561) Maimonidean philosophy as a form of rationalist mysticism?

The Kabbalistic Eitz Chaim as depicted in an early 18th century diagram from the Klau Scrolls Collection showing the complicated mystical path to unio mystica.

Introduction

This article—based extensively on the research by Professor Gideon Freudenthal—explores the possibility of a unio mystica (mystical union) attainable through Maimonidean philosophic and rationalist endeavours. This rationalist unio mystica parallels (and might even surpass) the unio mystica described by the mystics and Kabbalists. If this claim holds, then it is not only the mystics who can, allegedly, experience unio mystica, but also the rationalists. Yet, both states of unio mystica are defined very differently, as one is mystically ecstatic while the other remains purely intellectual. 

Kabbalistic and ecstatic states are often characterised by passive surrender of the mind and intellect, and the loss of self. Maimonides, however, may offer an alternative rationalist unio mystica, which is an active, intense and conscious engagement with the self and the intellect. 

This is quite a technical piece, but it may resonate with those looking for something more than just inspiration and confirmation from their religion. Thinkers and inquirers do not usually go down all that well within established spiritual systems, and are often accused of worshipping the intellect instead of the Deity. What follows is a perspective, based on a reading of Maimonides, that may offer a window into the notion of worship through intellect. Acquisition of knowledge as well as intellectual and empirical pursuits may themselves be vehicles of intense spirituality, creating a unio mystica (or התאחדות in the words of Maimonides, Guide III. 51) with the Divine. This becomes a significant theological counterbalance to the unio mystica, usually considered the unique and exclusive proclivity of the mystics and Kabbalists. 

Classical Greek philosophers

The classical Greek philosophers often claimed that a natural form of ethics and morality came in the wake of their studies. Socrates (470-399 BCE), in his Protagoras (345d), suggests that moral failings stem from ignorance. Plato (c.429–347 BCE) argued in his Republic (VI–VII) that knowledge of the Forms, especially the Form of the Good, leads to just action [see: Kotzk Blog: 527) Neoplatonic echoes in Chassidic Mysticism]. Plato maintained that true philosophers, by apprehending the Good, are uniquely qualified to govern because intellectual vision generally translates into moral virtue. Aristotle (384–322 BCE), in the Nicomachean Ethics (I.7), similarly emphasised that the study of ethics can lead to the cultivation of virtue. 

Maimonides’ emphasis on knowledge over ritual

Maimonides (1138-1204) famously drew on the classical Greek philosophers but seemed to go beyond the typical endpoint of moral virtues. He also advocated the notion that knowledge (sechel) leads to moral and spiritual perfection, and even claimed that such knowledge is all that survives the human after death—however, it is knowledge, rather than ritual, that is the highest virtue. The commandments are simply exercises that prepare the soul to focus on metaphysical truths. The Mitzvot function to reduce bodily distractions so that the intellect can comprehend God. 

In his Guide for the Perplexed (Moreh Nevuchim, III.51)—known as his ‘mystical chapter’—Maimonides describes the highest religious perfection as intellectual apprehension of God. Moral and ritual practices are presented as preparatory training that removes bodily impediments so the intellect can attain this bond with God. Thus, Maimonides goes a step further than the Greek philosophers and proposes that it is knowledge, not moral virtue, that unites the human with the Divine. 

Hermann Cohen and Freudenthal on the nature of unio mystica

It must be noted, however, that scholars are divided over the nature of Maimonides’ unio mystica. According to the German Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), Maimonides remains a pure rationalist and maintains that a human can only come close to the Divine but never achieve an ontological union. [Incidentally, R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik wrote his PhD dissertation on Hermann Cohen, who developed a rigorous Marburg Neo‑Kantian approach that emphasised the role in Judaism of pure thought and ethics rather than metaphysical speculation. See Kotzk Blog: 551) R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik’s adaptation of German Volk elements.] 

On the other hand, Freudenthal argues that Maimonides indeed describes a form of union and philosophical mysticism, in his ‘mystical chapter’ of the Guide III:51. However, it remains a rationalist form of unio mystica. It goes beyond Hermann Cohen’s ‘drawing close’ to God (without the union). Yet even Freudenthal’s  ‘rationalist’ unio mystica is not synonymous with the Kabbalistic and  ‘mystical’ unio mystica, which describes a non-rational ecstasy instead. 

We have thus identified three distinct positions on defining human approaches to the Divine: 1) Herman Cohen’s drawing close, 2) Freudenthal’s ‘rationalist’ unio mystica, and 3)  the general Kabbalistic or ‘mystical’ unio mystica. (Herman Cohen and Freudenthal, as mentioned, present two variant readings of Maimonides). 

Maimonidean ‘mysticism’: The experience is the work of the intellect

In this analysis, reference to Maimonides as a rationalist (or even as a rationalist mystic) is primarily focused on his rationalist and philosophical writings and not on his mainstream Halachic works like Mishnah Torah. It should be noted, however, that certain mystics, like Abulafia, regarded Maimonides’ philosophical works as profoundly mystical. Some even considered Maimonides to have been a secret mystic [see: Kotzk Blog: 071) Mysterious 'Secret Document' Attesting That Rambam Was A Mystic:]. Others suggest that Maimonides even made use of Sufi language to convey his views of religious experiences (Blumenthal 1987:27). Freudenthal, however, adopts a different stance. He firmly insists on a rationalist Maimonides throughout, even in his presumed ‘mystical’ moments: 

“If there is mysticism in the Guide, it is intellectual, in other words, tightly connected to intellectual activity. Mysticism here is not an alternative to reason, nor does it come after reason, which prepared for it. Rather, such mysticism is the culmination of metaphysical apprehension. When Maimonides speaks of the bond between man and God, he speaks of the intellect” (Freudenthal 2009:117). 

Maimonides writes: 

“If…you have apprehended God…in accordance with what is required by the intellect, you should…endeavor to come closer to Him, and strengthen the bond between you and Him—that is, the intellect” (Guide III. 51 [Pines, 620]). 

This bond (דבוק)—acquired through knowledge—becomes the union (התאחדות) with, and connection to, God. Freudenthal acknowledges that introducing mystically nuanced language to Maimonidean ideology is fraught: 

“The presupposition that mysticism is opposed to rationality often underlies the difficulty in accepting Maimonides as a mystic” (Freudenthal 2009:116). 

However, this Maimonidean unio mystica that Fruedenthal refers to is: 

“not a vision, nor is it beyond the reach of the intellect. On the contrary, the experience is the work of the intellect” (Freudenthal 2009:116, emphasis mine). 

Any form of rationalist or philosophical mysticism should satisfy two criteria: 

“First, the experience itself should involve philosophical content. Second, philosophy should be able to account for the experience” (Freudenthal 2009:116).  

In this sense, Freudenthal’s understanding of Maimonides’ intellectual mysticism may also be described as epistemological (or relating to the study of knowledge). Maimonides’ ‘mystical’ passages are intelligible as the endpoint of a demonstrable epistemology rather than as an inexplicable ecstatic break with reason. 

According to Professor David Blumenthal, this application of reason in worship of the Divine sees God’s wisdom in the study of  “all of reality”: 

“[Maimonides] associates worship with ahavah, the intellectual love of God that occurs when one perceives ‘all of reality as it really is…contemplating His wisdom in it’” (Blumenthal [citing the Guide] 1987:27). 

Freudenthal’s argument for a rationalist Maimonidean spirituality

If I understand Freudenthal correctly, his reading of Maimonides suggests a rationalist form of unio mystica:

“Philosophy is also a mode of worship leading toward mystical union” (Freudenthal 2009:113, emphasis mine). 

This allows the student of Maimonidean rationalism to experience a deep spiritual connection with God, through knowledge and rationalism, which precludes such studies from being wrongfully (although popularly) classified as secular, at best, or heretical, at worst. This way, Freudenthal reads Maimonides as espousing a rationalist, intellectual form of unio mystica—a philosophical mysticism in which rationalist cognition yields a genuine spiritual bond with God. This rationalist cognition involves the threefold unity of knower, knowledge, and known (discussed immediately below): 

Threefold unity of knower, knowledge, and known

Maimonides presents his view that the intellect serves as the bond (דבוק) between humans and God (Guide 1.68). This bond is not emotively experiential or ecstatic but “purely intellectual,” and  Maimonides’ ‘mysticism’ is “thoroughly rational” (Freudenthal 2009:117). Herman Cohen, of course, would argue that “rationalism excludes mysticism by definition” (Freudenthal 2009:117). 

Maimonides describes his theory of the threefold unity of knower, knowledge, and known as so fundamental to this thought because it is the “foundation of our Law” (Guide 1.68 [Pines 163]). The first chapter of Maimonides’ Guide comments on the first chapter of Genesis: “Let us make man in our image” (Genesis 1:26). Maimonides interprets this likeness, or common denominator, as referring to “intellectual apprehension.” The intellect serves as a bonding mechanism, as it is common to both humans and God. “The intellect is the bond between man and God” (Freudenthal 2009:123). Maimonides warns that intellectual apprehension must not be confused with perception or imagination. 

In any intellectual endeavour, the comprehending person becomes the knower who uses knowledge and thereby understands the known. The known is the object of cognition. At the highest level of thinking, these three components are not separate, but united. In their highest manifestation, when God is drawn into the category of the known, then—at that moment of understanding—an intellectual unio mystica can occur. 

“[T]he threefold unity of the intellect is best attained when a person exclusively cognizes nonphysical objects, especially God. For, being incorporeal, God is identical with His essence” (Freudenthal 2009:120). 

Maimonides further warns that knowledge of God is limited because the only way God can be understood is via negative theology (or apophaticism, which describes what God is not), and he resists any claim that God can be exhaustively comprehended. Freudenthal emphasises that the Maimonidean unio mystica is an epistemic (intellectual and intelligible) event rather than an ontological absorption as would be perceived through the experience of a mystic. 

The distinction between rationalist and mystical forms of unio mystica

The Maimonidean concept of an intellectual unio mystica is not an alleged journey into another world but a product of the intellect: 

“The intellect is not a substance. When an intellect is not intellecting, it does not exist. When a human being is not cognizing he has a soul but not an intellect…[Furthermore], [t]he ‘I’ that unites with the object known is not a body or soul, but the subject of the activity called knowledge—the intellect” (Freudenthal 2009:118). 

This stands in sharp contradistinction to mystical and ontological accounts of unio mystica, which depict visionary ascent and rapturous union, often described as the soul (and sometimes even the “I” of the body) being carried into heaven. Maimonides (as read by Freudenthal), instead, describes an epistemological and intellectual unio mystica rather than a soul or spiritual event. 

In the Maimonidean context: 

“It is crucial to remember that the unity established is not between a human and a sensory spatio-temporal object. Human beings do not become the objects they know. The threefold unity applies only to the intellect and the essence or form of its object” (Freudenthal, 2009:119). 

Analysis

Despite the theoretical differences between mystical and cognitive forms of unio mystica, or ‘union’ with the Divine, the interesting—albeit counterintuitive—point seems to be that intellectual pursuits can carry with them an intense form of ‘mysticism,’ analogous to, and perhaps even exceeding, the unio mystica claimed by the mystic. This is something that those consumed with an insatiable yearning for knowledge often attest to. It seems that Maimonides is confirming this intuition and attestation as התאחדות and endorsing this as a rationalist state of unio mystica.

 

Bibliography

Blumenthal, D.R., 1887, On Being a Rationalist and a Mystic, Voice of Tradition, ATLAS, 25-28.

Gideon Freudenthal, G., 2009, ‘The Philosophical Mysticism of Maimonides and Maimon’, in Maimonides and His Heritage, Edited by Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, et al., State University of New York Press, Albany, 113-152.

560) What Can We Learn From the Writing Style of Kabbalistic Source Books?

This is another guest post by Rabbi Boruch Clinton, and originally appeared on his B'chol D'rachecha site.

(I asked Rabbi Clinton to share his fascinating and original thoughts on the stylistic underpinnings of our mystical texts, not only because so much of his writing resonates with me, but also because I have never before seen a theory of mysticism expressed in such a forthright manner - Gavin Michal)

Many years ago, a Torah scholar speaking at a public gathering I attended said some strange things. Everything sounded fine until you spent a moment thinking about it. As an example, he insisted that “Rabbi S.R. Hirsch and the Baal Hatanya translated the word הלל identically.”

Now that’s simply untrue. R’ Hirsch’s translation of הלל is on the record and it bears no resemblance to the translation reported in the speech.1 It’s not as though there are any political points to be made here one way or the other, it’s just incorrect. I said nothing at the time, but I quietly wondered why that rabbi would have said such nonsense.

559) The murder of Rabbi Avraham Kohn: A contested history

R. Avraham Kohn 1807-1848

Introduction

This article examines the contested history surrounding the murder of R. Avraham Kohn on September 6, 1848. He was a student of the Chief Rabbi of Prague, Shmuel Landau, who ordained him in 1831. He was also a graduate of Charles University of Prague. R. Kohn, himself,  later became the Chief Rabbi of Lemberg (Lviv). 

The story

Jewish Encyclopedia

According to the Jewish Encyclopedia, we are left with more questions than answers concerning the murder of R. Kohn: 

“[W]hile the better element [of Jewish society] rallied about him, the enemies of culture and progress [i.e. the radical Orthodox] were actively engaged in embittering his life and in undermining his growing popularity. Impelled by unbounded fanaticism, and encouraged by the lawless conditions [during the civil unrest] prevailing in 1848, they finally concocted a plan to take Kohn's life. On Sept. 6, 1848, a man, hired by the fanatical clique, entered Kohn's kitchen and poisoned the dinner. While the other members of his family recovered, Kohn and his youngest child died the following day. A wearisome trial ensued; but for some unknown reasons it was suppressed” (Jewish Encyclopedia 1906:534). 

558) The Temple Mount in Religious Zionism: Yesterday’s radicals - today’s moderates?

Hishtachavaya (full body prostration) on the Temple Mount. Just three years ago, this act would have led to immediate ejection.  

Introduction

This article—based extensively on the research by Professor Isaac Hershkowitz—examines the transformation of the Temple Mount from a previously marginal symbol to a current central component of Religious Zionism. 

Until about two decades ago, the need to ascend the Temple Mount was not a primary concern for Religious Zionism. Today, however, it shapes the contemporary political, theological and messianic discourse (Hershkowitz 2026:2). With the demographic rise in the religious sector in general, and the Religious Zionist sector in particular, the question of the Temple Mount is likely to assume an increasingly prominent role in all future Israeli narratives. 

557) The Roaring Lion returns: A contemporary polemic against Jewish mysticism

The Roaring Lion by R. Leon of Modena

Note: This article examines Jewish mysticism and Kabbalah from a historical, psychological and analytical perspective. If you prefer not to read such treatments of mysticism, you may wish to skip this piece. 

Introduction

This article—based extensively on the research by Lippman Bodoff—examines the highly contested roots of Medieval Jewish mysticism. I started writing this article twice and then stopped. This was because I know that some of the ideas expressed in it will be challenging to some, particularly in an era where mysticism has become mainstream Judaism. For many (including myself from the early age of thirteen), mysticism, specifically in the incarnation of modern Chassidism, had been the portal through which we returned to Torah Judaism. 

556) The Babylonian Talmud in its original Persian-Iranian context

Introduction

This article—based extensively on the research by Professor Shai Secunda—explores aspects of the cultural, legal and spiritual background to the Babylonian Talmud. The title of this Talmudic corpus, ‘Babylonian Talmud’ is in itself interesting because it was not produced in Babylonia as many assume, but rather in Sasanian Persia (modern-day Iran). The Babylonian Talmud, or Talmud Bavli, is most often studied in yeshivot, where the cultural context of this foundational work of Jewish literature is usually overlooked. In yeshiva environments, the importance and extraordinary authority of the Babylonian Talmud is frequently regarded as Divine and sometimes accorded a status equal to or above the Torah itself (Secunda 2018: at 2 min). 

555) Resisting the friendship impulse: Relationships in the teachings of Ishbitz

Introduction

This article—based extensively on the research by Professor Israel Koren—explores a most unusual approach to sociability, friendship and family, in the teachings R. Mordechai Yosef Leiner of Izbica (Ishbitz) (1800-1854). He dramatically broke away from the warm, traditional Chassidic conception of interpersonal relationships, which had previously been regarded positively as both reflective of, and parallel to, union with the Divine. Instead, he promoted a decidedly anti-social stance where sociability was scorned. Today, the Ishbitzer’s work, Mei haShiloach, is very popular. However, R. Mordechai’s striking ambivalence toward human friendship and companionship goes mostly unnoticed. Koren’s study of the Isbitzer’s distinct asociality contributes to a fuller understanding of the writings of Ishbitz. 

554) Rabbinic perspectives on honour killings

The Bat Rabim collection of manuscripts in the Russian State Library.

Introduction

This article—based extensively on the research by Dr Moti Benmelech—examines rabbinic perspectives on honour killings. It traces the fraught process by which some rabbis tried to reconcile local honour codes with Jewish law and practice, while others resisted and pushed back to deliberately limit its reach to uphold Jewish legal and moral standards. 

Honour Killings

An honour killing, or shame killing, typically refers to the murder of a female family member by a male relative, who believes she has behaved immorally, committed adultery, or otherwise brought shame upon the family. Such killings are intended to preserve or restore the family’s perceived honour and reputation. The phenomenon persists to this day, and according to the UN, five thousand girls and women are killed each year in honour‑related violence. 

553) The forgotten legacy of Philo of Alexandria

 Introduction

This article—based extensively on the research by Rabbi Dovid Campbell—examines the often-overlooked intellectual legacy and deep influence of Philo Judaeus of Alexandria (20 BCE-50 CE) on later Jewish thought. Philo, a leader of “the largest Jewish community of the first century,” may have been “one of history’s most influential Jews”. He laid solid foundations for “the entire stream of Western philosophy, including its religious and distinctively Jewish branches” (Campbell 2024:42). Essentially, Philo was an early, if not the first, thinker to understand the Torah as speaking the language of philosophy behind the plain meaning of its text. For Philo, Torah was philosophy. At this stage in Jewish history, Torah meant Tanach or Bible, because the rabbinic or Talmudic period was just beginning. Philo introduced numerous philosophical ideas into Judaism that changed its shape forever, but the man behind these contributions was lost to Jewish history. Today, we only know about Philo because other religious traditions preserved his work. In fact, many of his forgotten contributions have unknowingly become part of the very fabric of contemporary Orthodox Judaism, to the extent that those who disregard them would—to this day—almost certainly be considered as espousing heretical views. Campbell’s groundbreaking research expounds on this peculiar irony. 

552) The added blessing in the Amidah: Who are we cursing?

 

Kefar Sachnin in Galilee

Introduction:

This article—based extensively on the research by Professor R. Reuven Kimelman[1]—examines the twelfth of the eighteen (today nineteen) blessings of the Amidah, in an attempt to establish just who it is referring to. The nature of the ‘blessing’ is more of a curse and a petition for this community (or these communities) to “instantly perish.” The text of this prayer—which is today known as Bircat haMinim (Blessing denouncing the Heretics)—becomes a fascinating window into Jewish perceptions of the need to exclude the ‘other’ during the first century CE. The question is: who is this unnamed ‘other’ (or ‘others’)? 

551) R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik’s adaptation of German Volk elements.

R. Yosef Ber Soloveitchik in 1944

Introduction

This article—based extensively on the research by Professor Daniel Herskowitz[1]—examines how certain elements of Germanic Volkish (volk = folk) thought, circulating in interwar Germany, are evident in the writings of R. Yosef Ber Soloveitchik, also known as the Rav (1903-1993). Volkism was a folk, cultural, and ideological movement which began in Germany in the late 19th century. R. Soloveitchik studied cultural themes that also appeared in Volkish and later National Socialist discourse, but R. Soloveitchik’s use was philosophical, not political. To be clear, although R. Soloveitchik adopted Volkish thought, he severely criticised it when it became politicised, adopted and weaponised by the Nazi party in Germany in the 1930s. Nevertheless, Volkism did indeed become the basis of the National Socialist movement in Germany. 

550) Likutei Halachot: Reinterpreting Halacha as a means to connect with the Tzadik

My copy of Likutei Halachot by R. Natan Sternhartz

Introduction

This article—drawing extensively on the research by Dr Leore Sachs-Shmueli[1]—examines the nineteenth-century Chassidic work, Likutei Halachot, by R. Natan Sternhartz of Nemirov (1780-1844). R. Natan worked on his manuscript of Likutei Halachot for forty years, from 1806 to two days before his passing in 1844. His autograph (i.e., original) manuscript is housed in the  National Library of Israel. This work by R. Natan, the foremost student of R. Nachman of Breslov (1772-1810), essentially redefines Halachic practice as a mnemonic (memory system) and theurgic (spiritually manipulative) means of connecting with the Tzadik, R. Nachman of Breslov (or more accurately Bratslav).