497) Language as incubators of theological ideas

 

Introduction

This article – based extensively on the research by Professor Edward Ullendorff (1920-2011) – examines languages as distinct incubators of theological ideas. In other words, we are going to see to what extent “different languages reflect different realities” (Ullendorff 1966:273) which, in turn, reflect different theologies; and how translations, in this case from the Hebrew of the Torah into English, can project different meanings from those of the original language. I then take this a step further and propose that sometimes the reflected theologies can impose themselves back onto the original source language, creating a double distortion. 

The Hebrew language

Hebrew, like other Semitic languages like Arabic, Aramaic, Ethiopic and Syriac, are not dramatically different from the Indo-European languages. Yet still, there remain vast and fundamental discrepancies in the language, meanings of words, as well as in modes of thought: 

“[F]ar too little attention has been given to those distinctions, and…the Hebrew Bible has far too often been rendered into a Western setting which has little or nothing in common with its own world of categories. We usually seek to understand the Hebrew Bible in terms of our own modes of thinking instead of allowing its categories, strange, different, absurd, incomprehensible as they may well on occasion seem, to come to us” (Ullendorff 1966: 275). 

Ullendorff, thus, suggests that instead of engaging in exegesis (where one “reads out” of, and interprets the Torah to try to understand it) − we instead engage in eisegesis (where one seeks to subjectively “read in” to, and try to make the Torah agree with us and our Western worldview). 

We shall now proceed to look at some examples of how some difficult Torah concepts are sometimes misunderstood and incorrectly interpreted due to a Western (even a Christian) theological bias. 

1) וְאָֽהַבְתָּ֥ לְרֵעֲךָ֖ כָּמ֑וֹךָ (veahavta lereiacha kamocha) means “Love your neighbour as yourself”

The various translations of this Hebrew phrase carry very different meanings. The Septuagint, or Greek translation of the Torah, also known as LXX, translates   וְאָֽהַבְתָּ֥ לְרֵעֲךָ֖ כָּמ֑וֹךָ (Leviticus 19:18) as the Greek equivalent of “Love your neighbour as yourself, καὶ ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν.” This seems to have filtered down into the English translation which has ever since remained the standard and common formulation of “Love thy neighbour as thyself.” This translation is also reflected in the New Testament (Matthew 22:39) with “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” A similar translation is also reflected in the Stone Edition of the ArtScroll Chumash with “[Y]ou shall love your fellow as yourself.” In the same manner, the Syriac translation has כנפשך, which also means "as yourself." 

The Aramaic biblical translation known as Targum Onkelos, however, gives the most accurate translation of this verse with “וּתְרַחֵם לְחַבְרָךְ כְּוָתָךְ, “love your fellow because he is like you.” In other words, the reason why we must love our neighbour is simply because he is just like you, כְּוָתָךְ, a human being, also created in G-d’s image. There is no commandment to love your neighbour the same way as you love yourself. That is not practically possible. 

That כָּמ֑וֹךָ means because he is like you, and not as you love yourself, can be seen in other instances where the Torah uses כָּמ֑וֹךָ, as in “מִֽי־כָמֹ֤כָה בָּֽאֵלִם֙, Who is like you among the gods?” (Exodus 15:11). Here, כָמֹ֤כָה clearly means “like you.” 

In the same chapter 19 of Leviticus, in verse 34, we find another occurrence of  וְאָהַבְתָּ֥ לוֹ֙ כָּמ֔וֹךָ. This is in reference to the “strangers who reside with you shall be to you as your citizens; you shall love each one כָּמ֔וֹךָ.” Again, כָּמ֔וֹךָ is popularly translated as “(You shall love him) as yourself.” And again, the Targum Onkelos goes against the other translations that use “as yourself,” and instead uses וּתְרַחֵם לֵיהּ כְּוָתָךְ, because he is just like you, כְּוָתָךְ, a human being. In this case, the verse is talking about a convert who has to be loved, not as yourself but because he is just like you (in this case just like a Jew). But there is no command to love another (even a convert) “as you love yourself.” 

Further support in favour of the Onkelos translation may be found in the sentence structure of our two base verses. Usually the word “וְאָֽהַבְתָּ֥, you shall love" is followed by “את” introducing the person or the object to be loved, such as “ואהבת את ה׳ אלקיך, And you shall love G-d.” It is only in our two verses in Leviticus, however, that we find “וְאָֽהַבְתָּ֥ לְ.” The Hebrew letter, Lamed, introducing an indirect object, implies a weaker, although still respectful form of love, again emphasising that there is no obligation to love another the same way as one loves oneself. 

This point is made by Ramban (Nachmanides) in his commentary on Leviticus 19:18:

וְטַעַם וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ הַפְלָגָה, כִּי לֹא יְקַבֵּל לֵב הָאָדָם שֶׁיֶּאֱהֹב אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ כְּאַהֲבָתוֹ אֶת נַפְשׁוֹ. וְעוֹד שֶׁכְּבָר בָּא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְלִמֵּד, חַיֶּיךָ קוֹדְמִין לְחַיֵּי חֲבֵרְךָ (ב"ם סב). אֶלָּא מִצְוַת הַתּוֹרָה שֶׁיֹּאהַב חֲבֵרוֹ בְּכָל עִנְיָן כַּאֲשֶׁר יֹאהַב אֶת נַפְשׁוֹ בְּכָל הַטּוֹב. וְיִתָּכֵן בַּעֲבוּר שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר "וְאָהַבְתָּ אֶת רֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ" וְהִשְׁוָה אוֹתָם בְּמִלַּת "לְרֵעֲךָ", וְכֵן "וְאָהַבְתָּ לוֹ כָּמוֹךָ" (ויקרא י"ט:ל"ד) דְּגֵר, שֶׁיִּהְיֶה פֵּרוּשׁוֹ לְהַשְׁווֹת אַהֲבַת שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּדַעְתּוֹ

 “This is an expression by way of overstatement, for a human heart is not able to accept a command to love one’s neighbour as oneself. Moreover, Rabbi Akiba has already come and taught, ‘Your life takes precedence over the life of your fellow-being.’ Rather, the commandment of the Torah means that one is to love one’s fellow-being in all matters, as one loves all good for oneself. It is possible that since it does not say ‘and thou shalt love ‘eth rei’acha’ as thyself,’ but instead it likened them in the word ‘l’rei’acha’ [which literally means ‘to’ thy neighbour], and similarly it states with reference to a proselyte, and thou shalt love ‘lo’ (him) [but literally: ‘to’ him] as thyself, that the meaning thereof is to equate the love of both [himself and his neighbour, or himself and the proselyte] in his mind” (Ramban, Torah commentary, Leviticus 19:18).[1] 

Nachmanides endorses the idea that it is impossible to love another as you love yourself, and that what is meant by this verse is simply to treat the ‘other,’ in one’s mind, as a fellow human. Thus, the standard English translation of וְאָֽהַבְתָּ֥ לְרֵעֲךָ֖ כָּמ֑וֹךָ as “Love your neighbour as yourself,” is not accurate (and may even be prohibited according to R. Akiva). 

2) התפלל (Hitpalel) means “to pray”

The word התפלל is often translated as “to pray.” But the Torah does not use the word התפלל in a context remotely similar to the way we understand prayer today. The English word prayer is used to refer to a personal or communal usually intense and thoughtful form of meditation or entreaty to a Higher Being. The Torah, however, does not understand התפלל (hitpalel) as a mystical communication with G-d. 

The word hitpalel, like its Arabic counterpart falla, actually means to “cut oneself” or “to make incisions.” In its original setting, the word hitpalel means: 

“to inflict pain upon oneself with the object of swaying the divine power to grant one’s request...” (Ullendorff 1966: 279). 

Ullendorff suggests rather dramatically that the Tefillin (related to tefilla and hitpalel): 

“serve as substitutes for the sacred marks cut in the flesh of the arm” (Ullendorff 1966: 279). 

I have never come across such a view before, but in any case, certainly during biblical times, the early prayers were not the meditative experiences as we understand them today. Originally, prayers were intrinsically bound up with a belief in the bargaining spirit of personal suffering or offering something of one’s value to the deity. 

After the flood, Noah built an altar “and offered burned offerings” (Genesis 8:20). Tefillah (prayer) in Aramaic is צלא (tzela) which like the Hebrew word צלי (tzli) means “to roast.” In the Aramaic Kaddish Shalem we still recite the words תִּתְקַבַּל צְלוֹתְהוֹן (tzlotehon) which means “accept our prayers/burned offerings.” After Noah offered his burned offerings we read that “the L-rd said in his heart: I will not again curse the ground any more” (Genesis 8: 21). This early “prayer” was not a soft meditation but an exchange of favours and a hard form of bargaining between humans and the deity. 

Hanna also made a deal with G-d: “If you will give to your handmaid a man child, then I will give him to the L-rd all the days of his life” (Samuel 1:10).  There are other forms of prayer also mentioned in the Torah but the general understanding of prayer was one of striking a deal with the deity. It is interesting to note that even the early synagogue was not called a 'בית תפילה or House of Prayer' but a 'בית הכנסת or House of Gathering.'

It is interesting to note that Isaiah actually references the Temple, which is a place of sacrifices, as a 'בית תפילה or House of Tefillah', indicating that tefillah was understood more in the sense of sacrifices and burnt offerings than prayers:

וַהֲבִיאוֹתִ֞ים אֶל־הַ֣ר קׇדְשִׁ֗י וְשִׂמַּחְתִּים֙ בְּבֵ֣ית תְּפִלָּתִ֔י עוֹלֹתֵיהֶ֧ם וְזִבְחֵיהֶ֛ם לְרָצ֖וֹן עַֽל־מִזְבְּחִ֑י כִּ֣י בֵיתִ֔י בֵּית־תְּפִלָּ֥ה יִקָּרֵ֖א לְכׇל־הָעַמִּֽים׃

"I will bring them to My sacred mount and let them rejoice in My house of prayer. Their burnt offerings and sacrifices shall be welcome on My altar; For My House shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples" (Isaiah 56:7).

Our current understanding of the word hitpalel and tefillah as prayer, has come a long way from how it was originally construed in the Torah. Time and context would thus determine the correct translation of the Hebrew word hitpalel into English. 

3) שטן (Satan) means “the Devil”

The word שטן (Satan) is depicted in various ways in the Torah, but none of them come close to the way it was understood in post-biblical Jewish and non-Jewish literature. In the Torah, Satan is not described as a ‘Devil’ or an evil spirit at all. Satan is sometimes depicted as a human adversary as in: 

וַיָּ֨קֶם יְהֹוָ֤ה שָׂטָן֙ לִשְׁלֹמֹ֔ה אֵ֖ת הֲדַ֣ד הָאֲדֹמִ֑י

“So God raised up an adversary against Solomon, the Edomite Hadad, who was of the royal family of Edom” (I Kings 11:14). 

Because Solomon had so many wives, his heart was not concentrated on spiritual matters and G-d had therefore decided to raise a human adversary (Satan) against him. 

Similarly, the Book of Samuel describes a human enemy as Satan: 

וְלֹא־יֵרֵ֤ד עִמָּ֙נוּ֙ בַּמִּלְחָמָ֔ה וְלֹא־יִֽהְיֶה־לָּ֥נוּ לְשָׂטָ֖ן בַּמִּלְחָמָ֑ה

“He shall not march down with us to the battle, or else he may become our adversary in battle” (I Samuel 29:4). 

Sometimes Satan is described as an angel of G-d who, as an adversary, blocked the way in the case of Bilaam’s donkey: 

וַיִּתְיַצֵּ֞ב מַלְאַ֧ךְ יְהֹוָ֛ה בַּדֶּ֖רֶךְ לְשָׂטָ֣ן ל֑וֹ 

In the Book of Job (Ch 1), Satan is depicted as one of the בני האלקים, sons or servants of G-d. 

In Zecharia, however, Satan is described as an “accuser” and a counterpart to the angel of G-d: 

וַיַּרְאֵ֗נִי אֶת־יְהוֹשֻׁ֙עַ֙ הַכֹּהֵ֣ן הַגָּד֔וֹל עֹמֵ֕ד לִפְנֵ֖י מַלְאַ֣ךְ יְהֹוָ֑ה וְהַשָּׂטָ֛ן עֹמֵ֥ד עַל־יְמִינ֖וֹ לְשִׂטְנֽוֹ׃

“I was further shown Joshua, the high priest, standing before the angel of G-d, and the accuser (Satan) standing at his right to accuse him” (Zecharia 3:1). 

In this case, it would depend on how one translates the term “accuser.” If “Accuser is depicted with a capital letter, then it does seem that Satan is understood to be some form of an independent entity. But if it is depicted in lowercase as in “accuser,” then Satan comes across more as a form of a prosecutor opposing a defender. The Septuagint renders Satan as διαβολος (informer), and from here the word “devil’ is derived in English and it takes on a more sinister connotation. 

Also, in Zecharia (4:10), we find an interesting description of Satan as one of the ‘seven eyes of G-d’: 

שִׁבְעָה־אֵ֑לֶּה עֵינֵ֣י יְהֹוָ֔ה הֵ֥מָּה מְשׁוֹטְטִ֖ים בְּכׇל־הָאָֽרֶץ

“Those seven are the eyes of God, wandering over all the earth.” 

Zecharia describes seven divine messengers that wander (מְשׁוֹטְטִ֖ים) all around the world and ‘report’ on the deeds of man to G-d. One of these seven messengers is Satan. This also parallels the description in Job, where G-d asks Satan where he has been, and he replies that he has been wandering (מִשּׁ֣וּט) around the world: 

וַיֹּ֧אמֶר ה׳ אֶל־הַשָּׂטָ֖ן מֵאַ֣יִן תָּבֹ֑א וַיַּ֨עַן הַשָּׂטָ֤ן אֶת־ה׳ וַיֹּאמַ֔ר מִשּׁ֣וּט בָּאָ֔רֶץ וּמֵֽהִתְהַלֵּ֖ךְ בָּֽהּ׃

“The Lord said to the adversary, ‘Where have you been?’ The adversary answered the Lord, ‘I have been roaming all over the earth’” (Job 1:7). 

According to Zecharia and Job, it seems that Satan’s job is to roam and wander and report on the deeds of humankind as one of the “eyes” of God. It also seems that sometimes he is depicted as Satan and other times as Shatan (from שוטט, “to wander”). The Arabic and Ethiopic languages have retained the form “Shaytan.” This view of Satan/Shatan as a wanderer and reporter on the deeds of humans was promoted by Shadal (R. Shmuel David Luzzatto) in 1876. 

According to Ullendorff: 

“Satan, as the roving ambassador of the Lord, more often than not had unfavourable things to report about man, and so there developed the idea of Satan as the opponent, the calumniator [one who slanders or makes personal attacks on another][2] – and finally even the incarnation of evil…But the original conception of Satan in the Hebrew Bible was innocent enough: one of the ‘sons of God’, even if one whose task was not particularly congenial to man” (Ullendorff 1966: 283). 

4) קדוש (Kadosh) means “Holy”

In English, the word “holy” conjures an image of a sacred and spiritual state. But in Hebrew, Kadosh simply implies that something is removed or separated from something else. 

The קדש הקדשים or “Holy of Holiest” may be holy but that’s not what it means. Kadosh means to separate or to be separated, removed, or distinguished from something else. Similarly, the expression גוי קדוש or “holy people” does not mean that the people are holy but that the people are separate and different from the surrounding people: 

“קדוש [Kadosh] is a geographical term connoting physical apartness, separateness; ‘holy’ is a theological term, permeated by a deep spiritual significance” (Ullendorff 1966: 285). 

A support for this can be seen in the Hebrew word for a woman of ill repute who is called a קדשה (kedeisha) which is certainly not meant to convey a sentiment of holiness. 

5) נביא (Navi) means a “prophet”

The term נביא (Navi) is usually translated as a “prophet,” but that is not what the word means. Navi simply means an “announcer,” and it carries none of the connotations of one who is inspired or has the ability to ‘see into the future.’ 

6) סליחה (Selicha) means “forgive”

Selicha or forgiveness is another heavily charged theological term. It is used to refer to forgiveness for sins between humans and G-d, and between humans and other humans who may have been wronged. However, in the Torah, the term Selicha is only used for sins against G-d, for the simple reason that סלח means to “rain upon.” In the times of the Torah, rains were considered a sign of G-d’s grace and forgiveness. 

7) אריה (Aryeh) means "lion"

The term Aryeh in its original Torah setting did not mean a “lion,” but rather a large animal. 

8) לחם (lechem) means “bread”

In the Torah, lechem did not always mean “bread,” but rather whatever the staple food of the place happened to be at that particular time. Some examples may be:

בְּזֵעַ֤ת אַפֶּ֙יךָ֙ תֹּ֣אכַל לֶ֔חֶם

"By the sweat of your brow shall you eat bread" (Genesis 3:10).

כִּ֠י לֹ֣א עַל־הַלֶּ֤חֶם לְבַדּוֹ֙ יִחְיֶ֣ה הָֽאָדָ֔ם

"For man does not live on bread alone" (Deuteronomy 8:3).

R. Reuven Chaim Klein pointed out to me that R. Menachem Ibn Saruk in his Machberet Menachem noted that lechem (bread) may also mean "meat." In Arabic, Lahmu means meat, and this is also reflected in the Hebrew of the verse:

אֶת־קׇרְבָּנִ֨י לַחְמִ֜י לְאִשַּׁ֗י

         "[T]he food [= meat] for My offerings by fire"

Lost in translation

It was only as late as the nineteenth century that we realised that direct translations from primary Hebrew texts (and for that matter, other classical languages as well), did not always carry standard, fixed and universal meanings after undergoing a process of translation. Until then, the translation of languages was generally considered to reflect a “universal metaphysical structure of reality” (Ullendorff 1966: 274). It was thought that all one needed to do with a translation of any given text was to simply render it into the new language and the simple act of translation would convey the same nuances, ideas and subtleties as the original language. 

We have looked at some examples of common translations of certain common words mentioned in the Torah, and seen how the English translations do not convey the accurate meaning of the terms; and to the contrary, sometimes, the translations even distort the original Hebrew meanings. 

“[E]very language structure carries its own metaphysics or basic concepts by which the world of our experience is ordered and systematised. A different language…might involve a different metaphysics, might, in fact, give an altogether different account of reality” (Ullendorff 1966: 274). 

These distortions become particularly problematic when we try to translate and understand not just words but theological concepts. The interesting thing is that sentences can generally be conveyed in other languages, but not words. Some languages, however, remain almost untranslatable because the speakers do not always see what we see, and they understand the world in a fundamentally different way from the way we perceive it. 

“Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society…[T]he ‘real world’ is to a large extent unconsciously build upon the language habits of the group…The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached” (Ullendorff 1966: 287). 

Analysis

Understanding any theological concept that has at one time been translated into another language – even when the original language has remained intact − must immediately alert the student to some possibility of confusion. This is so because oftentimes there is ‘pushback’ and influence from the translated language back to the original language. With time, even those familiar with the original language may find that they understand ideas differently from the way the original language would have been understood in its original setting. 

A remarkable example of this may be the word סליחה (Selicha) or forgiveness. According to Ullendorff (1966:285), Selicha originally meant to “rain upon,” and that word was later associated with grace and forgiveness because G-d was not intent on destroying the world; and the rains were a sign of forgiveness confirming the perpetuation of the world for yet another season. 

I tried to find English translations of the word סליחה (Selicha) that related to its original meaning, “to sprinkle” or “to rain,” but I could not find any translation connecting סלח to either “sprinkle” or “rain.”  The Jastrow Talmudic dictionary was the closest I could get, but even there, it only recorded that in ancient Assyrian, סלח meant “to sprinkle.” But there was still no Hebrew tie to “sprinkle” or “rain.”[3] 

If Ullendorff is correct about סלח originally meaning “to sprinkle” or “to rain” − and if I am correct that there are no translations readily forthcoming that connect the modern Hebrew word סלח to “sprinkle” or “rain” − then this is an example of an original language being significantly influenced by the later understanding of its translators. 

The same is true of words like Tefillah (prayer) where today we hear all sorts of intricate mystico-psychological interpretations of the Hebrew word Tefillah evoking the spiritual connectivity of prayer − which seems a far cry from the original meaning of the term Tefillah implying the bargaining power of “cutting,” “inflicting pain” and incurring a loss to affect divine favour. 

If all this is correct, then not just words, but also important theological concepts related to those words, may sometimes also cause a ‘pushback.’ In such a case, later readings of theology may be reflected backwards into earlier texts creating theological anachronisms − where we read modern ideas (from modern translations) back into the older texts that may not have been there in the first place. 

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[1] Translated by Charles B. Chavel. New York, Shilo Pub. House, 1971-1976 (with some amendments for British English). 

[2] Square brackets are mine.

[3] See, however, b. Keritot 24b, where “forgiveness” is achieved at the time of the “sprinkling (of blood),” יְדִיעָה בִּשְׁעַת סְלִיחָה. Still, one could say that this is an exegesis of a Torah text, by a Talmudic reasoning dating back to Talmudic times, thus excluding its more modern usage.