494) Inverted hierarchies: Humans making G-d more moral

Introduction

This article ꟷ based extensively on the research by Professor Dov Weiss[1] ꟷ examines how late Palestinian Midrashim, particularly the Tanchuma Yelamedeinu (fourth to ninth centuries CE), depict humans challenging G-d over morally problematic issues expressed in the Torah. In these cases, biblical figures are audaciously portrayed as both teaching and counselling G-d, as it were, convincing Him to adopt a more moral and ethical approach. The Midrashic work, Tanchuma Yelamedeinu exhibits about fifty examples of humans making G-d ‘more moral.’ 

493) Carrying on Shabbat: From Jeremiah to the Mishna

Jerusalem began trading on the silk route from around 200 BCE

Introduction

This article ꟷ based extensively on the research by Professor Alex P. Jassen[1] ꟷ examines how four pre-Mishnaic texts show evidence of the origin and expansion of the prohibition against carrying on Shabbat. The specific textual prohibition against carrying on Shabbat first begins with Yirmiyahu’s (Jeremiah’s) prohibition against carrying a ‘load’ (מַשָּׂא֙, massa), for trade and commercial purposes, and only in Jerusalem. It then underwent a process of expansion during Second Temple times as it passed through the four texts of Nechemiah (Nehemiah), the Book of Jubilees, the Dead Sea Scrolls and finally became the Mishna’s general Halachic prohibition, as we know it today, against carrying ‘anything’ to or from ‘any’ domain. We shall trace and map this textual progression. Our focus is on the textual trail, as the oral tradition (which we briefly discuss at the conclusion) is not possible to track in the same way. 

492) Are Halachic rulings (Piskei Halacha) open to critical analysis or do they represent Divine Will?

    The varying faces of Piskei Halacha:

A Psak Din from R. Henkin 1934 regarding an inheritance

A Psak Din signed by 250 rabbis declaring the Lubavitcher Rebbe the Messiah

Introduction

This article – based extensively on the research by Professor Adiel Schremer[1] − takes an in-depth and forthright look at the sometimes mysterious process of Halachic decision-making as practised by the Posek (Halachic judge or decisor). The Torah teaches that if any matter of law shall arise in the future that is too difficult for people to determine by themselves, then they must approach the “judge who shall be in those days” (Deut. 17:8-11) for adjudication:

וּבָאתָ֗ אֶל־הַכֹּהֲנִים֙ הַלְוִיִּ֔ם וְאֶ֨ל־הַשֹּׁפֵ֔ט אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִהְיֶ֖ה בַּיָּמִ֣ים הָהֵ֑ם וְדָרַשְׁתָּ֙ וְהִגִּ֣ידוּ לְךָ֔ אֵ֖ת דְּבַ֥ר הַמִּשְׁפָּֽט

However, the Torah is silent on exactly how the judge is to go about deciding the law: 

“Scripture offers no answer, and surprisingly it is neither discussed by later classical Jewish tradition, nor addressed by modern students of Jewish law” (Schremer 2010:5). 

In practice, we all know that the simple answer is to ‘ask a rabbi,’ or, under more pressing circumstances, to ‘ask a Posek’ (an authoritative Halachic decisor). The question, though, in light of the silence on the matter, is what specific process or methodology (if any) does the Posek (have to) follow?  Various interest groups sometimes propose direct or indirect 'guidelines,' but, as we shall see, that only contributes to the problem.