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Sunday 18 June 2017

130) THE DANGERS OF TRANSLATING HEBREW TEXTS:


THE DISPUTATION OF PARIS:

INTRODUCTION:
In the early 1200’s, Nicholas Donin - a disenfranchised Jew who had been excommunicated by his former teacher R. Yechiel of Paris - became baptised and joined the Franciscan Order.
Originally a Karaite Jew who only kept the written Torah and rejected the Oral Tradition, he was determined and well-positioned to attempt to uproot the authority of the rabbinical tradition from within Judaism.
He was quite successful in his mission and his prominent role in the infamous Disputation of Paris, on Friday 6 Tammuz 1240 – the first formal Jewish-Christian Disputation - resulted in the burning of every obtainable French manuscript of the Talmud. This amounted to twenty-four carriage loads containing about twelve thousand manuscripts which were destroyed on the streets of Paris. This became known as the Disputation of Paris, or The Trial of the Talmud.
POPE GREGORY IX:
In 1238, Nicholas Donin presented Pope Gregory IX with thirty-five accusations against the Jews who studied the Talmud which, according to him, contained negative references to Jesus and Mary. Donin knew his Talmud well, having translated it into French. He claimed that Jews were permitted to kill non-Jews and were allowed to break their promises to them as well. He said that Jews believed Mary to have been a common woman of ill repute. Furthermore, according to him, the Talmud contained ‘odd and obscene folklore’ such as Adam’s attraction to animals before he met Eve. He also claimed that rabbinical Judaism was no longer recognisable from the original biblical Judaism and that Jews spent more time studying Talmud than Bible. Donin’s translations of the Talmud changed the way Christians viewed the Jews.
Nicholas Donin’s actions were historically very significant because, apparently, until that time the church had a rather outdated perception of Jews as still being theological fossils of the biblical Israelites, who honoured the Law of Moses and the Prophets. The church seemed somewhat unaware of the dramatic way rabbinic Judaism had, in a sense, interpreted the religion more along the lines of the Talmud than the literal biblical texts.
This, of course, had always been the gripe of the Karaite Jews, but now Donin had brought the issue to the forefront of the church, which seemed and horrified by this ‘new development’ within Judaism. This was compounded by the allegations of anti-Christian blasphemy said to be found in the Talmud.[1]
In the opening statement in the Disputation, one of the defending rabbis[2] said: “Please do not make me respond to (Donin’s) words, since the Talmud is an ancient text and no one has spoken about it before. St. Jerome, after all, knew all of the Torah and the Talmud, just as other priests have, and if there is any problem to be found in it, we would have heard of it by now.”
Copies of the accusations were sent to all the Franciscans and Dominicans and they were informed that upon official investigation, if these allegations were to be found to be true, then all the available manuscripts of Talmud would be destroyed. In the meanwhile, both these Orders had the right to seize all the copies of the Talmud they could find. This marked the beginning of the Dominican Order being given inquisitorial tribunals under papal authority. They were already charged with the authority to police cases of suspected Christian heresy.
While this decree was issued throughout much of Europe, it was largely not acted upon, except in France where the Jews were threatened with their lives if they did not surrender their copies of Talmud.

While the Trial took place in 1240, the manuscripts were only burned around 1242. This was because of the efforts of the bishop of Sens who was a supporter of the Jews, who managed to delay the edict for some time. According to some accounts, this bishop suddenly died while in the presence of Louis IX, and this was taken as a sign that he was a heretical bishop – and they immediately began the burning proceedings.
CRUSADER ATTACKS:
Even before Nicholas Donin’s allegation had been presented to the Pope, he already managed to arrange a Crusader attack on the Jews, as an act of revenge against his people who had dared to publically humiliate and excommunicate him. During this attack, three thousand Jews were killed and five hundred others chose the option of conversion.
DOGMA AND PHILOSOPHY:
To better understand some of the nuances surrounding the era of the Disputation of Paris, one must remember that during this period which was known as the 13th century Church Ascendant, the church wanted to win over the hearts and minds of the Jews. It was not just interested in the crude persecution of Jews - although history shows that many incidences of crude persecution did indeed take place - it regarded it as a greater victory to persuade the Jews to accept Christianity by ‘logical reason of debate’.
This was the time when the church began to infuse principles of philosophy in their own faith. The church was, particularly through the efforts of Thomas of Aquinas (1225-1274), influenced by Aristotle (whom he referred to as ‘the Philosopher’.)[3] He argued that reason, not just faith, has a place within religion. Pope Benedict XV declared: "This (Dominican) Order ... acquired new lustre when the Church declared the teaching of Thomas to be her own”. (In modern times, under papal suggestion, priests are encouraged to study the writings of Thomas as part of their ordination programme.)
This was one of the reasons why Christianity felt so under attack. Their dogma and philosophy had been recently carefully laid out in minute detail and was therefore exposed and became vulnerable to anything that appeared to oppose it.
On the other hand, the Jews of the 1200’s generally had not developed a detailed dogmatic theology. Judaism certainly had many laws and strict commandments but its philosophy and dogma were far more open and unrestricted.
This created a tension between the Jews and the church, with the church expecting to debate on dogmatic issues which were absent from Judaism.
THE FOUR DEFENDING RABBIS:
King Louis IX appointed four leading rabbis to defend Judaism in the public debate:
R. YECHIEL OF PARIS (d. 1268):
R. Yechiel, also known as Sire (Sir) Vives, was a Tosafist from northern France who headed the Yeshiva of Paris which had three hundred students, one of whom was the famed R. Meir of Rothenburg. In 1258, R. Yechiel settled in Acre and established there the Midrash haGadol deParis. He is buried on Mt. Carmel near Haifa.[4]
The line of R. Yechiel’s argument was that the three references to Jesus in the Talmud refer to different individuals, with only one referring to the Christian Jesus[5], who was executed for sorcery. (This, in itself, was an astounding admission that he was prepared to have made during the debate.)
R. Yechiel went on to explain that while some of the texts in question were accurate, they referred to idolaters and not to Christians who were in a category of sophisticated religions.
R. MOSHE BEN YAAKOV OF COUCY:
R. Moshe was a student of R. Yehudah haChassid. He was also known as Moshe miKotsi and was an expert on Halacha who authored one of the first codifications of Law in his Sefer Mitzvot haGadol (or SeMaG).[6]
It has been suggested that the reason for this work was a direct result of the thousands of Talmudic manuscripts being burned after the Disputation of Paris. Because these texts were no longer available, he needed to present a Halachic summation of their contents.
The historical irony, of course, is that Nicholas Donin’s attempt to destroy rabbinical Judaism resulted in even more attention being focused in the codification of that very same law.
Another great irony was that ten years earlier, Jews had denounced the writings of Rambam to the Dominicans in France which resulted in Jews burning manuscripts of Maimonides on the same streets the Talmud was later burned by the Christians. This incident was sparked by Rambam's work, the Guide for the Perplexed, which was also translated into French! 
A third irony was that Nicholas Donin was himself accused of heresy by the Christians for his excessive rationalistic approach to Christianity, and may have even been put to death by the church.
R. YEHUDAH OF MELUN:
R. Yehudah was from the town of Melun, in north-central France forty miles from the centre of Paris, where he headed his academy.
R. SHMUEL BEN SHLOMOH OF FALAISE:
R. Shmuel is known by his French name, Sir Morel, by which is he sometimes referred to in rabbinical literature. He is also the Tosafot on certain Tractates of Talmud, particularly Avodah Zarah.

These rabbis were some of the greatest of the time, yet they were unable to exert pressure upon the church to change its negative views on the Talmud, as they now had translations they could read and interpret themselves.
As Seidman writes: “...translations and baptisms were parallel campaigns, performed in the same public space, demonstrating that the Jewish world had been blown open wide.”[7]

ANALYSIS:
FOR YOUR EYES ONLY?
From what we have seen, the catalyst for so many debates between the Christians and Jews in medieval times - which usually ended badly for the Jews – often was the translation of a Hebrew text into the native language or lingua franca:
The movement of translation from Jewish to non-Jewish languages stripped Jewish discourse of its protective covering, forcing Jewish texts out into an unfriendly Christian world”.[8]
Amazingly, to this day, some Jews still look suspiciously upon any texts translated from the original Hebrew or Aramaic. This is true particularly within elements of the sheltered yeshiva world, where no one will want to be seen using a Gemora with an English translation - even by Artscroll!
Never mind an English translation, but no one would even want to be seen with a Modern Hebrew paraphrase of the Aramaic.
Jastrow’s Aramaic dictionaries are not openly consulted in some places, and if they reluctantly are, they are occasionally used as book props or even foot rests!
But the fact is that more and more texts are becoming available in ‘foreign languages’. This presents a great challenge today - not just to Judaism but to every religion - where so much literature is openly available on the internet. Scholars and laymen alike can now peruse the once secret and indecipherable texts of the other’s faith.
We can no longer hide behind excuses of difficult concepts being explained away as ‘lost in translation’ because now all religion is laid bare. Today, except for those within closed communities, we can no longer hide behind erudite religious ‘spin’.
It’s not so easy to hide texts away anymore. This presents a great challenge for us.
Even sects within Judaism, who had no idea what teachings their sister sects were espousing (although they understood the language, the texts were not readily available) – they now have insight not readily accessible before.
Hopefully, it will result in stronger, more honest and meaningful encounters with faith.
Perhaps there is more open honesty to be ‘found’ than ‘lost in translation’!

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Faithful Renderings: Jewish-Christian Difference and the Politics of Translationby Naomi Seidman.

Judaism on Trial: Jewish-Christian Disputations in the Middle Ages, by Haym Maccoby.

Beautiful Death: Jewish Poetry and Martyrdom in Medieval France, by Susan L. Einbinder.









[1] See Beautiful Death: Jewish Poetry and Martyrdom in Medieval France, by Susan L. Einbinder. See alsoKOTZK BLOG 84 for an alternate explanation.

[2] This was R. Yechiel of Paris, who recorded the proceedings in his work known as Vikuach or Debate. [3] See Haym Maccoby: Judaism on Trial: Jewish-Christian Disputations in the Middle Ages.
[4] Some say he never lived in the Land of Israel and remained in France, where he died. There may be evidence of fragments of his tombstone which reads: Moreinu Yechiel... leGan Ed...
[5] Sota 47a.  Sanhedrin 107b refers to another ‘Jesus of Nazareth’. The third reference from Gittin 47a was to another who ‘gets boiled in a boiling pot’.
[6] Although he seems to have followed a similar format to Rambam’s Mishneh Torah, he - unlike Rambam – offers lengthy discussion and explanation of the laws. He also borrows much from Rashi and the Tosafists and usually favours the customs of Ashkenaz over Rambam.

[7] See Faithful Renderings: Jewish-Christian Difference and the Politics of Translation, by Naomi Seidman, p. 138.

[8] Ibid.

Sunday 11 June 2017

128) RATIONALISM, MYSTICISM AND NOW SUPERSTITION?

INTRODUCTION[1]:

Do some of our common 'religious' practices today fall under the category of rationalism, mysticism or possibly just plain superstition?

RAMBAM ON SUPERSTITION:

Rambam writes:

“ Anyone who whispers a charm over a wound and reads a verse from the Torah, or one who recites a biblical verse over a child lest he be terrified, or one who places a Torah scroll or tefillin over an infant to enable him to sleep, are not only included in the category of sorcerers and charmers, but are included among those who repudiate the Torah. They use the words of the Torah as a physical cure, whereas they are exclusively a cure for the soul, as it is written, ‘they will be life to your soul.'
On the other hand, one who is enjoying good health is permitted to recite biblical verses, or a psalm, that he may be shielded and saved from affliction and damage by virtue of the reading.” [2]
The last sentences is interesting because, although it is not the Rambam’s ideal of religion, it is nevertheless, still within the parameters of religion (as opposed to superstition), as it is G-d and not just the verses that one is appealing to - the verses are secondary and no longer have the urgency they would have had if one were to be desperate and unwell.
Rambam was known to have often offered ‘religious concessions’ to the populace. He even believed that the biblical sacrifices were only permitted as a means of accommodating the ‘ignorant masses’’ desire to infuse theology with ritual sacrifice – a sentiment which was common at that time – notwithstanding the fact that the notion of sacrifice was, in his view, never considered a true spiritual virtue. See KOTZK BLOG 68.

MEZUZA:

Rambam writes about Mezuzah:
“There is a widespread custom to write the word Shaddai on the outer side of the Mezuzah, opposite the blank space between the two sections. Since it is written on the outside, there is no harm done. On the other hand, those who write inside the Mezuzah names of angels or names of saintly men, some biblical verse or some charms, are included among those who have no share in the world to come. Those fools not only fail to fulfil the commandment but they treat an important precept, which conveys God's Oneness as well as the love and worship of Him, as if it were an amulet to benefit themselves, since they foolishly believe that the Mezuzah is something advantageous for the vain pleasures of this world.” [3]

ANGELS:

Rambam didn’t believe angels manifested in reality, even though they are frequently mentioned in the Torah. He maintained that every encounter with an ‘angel’ took place in a dreamlike state. See KOTZK BLOG 110.

GUIDELINES:

Rambam set out three guidelines we need to consider before accepting anything as religiously true:
1) It must be provable by human logic such as by astronomy, mathematics and geometry.
2) It must be perceivable by the five senses.
3) It must come down to us through the prophets or the righteous.

SELECTIVE DISCRIMINATION:

Rambam was such a believer in the necessity of using human rationale in the sphere of religion, that he even went against many of the teachings of the Talmud and Midrashim:
Writing about astrology, Rambam said “fools have composed thousands of books of nothingness and emptiness” – even though early rabbinic sources are replete with references to astrology.
In his Letter to Yemen, he writes that we do not have to take everything the previous generations wrote as being authoritative (except, of course when it came to matters of clear Halacha):
“Do not consider a statement true because you find it in a book, for the prevaricator is as little restrained with his pen as with his tongue. For the untutored and uninstructed are convinced of the veracity of a statement by the mere fact that it is written; nevertheless, its accuracy must be demonstrated in another manner.”
In Rambam’s view, anything that is written within rabbinic literature which contradicts rationale - outside of clear Halacha - has to be re-evaluated. This is because various statements may have been made within the framework of a particular historical and cultural milieu.
For many religious people today, this may appear to be a rather radical and untraditional view. Perhaps the best way to explain this approach is to understand that Rambam’s magnum opus, or masterpiece, the Mishneh Torah was a distillation of Halacha from the labyrinth of the Talmud. It intentionally left out, not just the discussion but even the derivation of the Law, and presented only the practical outcome.
In this sense, Rambam filtered out much of what he believed was not vital to the student of Halacha, so that he should not be encumbered by unnecessary and impractical information.  
He did the same with regard to what he considered to be ‘irrational’ beliefs common at that time and in that culture.
It is possible, to borrow a modern term, that Rambam regarded the Talmud as a kind of ‘internet’ of the day. It recorded whatever it could lay its hands on, for the sake of preserving the teachings for posterity, assuming the information and recorded statements would later be subjected to some measure of discretion by the readers.
It is also feasible that Rambam treated the Talmud the very same way as many today treat the Rambam himself. It is quite common for us to selectively take the Rambam’s Halachic writings (E.g. Mishneh Torah) and regard them with authority, while disregarding his Hashkafic or philosophical writings (E.g. Moreh Nevuchim). Rambam too, may have only regarded the Halachic aspects of the Talmud as being authoritative while disregarding some of the other values it espoused.
Understandably, not everybody was enthralled by his rationalist approach to Judaism:

VILNA GAON DISAGREES VEHEREMENTLY WITH RAMBAM:

There is a fascinating ruling in the Shulchan Aruch which permits a superstitious practice, under certain circumstances:
If someone is stung by a scorpion, it is permitted, even on Shabbat, to recite a charm over the victim, although such a thing is of no benefit whatsoever. Still, since a life is in danger, they (the rabbis) permitted it lest the victim suffer mental (psychological) anguish.

The Vilna Gaon comments on this:
This opinion (of the Shulchan Aruch offering a concession to use a charm on someone psychologically traumatised by a scorpion’s sting – although ‘there is no benefit whatsoever’) is the Rambam’s (view) as expressed in his Hilchot Avodah Zarah.
However, all subsequent authorities disagreed with him because of the (fact that) numerous charms (are) recorded in the Talmud.
He (Rambam) was drawn by the accursed philosophy, and that is why he wrote that witchcraft, names, charms, demons and amulets, are all deception.
But he has been thoroughly refuted on the strength of the innumerable stories found in the Talmud (concerning these issues)...
(P)hilosophy with her blandishments led him to explain all such stories allegorically and to uproot them from their literal meaning.
As for me, heaven forbid that I should accept any of those allegorical explanations.”
Thus the Vilna Gaon felt utterly compelled to distance himself from Rambam’s stance on charms and demons etc. by virtue of the simple fact that they are mentioned so often in Talmudic and other rabbinic literature. This clearly shows, in the Vilna Gaon’s view, that these concepts must be part of authentic Judaism, and he, therefore, has to reject the Rambam’s rationalist approach.

ANALYSIS:

Here we have an extremely stark debate between Rambam and the Vilna Gaon (although they lived about five hundred years apart).
Rambam was prepared to dismiss a whole array of (non-Halachik) Talmudic teachings because he felt them to be out of step with rationalism.
The Vilna Gaon, a mystic by nature, could never contemplate such a notion, under any circumstances. We have to accept everything written in the Talmud as absolute religious truths.
- These are clearly two very different paths and the reader will, most likely, be drawn to one view at the exclusion of the other.
This is not necessarily a bad thing as Judaism has always meant different things to different types of people.

HYPOTHESIS:

The question is – have we not abused the traditional mystical view and morphed it even further away from rationalism by creation a third category, namely that of superstition?
Religion is hard.

Honest religion leaves us with more questions than answers.

True religion finds us in a constant state of asking, probing and searching.

Superstition comes hidden behind a blanket of intense apparent religiosity. And much of the modern religious world today has bought in to this veiled superstition.

Superstition comes endorsed by very religious looking and sounding leaders who use catch phrases speak with the voice of authority.

Superstition makes Judaism easy. Wear a red band on your arm, check your mezuzah, bake a challah, make an Amein party or say Tehillim. Just make sure to get the Hebrew name and the mother’s name right and if the sick person still happens to pass away, well G-d just needed another angel in heaven. Or, that soul only had to come down for a short period of time to effect its tikkun – and then it is ruthlessly snatched away.

Superstition provides more answers than questions.

Rationalism and mysticism have always been two legitimate branches of Judaism with much historical precedent. Many say that the common approach to Judaism nowadays is more inclined towards that of the mystics – but that notion could be challenged. We may have created, instead of perpetuating traditional mysticism, a third branch of Judaism which comes disguised as spiritual mysticism yet, when unveiled is nothing more than common superstition.

It finds us in a constant state of reliance upon a certain type of populist religious leadership, and that intellectual subjugation and suspension of the intellect, leaves the practitioner in a state of mindless yet comfortable nirvana. 

But this nirvana may not be as deeply rooted within genuine Judaism as some would like us to believe.





[1] Many of the ideas in this article have been taken from Maimonides, Spinoza and Us: Toward an Intellectually Vibrant Judaism, by Rabbi Marc Angel.

[2] Hilkhot Avoda Zara, 11:12
[3] Laws of Mezuzah 5:4