking donkey and the burning bush, according to R. Nissim, never occurred in reality but were prophetic visions or dreams. As Professor Kreisel puts it: “What is crucial in both cases is the content of the revelation, not whether the events described actually happened outside of the prophet’s soul.”

BINDING OF ISAAC:

The binding of Isaac was also not taken literally by R. Nissim but rather as occurring in a prophetic vision.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT:

Reward and punishment are not miraculously visited upon us but instead the result of a harmony in the social order when a kind deed is done - and the opposite occurs when a moral act does not take place. In this sense, a society reaps what its constituents sow.

According to Professor Alan Verskin, R. Nissim of Marseilles acknowledges that belief in an angry G-d of vengeance would be beneficial to keeping the followers within the straight and narrow, however;

“...a person who is taught to behave ethically because of the natural consequences of his actions will have a more consistent and dependable source of motivation. A person who believes in naturalistic reward and punishment, he (R. Nissim)[8] concludes, will be better able to maintain his faith in the face of the vicissitudes of fortune. He will not be led to deny the laws of right and wrong because of a feeling that G-d neglects their enforcement. Lest his view seem impious...citing a passage from the Talmud...he...argues:

‘[The Sages] of blessed memory indicated that nature’s activity is not suspended or changed for the sinner, for they said: ‘Suppose a person stole a measure of wheat and sowed it in the ground; it is right that it should not grow, but the world pursues its natural course.’”[9]

R. Nissim knew that this view of natural consequential reality would not be acceptable by the masses and “...in view of the circumstances prevailing at any particular time and place, it is better for the multitude to understand reward and punishment according to the literal meaning of scripture...The teacher...must be very sensitive to the needs of his audience so as not to harm them and his society.” [10]

R. Nissim writes; “Because religion is given to all – sage, fool children and women – it is necessary that it speak with each person in a way which is appropriate and useful to him.”[11]

KASHRUT:

Many will find R. Nissim’s interpretation of the laws of Kashrut as unacceptable as he maintains that they were instituted for health reasons!

THE WIDOW AND ORPHAN:

Here is an example of a commentary from Ma’aseh Nissim, as translated by Professor Kreisel (based on ms. Paris 720, folio 81r):

'You shall not ill-treat any widow or orphan’[12]

If they do not practice judgement in the land, but the mighty exploit the powerless and devour them with greedy mouths, and the strong rob the hapless weak, continuously afflicting them, then the political community will be destroyed.

There will exist no agreement among them, only incessant quarrel, strife and contention. It will be easy for enemies to defeat them... Conceivably, this is also said because the robbed and oppressed may rise up against the oppressor, ambush and kill him.

There is an allusion to this – i.e., that the punishment will be meted out by the oppressed who can no longer bear the burden of affliction – in what is said. ‘I will heed their outcry as soon as they cry out to me’[13].

If [the oppressed one] does not cry out and does not feel affected, [the oppressor] will not be punished.”

This is a fascinating and unusual commentary as it offers transactional, social and political reasons for not taking advantage of the widow and orphan. It reads like something written in the 1960’s or a part of some socialist manifesto.

R. NISSIM’S JUSTIFICATION:

R. Nissim writes, unapologetically, about those who always just follow the literal and miraculous meaning of the Torah without any understanding:

They are like a burden-carrying mule that knows nothing of the purpose of its labours and the utility of its activity. The rationalists observe the commandments with the requisite scrupulousness because of their purpose and utility. They observe the commandments with their limbs, and even more with their thought and heart, for every practical commandment comes either in order to teach a correct opinion or to reject a false opinion; to help a person to acquire a noble quality or distance the person from an opprobrious one.

Just as it happens that the masses, due to their fear, do not sin and are scrupulous in their observance since they do not know anything, it happens at times that they perform the less significant commandments, abandon the more precious ones and are lenient in their observance the weighty ones because of their limited discernment...

In reference to the masses they say that they are the ones committed to the practical commandments and they are the pious ones (hasidim). How mistaken are those who say this. For our sages have already maintained: “The ignorant one is not pious (hassid)[14]

THE LIMITATION:

R. Nissim of Marseilles’ very strong views come time and again with a warning that these views are not to be shared too openly as they would undermine the spiritual comfort zone of the masses.

THE ‘CODED’ MIDRASHIC SUPPORT:

R. Nissim of Marseilles adopted a similar understanding of Midrashic literature as did Rambam. He too believed that the Midrash was often a coded message to the intellectually elite yet so cleverly disguised that the masses could still interpret it on a more literal level.
Here is an example of this ‘Midrashic code’:

[ז] מה כת' למעלה מן העיניין, בפרשת משכן, כאשר צוה י"י את משה למה הדבר דומה, למלך שהיה מצוה את עבדו ואמר לו בנה לי פלטין. על כל דבר ודבר שהיה בונה היה כותב עליו שמו שלמלך. היה בונה בכתלים והיה כותב עליהם שמו שלמלך. היה מעמיד בעמודים והיה כותב עליהם שמו שלמלך, היה מקרה בקורות וכותב עליהן שמו שלמלך. לימים נכנס המלך לתוך פלטין, על כל דבר ודבר שהיה מביט היה מוצא את שמו כתוב עליו. אמר כל הכבוד הזה עשה לי עבדי ואני מבפנים והוא מבחוץ, קראו לו שיכנס לפנים. כך בשעה שאמר לו הקב"ה למשה עשה לי משכן על דבר ודבר שהיה עושה היה כותב עליו כאשר צוה י"י את משה. אמ' הקב"ה כל הכבוד הזה עשה לי משה ואני מבפנים והוא מבחוץ, קראו לו שיכנס לפנים. לכך נאמר ויקרא אל משה.

The Midrash[15] records that G-d commanded Moshe in principle to build a Tabernacle. Moshe did indeed build such a Tabernacle and the Torah commends Moshe by saying that he did: “As G-d had commanded Moshe.”

The Midrash continues by creating an analogy between Moshe and a servant whom the king commanded, in principle, to build a palace - but without specifying the details of the construction.

The servant was so eager to fulfil the desire of the king that he wrote the king’s name on each brick and item of the palace. The king, of course, was very pleased with his servant and when the palace was completed he called his servant to come inside the palace. Similarly, G-d was pleased with Moshe, who also wrote, ‘As G-d had commanded Moshe’ on every item of the Tabernacle - and when it was completed He called Moshe inside.

On the surface this seems to be a typical and rather innocuous Midrash. However, R. Nissim of Marseilles interprets this Midrash as follows:

העירו בזה זל לסוד גדול נמשך למה שרמזנו אליו בזה הפרקוזה כי הצואה בכלל היתה מהשם יתברך לשכל משה. והשמיע לו הדברים דרך כלל לכל מוסרי התורה וצוויה ואזהרותיה  לחלק השכלי, ליסד החלק הגופני ולהנהיגו, ושיכוון אל הנאות והמועיל תמיד, וירחיק המזיק לגוף ולנפש. ומשה היה כותב על כל פרט ופרט: “כאשר צוה יי את משה לכבוד השם, ולהגדיל הדברים בעיני ישראל, למען תהיה יראת השם על פניהם לבלתי יחטאו.

The sages alluded to a great secret (in this Midrash)[16]...namely – that the command in general was to the intellect of Moses. G-d communicated the matters in general – namely, all the commands of the Torah to the rational faculty (of Moses)[17] in order to govern the corporeal side, directing it always to the salutary, and to abolish what is harmful to the body and the soul. And Moses would write by each detail: ‘As the L-rd commanded Moses’, in order to honor G-d and to increase the significance of these matters in the eyes of the Israelites in order that they fear G-d and refrain from sin.”[18]

Thus in effect, we have what appears to be quite a subversive Midrash in sheep’s clothing: 

The Torah clearly states that Moshe built every item according to G-d’s specific command – yet the Midrash says that only the general command was given by G-d, but that Moshe independently ascribed every detail to G-d!

Professor Kriesel writes:

R. Nissim maintains that the Talmudic Sages, the keepers of the Oral Law, secretly shared this approach and communicated it by means of midrashim. He saw himself as part of a historical chain of possessors of truth beginning with Abraham and including the prophets and Sages, but interrupted in the Middle Ages and only re-established by Maimonides...”

Thus neither the Midrash nor R. Nissim’s interpretation is really subversive at all, as he continues:

For him (R. Nissim)[19] this does not detract one iota from the truth of Judaism, from the Torah being the Word of G-d, and from the binding nature of all of its commandments...

R. Nissim serves as an example of how far the group of radical rationalists to which he belonged were prepared to go in their reinterpretation[20] of the Torah, while still considering themselves to be loyal rabbinic Jews...

The Torah in all its details is perfect and ‘Divine,’ in R. Nissim’s view, though he does not view G-d as personally and directly communicating every word.”

R. SHMUEL IBN TABBON:

As mentioned, R. Nissim was deeply influenced by the rationalism of Rambam. But he was also influenced by the translator of Rambam’s writings from Arabic to Hebrew, namely, Shmuel Ibn Tabbon (1160-1232) who wasn’t afraid to publicise his own views on this issue:

It is a time to act for the L-rd.[21] 

– I see that the truths that have been hidden from the time of our Prophets and the Sages of the Torah are now all well known to the nations of the world. In most places, they interpret the esoteric doctrines found in the Torah, the words of the Prophets and those who speak with the Holy Spirit, in accordance with these truths.

Our nation is so completely ignorant of them to the point that we have become subject to their scorn as a result of our ignorance.

They shame us by saying that we possess only the shells of the Prophets’ words.”[22]

R. Shmuel Ibn Tabbon was quite militant in issuing his rally cry for the rationalists to unite and speak out before they lose the theological battle to the non-rationalists, and the direction of future Judaism tends more towards the emphasis on the mystical experience.

ANALYSIS:

It is interesting to note that Rabbeinu Nissim of Marseilles was probably more radical in his aversion to the supernatural than Rambam and Ibn Tabbon, yet (unlike the others) he went out of his way on many occasions to have his views downplayed so as not to offend the mainstream. 

He practised a live and let live approach to theology and realized that what he was saying was not for everybody.

Of the two most intelligent people I know, one is a rationalist with a healthy dose of scepticism, and the other is a  scholarly mystic - yet ironically their reaction to this article was not what I expected: The rationalist felt that Rabbeinu Nissim was too clinical because: 'there is a point when even the ultra-rationalist has to concede that it is irrational to explain everything in purely rational terms.


And the mystic confessed that ultra-non-rationalist writers were able to get away with some of their more extreme views with unfair impunity: 'Whereas paperbacks which popularise mystical ideas which saw their progenitors excommunicated and made to leave town, are freely available in orthodox Jewish bookshops - works by serious orthodox writers representing orthodox rationalism cannot be bought under the counter. The strand of Jewish orthodox rationalism - with a demonstrated history of Torah giants behind it - is thus denied.'



For many, Rabbeinu Nissim's views will be offensive at best - for others they may be meaningful and provide a lifeline to a Torah they would otherwise completely reject.

Either way, the classical tensions between the mystics and the rationalists really tested the outward parameters of Jewish theology in all its directions and broadened the playing fields of authentic Judaism. At the end of the day 'radical theological differences could be accepted as long as a Halachic commonality could be found.'

Perhaps all this is just a way of preparing the groundwork for a future era when no Jew will be left behind.






[1] The Medieval Period is also known as the Middle Ages, encompassing the period from the 5th century to the 15th century. We refer here particularly to the period of the Rishonim which spanned 1038-1500.
[2] The Torah Commentary of R. Nissim ben Mosheh of Marseilles: On a Medieval Approach to Torah u-Madda, published in the Torah u-Madda Journal of Yeshiva University10/2001. See also: Some Observations on Ma’aseh Nissim by Howard Kreisel.
[3] Edited by H. Kreisel, Mekeitze Nirdamim, Jerusalem 2000. The work is also sometimes called Sefer  haNissim and Ikkarei haDat.
[4] Parenthesis mine.
[5] Hilchot Teshuva 3:7
[6] Parenthesis mine.
[7] Guide of the Perplexed, 2:25 (Pines translation).
[8] Parenthesis mine
[9] Avodah Zarah 54b.
[10] Teaching Philosophy to the Multitude: An Introduction to the Educational Philosophy of Nissim ben Moshe of Marseilles, by Alan Verskin.
[11] Ma’aseh Nissin Ch 9. 112.
[12] Shemot 22:21
[13] Shemot 22:22
[14] Ma’ase Nissim 116.
[15] Vayikra Rabbah 1:7.
[16] Parenthesis mine.
[17] Parenthesis mine.
[18] Ma’aseh Nissin 178.
[19] Parenthesis mine.
[20] As will become apparent in the next few sentences, rabbis like Shmuel Ibn Tabbon would take issue with the use of the word ‘reinterpretation’ – and would be happier with ‘interpretation’ as they believed this was, in fact, the way the Torah was originally to be understood. It was the ‘traditionalists’ who, in their view, were the ‘re-interpreters’.
[21] Psalms 119:126. This verse was always used whenever the Sages felt compelled to come up with an innovation they believed was urgent for the future continuation of Judaism.
[22] Maamar Yikavu haMayim 173.