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Hishtachavaya (full body prostration) on the Temple Mount. Just three years ago, this act would have led to immediate
ejection.
Introduction
This article—based extensively on the research by Professor Isaac Hershkowitz—examines the transformation of the Temple Mount from a previously marginal symbol to a current central component of Religious Zionism.
Until about two decades ago, the need to ascend the Temple Mount was not a primary concern for Religious Zionism. Today, however, it shapes the contemporary political, theological and messianic discourse (Hershkowitz 2026:2). With the demographic rise in the religious sector in general, and the Religious Zionist sector in particular, the question of the Temple Mount is likely to assume an increasingly prominent role in all future Israeli narratives.
Until the Six-Day War in 1967, the Temple Mount—while central to Jewish historical memory and messianic expectation—played little role in mainstream secular Israeli politics or in the evolving theology of Religious Zionism. By contrast, it was the Western Wall—not the Temple Mount—that commanded most political and religious attention (Hershkowitz 2026:2). This all changed after the Six-Day War, when the Western Wall began to be viewed as a marker of exile and the past, while the Temple Mount became the focus of redemption and the future [see: Kotzk Blog: 507) The rise of contemporary Religious-Zionism].
Trajectory of transformation
British Mandate: 1920-1948
During the period of the British Mandate, Jewish attitudes toward the Temple Mount:
“blended profound historical reverence with pragmatic restraint amid political realities and intercommunal tensions. Broadly, the longing for the Temple Mount during this period lacked a robust territorial dimension…” (Hershkowitz 2026:3).
During this period, the Western Wall was the nearest and
most practically accessible remnant of the Temple. It aligned with the
prevailing attitude to prioritise “coexistence over territorial claims”
(Hershkowitz 2026:3). This perspective was also the position of Rav Kook, Chief
Rabbi of Palestine, and is important because it shows how early Religious
Zionism, even in its messianic currents, did not initially push for
direct engagement with the Temple Mount.
Jordanian Control: 1948-1967
Between 1948 and 1967, the Temple Mount was under Jordanian control and remained inaccessible to Jews during this period. In fact, throughout this period, there was a deliberate policy of refraining from asserting claims over holy sites in the land as a whole, “favouring stability over territorial or militaristic pursuits” (Hershkowitz 2026:3).
After the 1967 Six-Day War
After the capture of the Temple Mount in 1967, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan advocated for Jewish access and limited Muslim autonomy over all sacred sites. The era of pragmatic restraint that had characterised previous times had come to a close, and an era of renewed (secular and religious) messianism had taken hold:
“Nevertheless, it would be
accurate to assert that even among those gripped by a messianic fervor
immediately following the war, the broader expanses of the land captivated
their imagination far more, relegating the Temple Mount to a relatively minor
achievement of the conflict” (Hershkowitz 2026:4).
During the post-1967 period, the emphasis was placed more on expanding territorial control than on the Temple Mount itself. This was largely driven by an:
“affirmation of the messianic value of the current era, [which] gave rise to an existential need to expand the boundaries of settlement” (Hershkowitz 2026:6).
Even Religious Zionist factions “sidelined the Temple Mount” as Gush Emunim began settlement of Judea and Samaria, “neglecting the Mount’s status” (Hershkowitz 2026:5). The Western Wall, however, emerged as a significant new national and religious symbol, with greater energy devoted to its development than to securing access to the Temple Mount:
“[T]he Temple Mount was ceded to
the Muslim Waqf with minimal public resistance, underscoring its secondary role
at the time” (Hershkowitz 2026:4).
The Waqf is the Islamic trust that administers and oversees the Temple Mount (known in Arabic as Haram al-Sharif). Since 1187, when Saladin placed the site under Islamic custodianship, the Waqf has been responsible for managing religious affairs there.
In the meantime, the Western Wall’s significance became even more dominant. In 2000, the Camp David Summit proposed a “vertical division” of the Temple Mount. This amounted to Palestinian control over the upper area, including the Al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, while a special status was granted to the subterranean areas which included possible Temple remnants. Camp David marked the beginning of a renewed interest in Jewish engagement with the Temple Mount (Hershkowitz 2026:5).
From 2000 onwards
From around 2000 onwards, various rabbis within the Religious Zionist movement began awakening an engagement with the Temple Mount which had remained relatively dormant until then:
“The Settlements’ Rabbis’ Council, shedding mid-90s restraint, endorsed ascent, with luminaries like Rabbi Dov Lior, Rabbi Elyakim Levanon, and Rabbi Haim Druckman, disciples of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, leading students atop the Mount” (Hershkowitz 2026:6).
Today, it is evident that the renewed interest in, and
practice of, ascending the Temple Mount—beginning from around 2000—has
become mainstream and widespread. Hershkowitz now addresses the question of
whether or not this popular turn to the Temple Mount was fueled by
fundamentalist or moderate elements.
A non-extremist approach
At this juncture, Hershkowitz’s research takes an intriguing—if somewhat counterintuitive—turn. He argues that the post‑2000 surge of interest in the Temple Mount, though undeniably messianic, did not represent a fundamentalist or extremist development:
“As crises beset the settlement movement, the original messianic trend to return to the Temple Mount gradually strengthened, even among elements within Religious Zionism not perceived as fundamentalist… even among significant factions within Religious Zionism that positively regard liberal and democratic values” (Hershkowitz 2006:6).
In 2003, the Tzomet Institute published the anthology Kumu veNa’aleh (Arise and Ascend), edited by R. Yisrael Rosen, which, by “leveraging meticulous scholarship to crack the blanket prohibition” (Hershkowitz 2026:6), declared it Halachically permissible to ascend the Temple Mount. Rabbis from various affiliations joined together, and half of Israel’s Hesder Yeshivot and some important High Schools regularly visit the Temple Mount. These visits are not framed as rebellion, but as mainstream piety:
“Moderate rabbis from Har Etzion Yeshiva, like Rabbi Yuval Sherlow and Rabbi Yaakov Medan, joined hardline voices like Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, forging a coalition spanning Religious Zionism’s spectrum” (Hershkowitz 2026:6).
It should be noted that a significant segment of the Orthodox and ultra‑Orthodox community maintain an absolute ban and Halachic prohibition on ascending the Temple Mount.
On an interesting aside:
“[T]he current lack of practical engagement with sacrificial rites facilitates an esthetically appealing and digestible ‘marketing’ of the longing for the Temple site, sidestepping controversies over aspects of divine service at the Temple that might be perceived as archaic” (Hershkowitz 2026:7).
The following graph depicts the tenfold rise in numbers of
visitors to the Temple Mount over the past fifteen years. The average age of
these ascenders is younger than the demographic average in Israel. This
indicates a profound and dramatic shift in contemporary Religious Zionist
discourse:
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Ascension to the Temple Mount has now become non-radical, mainstream and normative:
“This trend aligns seamlessly with an ideological need interwoven with the theological fabric that has characterized Religious Zionism nearly since its inception. An active ethos of terrestrial efforts to advance redemptive processes, combined with the establishment of an acceptable goal (institutionalizing the right to pray and a place of prayer on the Mount)… [This] explains why the ascent to the Temple Mount and the political and religious struggle for Jewish sovereignty and prayer rights upon it are likely to constitute one of the central objectives facing Religious Zionism in the coming decades” (Hershkowitz 2026:10).
Conclusion
We have observed a distinct transformation of the Temple Mount, “from a marginal symbol to a central component of Religious Zionism’s contemporary identity” (Hershkowitz 2026:1). These findings—based on historical analysis, ideological discourse, rabbinic rulings, and empirical data—indicate that this development does not represent a radical trend by radicalised individuals. Rather, they appear to be driven predominantly by moderate players whose views have become institutionalised and normalised within mainstream contemporary Religious Zionist circles.
This changes the perceptions noted by previous scholarship
that the driving force behind this shift and transformation of Temple Mount
activism emerged from extremist, radical and subversive groups like the
followers of R. Meir Kahane and others. These radicalised groups may indeed
have been active in the initial stages of this phenomenon, but no longer
represent its current trajectory” (Hershkowitz 2026:2).
At first glance, if I understand Hershkowitz correctly, his position seems not one of outright advocacy or opposition, but rather a balanced sociological, theological and historical analysis of the normalisation of Temple Mount ascents within mainstream Religious Zionism. On this reading, his examination is descriptive, not prescriptive or evaluative.
On the other hand—and I may be completely wrong—there may be another way of reading him. Hershkowitz (2026:1) does write that he “traces the gradual erosion of that [earlier] restraint” (emphasis mine) against engagement with the Temple Mount. This phrasing, perhaps, leaves room for interpretation because some readers may view the mainstreaming of formerly radical ideas as cause for concern.
Hershkowitz also offers a projection about Religious Zionism’s present identity and likely future priorities, and by highlighting the move from fringe to core, alludes to possible consequences and implications. The data shows evidence of significant and measurable change, and by emphasising the institutionalisation and normalisation of this change, he may be suggesting strategic (and achievable) intent.
On the shifting definition of ‘moderate,’ consider the following example: In 2009, during Pope Benedict’s visit to Israel, R. Yisrael Rosen (1941-2017) publicly commented on the event. Rosen was then head of the Tzomet Institute (the moderate body, mentioned earlier, that had issued Halachic guidance allowing ascent to the Temple Mount). He told the Pope rather bluntly that Jesus was a false messiah who deserved to die, but Catholics could still help Israel to fight a war against fundamentalist Islam.
At the same time, Chief Rabbi Yisrael Meir Lau, although clearly supportive of the state, identifies more as ultra-Orthodox—and presumably ‘less moderate’—adopted a very different approach:
“Jewish people are scattered all over the globe…[T]he Catholic Church has a large amount of influence…[Therefore] I, as a rabbinic figure…foster good relations with the Catholic Church… at least, by being involved in dialogues with other religions, I know I am doing what I can."[1]
So, who exactly (and how moderate) are the contemporary
mainstream moderate players whose views have now become institutionalised
and normalised?
Bibliography
Hershkowitz, I., 2026, ‘From Fringe to Core: The Temple Mount in Religious
Zionism's Evolving Identity’, Modern Judaism - A Journal of
Jewish Ideas and Experience, Vol. 46, no. 1, 1–19.
[1]
Online source: https://www.jpost.com/features/front-lines/article-142349.
Retrieved 18 June 2026.









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