575) Can rabbis like Maimonides make mistakes?

 

Introduction

This study—drawing extensively on research by Professor Rabbi Marc Shapiro, a student of Professor Rabbi Isadore Twersky—examines competing conceptions of rabbinic fallibility and infallibility. Put more bluntly, can great rabbis make mistakes? For the most part, later rabbinic authorities seem to have held that the sages of earlier generations did not err. This article uses Maimonides (1138-1204) as a test case to explore this matter. 

Open criticism of Maimonides

Shapiro notes that many of Maimonides’ contemporaries as well as later rabbinic authorities severely criticised him. These include Raavad III (Avraham ben David of Posquières, 1110-1180) and Rashba (Shlomo Ibn Aderet, 1235-1310), who was a student of another notable critic, Nachmanides (1194-1270). 

Maimonides’ own great-great-grandson, Yehoshua ha-Nagid (c.1310-1355), noticed an internal contradiction in Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah. He implies a certain carelessness on Maimonides’ part, suggesting we ignore the incidental Halachic statements Maimonides makes in passing while primarily engaged in another matter (Teshuvot R. Yehoshua haNagid, no.15). 

A short while later, Rashbatz (Shimon ben Tzemach Duran, 1361-1444) openly criticises Maimonides after noting an apparent internal contradiction and claims: 

“Perhaps Maimonides forgot what he originally wrote” (Tashbetz [authored by Rashbatz],^[1]  vol. 3, no.274). 

Later, Yosef Karo (1488-1575), author of the Shulchan Aruch, does not hold back his criticism and suggests, for example, that Maimonides was unaware of a certain but pertinent text in the Jerusalem Talmud (Kesef Mishneh, Nedarim 12:1). 

Menachem Azariah da Fano (Rema miFano, 1548-1620), a student of Moshe Cordovero, had no problem assuming that a difficulty in Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishna was simply that it was written when the author was young. 

The Vilna Gaon (1720-1797) maintains that in one responsum, Maimonides forgot something. Then, regarding an internal contradiction in the Mishneh Torah, he suggests Maimonides must have changed his mind and forgot to correct his earlier view (Biur haGra, Orach Chaim 301.42). 

Although there are exceptions, as we draw closer to our times, these criticisms of Maimonides give way to a more uncritical, laudatory and heroic approach, in which mistakes and contradictions were only ‘apparent’ and, instead, carried nuanced and important hidden meanings. This, even though Maimonides acknowledged in a letter to Yehonatan of Lunel that he suffered from forgetfulness as he aged. His son, Avraham ben haRambam, also acknowledged that his father forgot a Talmud source (Birkat Avraham, no. 13). 

The ‘principle’ of infallibility     

Shapiro (1984:59) describes the tradition and belief that great rabbis do not make mistakes as a “leitmotif” (recurring theme) and “principle of interpretation” like a lens running through much of later rabbinic literature. It claims that Maimonides could never have made mistakes, as that would reduce him to a mere mortal. If something looks like a mistake on the surface, a deeper, hidden reason must be behind it. Shapiro (1984:60) calls these views the “hagiographic approach,” which aims primarily to exalt and idealise its subjects, in this case Maimonides, rather than present them in a balanced and accurate manner.  This approach is exemplified by Yosef Kolon (c.1420-1480)—whose decisions informed Moshe Isserles’ glosses on the Shulchan Aruch— who writes: 

“If our master [Maimonides] was before us, he would have explained it” (Shut Maharik, no. 126). 

The Talmudist and Kabbalist, Malachi haCohen (c.1700-1772), similarly states: 

“All of Maimonides' words are exact (betachlit hadiyuk), and you should scrutinise and apply casuistry [intense analysis] to them just as you are able to do with the Talmud" (Yad Melachi, Kelalei haRambam, no.3). 

Chaim Yosef David Azulai (Chida, 1724-1806) writes: 

“[F]or all of his [Maimonides] words are carefully formulated. Therefore, if due to the weakness of our intellect we have not found a resolution to his words, assume that the fault lies with us… The great authorities of years past [could criticise Maimonides because they] were masters of the Torah and they could say whatever appealed to them, but not us” (Chida, Chaim Sha’al, vol.1, no. 15). 

Chida remains adamant that Maimonides was intellectually flawless. Even when Yosef Karo suggests that Maimonides may not have known all the Halachic enactments (takanot) of the rabbis of the Gaonic period (589 CE to 1038 CE), Chida insists Maimonides knew everything about the Gaonim. 

In another example, Yechezkel Landau (Noda beYehuda, 1713-1793) declares that Maimonides did not rule halachically on every Talmudic dispute because he remained undecided on them (Noda beYehuda, Orach Chaim, no. 39). Chida, however, dismisses that out of hand and insists that Maimonides was unquestionably able to rule on all Halachic cases (Yosef Ometz, no. 25). 

While such hagiographical claims remain common today, they are difficult to reconcile with the numerous instances in which Maimonides appears to have made straightforward errors. 

Examples of apparent errors in Maimonides’ writings 

Shapiro (1984:65) does not hesitate to call the following examples the result of Maimonides’ “forgetfulness and carelessness,” because “[t]here is no question” that he cited biblical verses from memory and did not look the sources up: 

“[I]n a number of cases Maimonides made the same mistake in more than one place, showing that the error was ingrained in him. It is also clear that Maimonides sometimes recorded halakhot from memory, without checking the underlying Talmudic passage, for had this text been in front of him he would not have misquoted the biblical verse, or cited a mistaken verse” (Shapiro 1984:65). 

Confusing the Jubilee year for the Sabbatical year:

Maimonides cites Leviticus 25:11, “לֹ֣א תִזְרָ֔עוּ וְלֹ֤א תִקְצְרוּ֙ אֶת־סְפִיחֶ֔יהָ וְלֹ֥א תִבְצְר֖וּ אֶת־נְזִרֶֽיהָ —you shall not sow, neither shall you reap the aftergrowth or harvest the untrimmed vines” — in the context of the Sabbatical year; whereas the verse, in fact, refers to the Jubilee year (as it clearly opens with, “יוֹבֵ֣ל הִ֗וא שְׁנַ֛ת הַחֲמִשִּׁ֥ים שָׁנָ֖ה תִּהְיֶ֣ה לָכֶ֑ם — That fiftieth year shall be a jubilee for you.”). (Maimonides, Commentary on Mishna, Shevi’it 1.1). 

Confusing a verse on an animal offering for tithing cattle:

Maimonides cites Leviticus 27:10, “לֹ֣א יַחֲלִיפֶ֗נּוּ וְלֹֽא־יָמִ֥יר אֹת֛וֹ — one may not exchange or substitute another for it” — in the context of tithing cattle, whereas the verse in fact refers to animals as an offering (as the preceding verse opens with, “וְאִ֨ם־בְּהֵמָ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֨ר יַקְרִ֧יבוּ מִמֶּ֛נָּה קׇרְבָּ֖ן לַֽה — If any animal that may be brought as an offering.”). (Maimonides, Commentary on Mishna, Ma’aser Sheni 1.2). 

A verse that does not exist

Maimonides (Commentary on Mishna, Ma’aser Sheni 3.2) incorrectly cites Leviticus 7:18 as:

ואם תאכל יאכל מבשר זבח השלמים וכו' פיגול הוא לא ירצה 

But the actual verse reads: 

וְאִ֣ם הֵאָכֹ֣ל יֵ֠אָכֵ֠ל מִבְּשַׂר־זֶ֨בַח שְׁלָמָ֜יו בַּיּ֣וֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי֮ לֹ֣א יֵרָצֶה֒ הַמַּקְרִ֣יב אֹת֗וֹ לֹ֧א יֵחָשֵׁ֛ב ל֖וֹ פִּגּ֣וּל יִהְיֶ֑ה 

He seems to have confused his verse with another verse in Leviticus 19:7, which reads: 

וְאִ֛ם הֵאָכֹ֥ל יֵאָכֵ֖ל בַּיּ֣וֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁ֑י פִּגּ֥וּל ה֖וּא לֹ֥א יֵרָצֶֽה׃ 

Another verse that does not exist

In Yesodei haTorah (5.4), with reference to Molech, Maimonides incorrectly cites the following verse, which does not exist:

ונתתי אני את פני באיש ההוא

He seems to have confused his verse with another verse in Leviticus (20:3): 

וַאֲנִ֞י אֶתֵּ֤ן אֶת־פָּנַי֙ בָּאִ֣ישׁ הַה֔וּא

Or perhaps another verse in Leviticus (20:5):

וְשַׂמְתִּ֨י אֲנִ֧י אֶת־פָּנַ֛י בָּאִ֥ישׁ הַה֖וּא  

Yet another verse that does not exist

In Sefer haMitzvot (negative commandment 286), Maimonides cites Deuteronomy 19:16 as:

 יקום עד חמס באישלא

But the actual verse reads: 

כִּֽי־יָק֥וּם עֵד־חָמָ֖ס בְּאִ֑ישׁ 

He seems to have confused his verse with the previous verse (Deuteronomy 19:15), which reads:

לֹֽא־יָקוּם֩ עֵ֨ד אֶחָ֜ד בְּאִ֗ישׁ 

A verse in Deuteronomy

Maimonides (Teshuva 6.1) incorrectly cites Deuteronomy 24:16 as: 

איש בחטאו יומת

The actual verse reads: 

אִ֥ישׁ בְּחֶטְא֖וֹ יוּמָֽתוּ 

It seems he may have got confused with II Kings 14:6, which states: 

אִם־אִ֥ישׁ בְּחֶטְא֖וֹ יָמוּת [קרי:  יוּמָֽת] 

Guide

In the Guide for the Perplexed (2.19), Maimonides incorrectly cites a verse in Jeremiah as:

עשה השמים

The actual verse from Jeremiah 32:17 reads:

אַתָּ֣ה עָשִׂ֗יתָ אֶת־הַשָּׁמַ֙יִם֙ 

Elsewhere in the Guide (3.40), Maimonides incorrectly cites Leviticus 27:3, saying that a man's valuation is sixty shekels. The actual verse states that it is fifty shekels:

וְהָיָ֣ה עֶרְכְּךָ֗ חֲמִשִּׁ֛ים שֶׁ֥קֶל 

Letter to Yemen

In his Letter to Yemen, Maimonides incorrectly cites Leviticus 27:28 as: 

ואם החרם יחרים 

The actual verse reads:

אַךְ־כׇּל־חֵ֡רֶם אֲשֶׁ֣ר יַחֲרִם֩ 

Yosef Ibn Kaspi defends Maimonides 

Yosef Ibn Kaspi (c.1280-1345) was a great follower of Maimonides and writes in his defence: 

“Is it necessary that he [Maimonides] always remember all these details without error?... How can anyone who knows what it takes to write a book, one in which the author cites hundreds and even thousands of verses and sayings, think that the author will not [unintentionally] omit or add or make minor changes? Does one expect that while deeply involved in his book, every time he wishes to cite a verse he will take out the Bible and trouble himself to find it? This is wondrous only for those imbeciles who do not know what it takes to author a book” (Ibn Kaspi, Commentary on the Guide, 1.19). 

Mistakes in book titles

Maimonides made mistakes not only in referencing Torah verses, but also in referencing books. Shapiro takes us through a dazzling array of these mistakes: 

“Maimonides refers to something as appearing in Keritut when it is actually found in Me'ilah, or Beizah when it is found in Megillah, or Shvi’it when it is found in Terumot,  or Sanhedrin when it is found in Makkot, or Bereishit Rabbah when it is found in Hagigah; when he refers to something as appearing in the last chapter of Bikkurim when he means the second chapter, the fifth chapter of Eruvin when he means the sixth, the third chapter of Yoma when he means the second, the seventh chapter of Shabbat when he means the sixth” (Shapiro 1984:69). 

Two conflicting rulings in Maimonides’ Code

An apparent contradiction exists between two sections of Maimonides’ Halakhic Code, the Mishneh Torah, where he discusses the time restrictions for the limbs of a burned offering to remain burning on the altar. 

In Ma’aseh haKorbanot (4.2), Maimonides writes that under Torah Law the limbs may remain on the altar until dawn the following day, but that stricter Rabbinic Law permits them to remain only until midnight to prevent negligence. 

In Korban Pesach (1.8), however, he writes that the limbs “may be burned any time of the night until dawn” with no mention of stricter Rabbinic Law with its midnight limit. 

Some rabbinic commentators who regard Maimonides as infallible, incapable of any mistake or oversight, interpret the second section as merely describing the Torah Law (up to dawn) and omitting the Rabbinic law (up to midnight).

“[W]hen the best the traditional commentators can come up with is that Maimonides recorded an incorrect halakhah because he assumed the reader would know that this was only the biblical law, I think the academic scholar must look elsewhere” (Shapiro 1984:79). 

The problem with the forced interpretation that Maimonides is describing a Torah Law is that Maimonides is writing in a practical Code of Law. Mishneh Torah is not a study of theoretical law but a practical guide intended for readers to quickly and concisely consult for rulings on Jewish law: 

“[I]f the code says that one can do something until dawn, then that is what the reader assumes the halakhah to be” (Shapiro 1984:77). 

Shapiro argues that students should be willing to consider this contradiction as just another instance of Maimonides making an editorial mistake. Or, perhaps he changed his mind and forgot to revise one of the paragraphs. Instead of forcing a strained interpretation of a contradiction in a practical text, this makes more sense because, in any case: 

“[I]t would have been just as easy for Maimonides to cite the correct practice” (Shapiro 1984:78). 

An honest scholar of Maimonides should not feel compelled to harmonise or explain—at all costs—every contradiction in the Mishneh Torah or misquoted Torah verse (of which there are many). 

Two conflicting rulings in Kashrut

Another apparent contradiction exists between two sections of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, where he discusses the kosher dietary laws of mixing milk and meat. 

In Ma’achalot Asurot (9.3-4), Maimonides writes that from the verse “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19), we derive the laws of not cooking milk and meat together. The word “kid” suggests that only the species of beheima (domesticated animals, like a goat or cow) may not be cooked with milk (also from a domesticated animal). However, a chaya (wild kosher animal like a deer) may be cooked (bishul) and benefited (hana’a) from, provided the meat is not eaten (achila). 

In Mamrim (2.9), however, Maimonides states, “this verse prohibits the cooking or eating of meat with milk, both the meat of a domesticated or wild [kosher] animal… Should the court permit the flesh of a wild [kosher] animal with milk, it would be taking away [from the commands of the Torah].” 

On a straightforward reading, these passages appear contradictory, because in the first case Maimonides says it is permitted to cook the meat of a chaya, a wild kosher animal in milk (except that it may not be eaten). In the second case, however, he says it is forbidden to cook the meat of a chaya, a wild kosher animal in milk. 

Many classical commentators (like Yosef Karo, David Ibn Zimra, Levi ben Habib) were uncomfortable with the suggestion that Maimonides made a mistake or contradicted himself. Instead, they argue that Maimonides was explaining the principle that one cannot add to or subtract from a Torah verse.  In other words, in the second case (Mamrim), Maimonides was not teaching a Halacha but describing a legal principle. The principle is that rabbis cannot abolish or change a Torah law or describe anything that contradicts the tenor of a Torah verse. The Torah ostensibly prohibits cooking meat and milk, so how can the permissibility of cooking milk and meat (from a wild kosher animal) be derived from that same verse? 

Shapiro challenges this explanation, questioning how Maimonides could be: 

“prepared to use an example that is not in accord with the halakhah [because you can indeed cook a chaya, a wild kosher animal in milk as long as you don’t eat it]… and that contradicts what he states elsewhere [that you can cook a chaya in milk]... [and why] couldn't Maimonides find an example that was in accord with halakhah?” (Shapiro 1984:81). 

Shapiro argues that the forced solution raises additional difficulties. Firstly, we are dealing with a Code of Law, not a theoretical treatise. Secondly, if Maimonides was willing to use a Halakhically incorrect example, then how can we trust his legal opinions anywhere in the Mishneh Torah? Instead, Shapiro suggests that: 

“[B]latant contradictions in the Mishneh Torah were the result of careless, or incomplete, editing, and…Maimonides was intent on correcting these matters” (Shapiro:1984:83). 

Shapiro adopts a pragmatic approach and acknowledges that writers of voluminous works make mistakes and constantly correct themselves. In the last example, we have the actual testimony of Maimonides’ great-great-grandson who had an original manuscript of Mishneh Torah in Maimonides’ handwriting…and the word “chaya” (wild kosher animal) did not appear in the second section (Mamrim) (Teshuvot R. Yehoshua haNagid, no. 16). 

This manuscript evidence undermines the need for complex explanations that interpret Maimonides as teaching a legal principle seemingly at odds with the accepted Halacha. Instead, the apparent contradiction may reflect a simple textual error, reminding us that even great rabbinic authorities can make mistakes—and then correct them [see: Kotzk Blog: 474) A mind in motion: Maimonides correcting Maimonides]. 

 

Bibliography:

Shapiro, Marc B., 1984, ‘Principles of Interpretation in Maimonidean Halakhah: Traditional and Academic Perspectives’, in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, edited by Isadore Twersky, Harvard University Press, 89-183.

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[1] Tashbetz means an ornamental setting, probably a play on the author’s name Rashbatz.