 |
| Many are familiar with Chasdai Crescas' work, 'Or haShem' - but his vision of a new Halachic Code is even more interesting. |
INTRODUCTION:
R. Don Chasdai Crescas (1340-1410) was a philosopher and halachist
from Catalonia in the north-eastern region of Spain. His teacher was Rabbeinu
Nisim of Gerona, also known as the Ran, and his most well-known student
was R.
Yosef Albo.
In his philosophical work, Or haShem, Chasdai Crescas
tries to show how Maimonides’ rationalism, a century and a half earlier, was overly influenced by Aristotle; and he attempts to rescue Judaism
from that type of rationalist Greek thought.
It is Crescas’ approach to Halacha, however, that is
so fascinating because he wanted to re-evaluate and reframe the way we write our
codes of law - particularly Rambam’s famous code known as Mishneh Torah.
The purpose of this article to try and understand Chasdai
Crescas’ reasoning for wanting to disrupt the popular Halachic process
and replace it with a fundamentally new vision of Law.
I have drawn from the research of Professor Ari Ackerman,
a graduate of Yeshivat Kerem beYavne who is now a professional academic.
NOTE: The Reader is reminded that this is a
theoretical exploration of Chasdai Crescas’ views on Halacha, and is not
intended to suggest any change to the way we conduct the Halachic process
today.
CRESCAS’S UNPOPULAR VIEW ON TORAH STUDY AND CODES OF LAW:
Chasdai Crescas agreed with Rambam on two major principles:
1) Theoretical Talmud study for its own sake had no
beneficial value! While this might sound strange to the modern ear - as this
type of study is the staple of the modern yeshivot - it was a sentiment well
established by Rambam. He claimed
in his Mishneh Torah, that it was no longer necessary to study Talmud,
because he had already summarised all its salient and practical points.
“In short, outside of this work [i.e., the
Mishneh Torah]
there was no need for another book to learn anything whatsoever that is
required in the whole Torah, whether it be a law of the Scriptures or of the
Rabbis.”
In fact, in a
letter to a student, Rambam went even further:
“If one spends time studying commentaries [of the Talmud]
and the disputes in the Talmud... then one is wasting one’s time.”
Crescas
concurred.
2) Another area
where Crescas agreed with Rambam was in the need for a practical Code of Law, in
place of Talmudic dialectics and theoretical legal argumentation.
- But where
Crescas vociferously departed ways with Rambam was in the area of the ultimate
goal of Judaism: For Rambam it was the Sechel, the rationalist and
philosophical mind which led to perfection; whereas for Crescas it was simply
the practical fulfilment of the commandments that led to righteousness. This
was why Crescas was so concerned about the importance of Codes of Law.
RAMBAM’S
‘THEORIA’ VS CRESCAS’S ‘PRAXIS’:
Because Crescas
believed that the correct practice of the commandments could lead to human
perfection, therefore the entire purpose of Torah study had to be practical,
deed orientated and not concerned with intellectual arguments and discussion.
This practical knowledge had to be clear, concise and easily accessible.
In theological terms this
is known as praxis (which is defined as the process by which a theory is enacted,
embodied, or realized.)
Ackerman describes Crescas’ emphasis on
praxis as follows:
“[The purpose of Torah study should be to]
distil the discursive, scattered and indeterminate halakhic traditions into
clear and concise legal directives, which could be widely accessed.”
By
contrast Rambam placed his emphasis more in theoria, (which is defined
as intellectual and rational contemplation).
By providing a concise Code
of Law to free the student from Talmudic dialectics, Rambam allowed more time
for the mind to be engaged in rationalist pursuits.
As
Ackerman puts it:
“Maimonides and Crescas arrived at the same
conclusion from antithetical premises.
Maimonides embraced comprehensive codes
because he wanted to allow the scholar to devote himself to theoria.
Crescas embraced comprehensive codes
because he believed that human perfection is primarily connected to praxis.”
CRESCAS
BREAKS WITH THE OLD STYLE OF THE TOSAFISTS:
Because Crescas believed in
the primacy of praxis and therefore in the supreme significance of the observance
of the commandments, he broke from the earlier rabbinic approach, especially
that of the Tosafists of Northern France and Germany who had preceded
him, who valued “the creative dialectic [theoretical argumentation]of Torah study over the
adjudication of halakhah.”
Although Crescas was living
in Spain, the Tosafist style of study had already begun to filter down
from France and Germany to Catalonia through teachers like Ramban (Nachmanides,
1194-1270).
But Ackerman explains:
“[Crescas] never attributed independent
value to the study of Torah.
Consequently, in contrast to Nahmanides and
his students, Crescas valued comprehensive halakhic codes, which allowed a Jew
to navigate the deep and rough waters of the halakhic
sea”.
A NEW CODE TO
RIVAL RAMBAM’S CODE:
In the
Introduction to his theological work Or haShem, Crescas enthusiastically
proclaimed his intention to write a new Code of Jewish Law in order to counter
the Mishneh Torah of Rambam.
Crescas went on
to severely criticise the manner in which Rambam wrote his Code.
1) He began
with the fact that Rambam did not quote or reference his Talmudic sources.
2) Then
he criticised the fact that Rambam did not offer alternate or differing views from
the ones he presented.
3) Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, he criticised
Rambam’s omission of broad principles of Halacha and, instead, he simply
laid out ‘specific legal conclusions’.
The first two
criticisms of Rambam were not just peculiar to Crescas but were widespread
criticisms held by many others as well.
The third
criticism, however, concerning the absence of a presentation of principles of
law from which a Halachic decisor could draw from in the future, was of
great concern to Crescas.
THE LAW MUST NEVER BE ALLOWED TO BECOME FOSSILIZED:
By criticizing Rambam’s focus on ‘specific legal
conclusions’, Crescas reveals perhaps his greatest difference from Rambam’s
Code and probably from all other future Codes as well:
In Crescas’s view, one cannot produce a Code of Jewish Law
that essentially remains a book or a list of laws!
Once one does that, one intrinsically fossilizes halacha
forever so that it stagnates and loses its power of relevance.
Law must be principle
based, so that future scholars will not just tick the boxes in the list, but
instead, apply their minds to the fundamental Halachic axioms which must
always trump the specific detailed conclusions.
For Crescas:
“[Jewish] Law was a boundless
entity that continued to expand dynamically and infinitely,
and whose particulars could not be confined
or encompassed.”
A
NEW SET OF PRINCIPLES FOR HALACHIC DERIVATION:
Those familiar with the
process of Torah study and analysis would know about R. Yishmael’s Thirteen
Hermeneutic (defined as the methodology of biblical interpretation)
Principles of Torah Interpretation.
As a general rule (although
in truth it’s not so simplistic), one may safely interpret the Torah based on
these Thirteen Principles and arrive at an acceptable biblical interpretation.
This was already well established a thousand years earlier during Talmudic
(Mishnaic) times in the Baraite deRabi Yishmael around the 1st
century CE.
In a most audacious move,
Chasdai Crescas attempted to formulate a new set of Principles, not for
biblical interpretation but rather to derive Halacha from post-biblical
legal texts (i.e., Talmud and Midrash Halacha).
This set of Principles of Halachic
Interpretation would be used under all circumstances and at all times in order
to arrive at appropriate Halachic practice.
Thus Crescas’ new Hermeneutic
Principles for Talmud Study would be used to formulate Halacha, just
like R. Yishmael’s Hermeneutic Principles for Biblical Study were used for
biblical interpretation.
In Crescas’s view, Rambam got
it wrong by being ‘overly occupied with concrete cases’ and by
presenting a book of laws which essentially fossilized those laws forever.
Rather, one needed a book of fundamental Halachic Principles which would
dynamically focus ‘on the theoretical grounding of the law’ and rise to
meet the changing Halachic challenges of the future.
As Ackerman puts it:
“These bedrock principles of the law
allowed for the derivation of new laws from the existing
laws. By grasping the principles, one
encompassed the law in its entirety...
According to Crescas, by focusing on the
particulars of the law, Maimonides mistakenly conceived of the law as a static
system and failed to provide guidance in adjudicating new cases that resulted
from the infinite nature of the Torah.
Consequently, in depicting his own code,
Crescas asserted that he would compose a ‘compilation,
which contains the commandments of the Law with their causes according to the
subject matter, with conception of their definitions and their general
principles’ (ha-gedarim ve-ha-klalim).“
Crescas believed that at
Mount Sinai it was only the principles and not the minutiae of
the Law that was revealed. This was not his unique innovation as this idea has
its roots in earlier rabbinic literature. But now he wanted to consolidate those original principles in their purest form, in a new Code.
FOR
TALMUDIC SCHOLARS ONLY:
Crescas’s daring scheme,
however, did come with a caveat and condition that his Principles would not be
subject to the whims of just anyone, but they were meant only to be interpreted
by talmidei chachamim, or scholars, who were familiar with the Talmud.
PRECEDENT
FROM THE RALBAG:
It’s interesting to see that
Crescas’ vision of a completely different Code of Law may have been partially
influenced by the French Talmudist, the Ralbag
(1288-1344), who passed away when Crescas was four years old.
In Ralbag’s commentary on the
legal sections of the Torah, he (also) makes reference to the importance of
understanding the roots of the law. In the Introduction to his
commentary on the Torah, Ralbag writes:
“We will enumerate the roots (shorshei) of
the laws of [each] commandment...in the most succinct form possible.”
And amazingly, Ralbag added
that he (also) wanted to produce a halachic work ‘that would detail the
roots of each commandment’.
Ralbag actually developed a
system of 22 shorashim, or hermeneutic principles. This means that
Crescas was not the first to incubate such a scheme, although he did take the
matter even further by referring to an ‘infinity’ and ‘expanding’
of the Law.
CRESCAS’S
‘INFINITE’ AND ‘EXPANDING’ LAW:
The concept of infinity
played a significant role in developing Crescas’ theological thinking:
“Infinity looms large in Crescas’s innovative philosophic, scientific, and
theological approaches.
Infinity...served the
lynchpin of his halakhic philosophy.”
‘INFINITY’
AND THE KABBALISTIC INFLUENCE:
It must be remembered that
one cannot discount the Kabbalistic influence on Crescas who was born 80
years after the publication of the Zohar around 1260.
No biblical or earlier rabbinic
sources explicitly discuss the idea of an infinite Torah in the way Crescas does
because “the notion of the infinite Torah was introduced only by the
kabbalisic tradition.”
Clearly, the Zoharic
influence would have helped shape his notion of Infinity which would have
included an infinite Torah with infinite Halachic possibilities.
According to Ackerman:
“The kabbalistic notion of the infinite
Torah concerned the possibility of unlimited interpretations of the Written
Torah. Thus, kabbalistic sources conceived of the
infinite nature of the Torah as a hermeneutic principle that governs the
exegetical possibilities of the text.
According to Crescas, the infinite nature
of the Torah determined the infinitude of the law; halakhah was boundless and
the particulars of Jewish law could not be confined within a finite work.”
CONCLUSION:
As we have seen, Chasdai
Crescas’ bold perception of Halacha - which he based upon Ralbag and
the recently surfaced Zohar - opened up other and variant avenues of possible Halachic
discourse.
In his view, Halacha
was no longer a stagnant list of do’s and dont’s which were forever to be memorialized
in a legal compendium. Instead, Halacha was to be something organic and
infinitely alive and yet still within the boundaries of Torah Judaism, as long
as his set of Hermeneutic Principles were upheld.
ANALYSIS:
Three hundred years after
Chasdai Crescas, many of the new Chasidim began to teach (controversially) that
if the ‘principle’ or ‘purpose’ of prayer, for example, is to cleave to G-d, then if one does
not feel ready to pray at the established prayer times, one may delay the
prayer in pursuit of that original principle.
Five hundred years after
Chasdai Crescas, Rav Kook (1865-1935) wrote about Kavanah or intent with
regard to the commandments. Normally, in rabbinic literature, Kavanah refers
to concentration and focus but Rav Kook “refers to the ideal or purpose
towards which the commandments point.”
In a brilliant examination of
Rav Kook’s various writing on the reasons for the commandments, Professor Don
Seeman writes:
“In
fact, R. Kook insists that the subordination of kavanah (intention) to maaseh
(normative practice) is dependent on the moral development of the nation as a
whole and may be reversed when circumstances warrant.
With respect to the Talmudic opinion that
‘mitzvoth will be nullified in the future’ (Niddah 61b), R. Kook insists that
this does not mean that the commandments will be discontinued but only that the reasons for the commandments
which are now secondary to practical performance will be made primary,
conditioning the shape of future practice on better appreciation of their
intent.
In some passages, he suggests that the commandments will be
observed more willingly in the future, through a better-integrated (and
possibly prophetic) identification with their purpose, rather than through
external imposition of authority, as they are today.”
In this sense, it appears
that Rav Kook took over from where R. Don Chasdai Crescas left off.
Rambam Sefer haMitzvot, 20–21. (Translation from
Twersky, A Maimonides Reader, 425–427.)
Igrot haRambam; Isaac Shalit edition,
vol. 1, 312.
Shemot Rabbah par. 41:6 and Midrash Rabbah (Vilna:
Ahim Rom, 1885), vol. 1, 69a–b.
