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| Piskei haRid and Piskei haRiaz. Rid (grandfather) and Riaz (grandson) published together in one volume, although their worldviews were very different. |
Introduction
This article—drawing extensively on the research of Professor Marc Shapiro[1]—asks whether the Italian commentator and Talmudist, R. Yeshaya di Trani (known as Riaz) had a larger influence on future Judaism than Maimonides. Riaz was one of the rabbis who vigorously opposed Maimonides during the Maimonidean Controversies that consumed the rabbinic world in the centuries after Maimonides’ passing in 1204. It seems that the rabbis were not ready for the radical expansiveness of Maimonidean thought, and under the leadership of Riaz—the great anti‑Maimonidean polemicist—refused to allow Judaism to be subjected to philosophical creed or inquiry. Maimonides’ towering philosophical system threatened to redefine Judaism as a religion of creed and rational inquiry. Not all rabbis were prepared to accept this radical shift, and Riaz emerged as one of the most forceful voices of resistance, rejecting the binding nature of Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles of Faith as well as his rationalism. Instead, he argued for a simpler, unsophisticated and non-dogmatic faith based solely on Halachic observance.
Background to R. Yeshaya of Trani (Riaz, d.c. 1280)
Trani is a seaport city in southern Italy. Yeshaya di Trani (the younger) was the maternal grandson of Yeshaya di Trani (the elder). He is generally known as either ריא״ז (Riaz, or R. Yeshaya Acharon Zal), or alternately as ריב״א (Riva, or R. Yeshaya ben Eliyahu)—to distinguish him from his grandfather the רי״ד (Rid, or R. Yeshaya ben Mali di Trani, also known as R. Yeshaya haZaken, the elder, 1165-1240).
Riaz wrote commentaries on parts of the Tanach which stand out as being the first commentaries to be produced in Italy. They are notably concise and free of allegorical interpretations and often cite grammarians like Avraham Ibn Ezra. It seems that he was not fond of quoting Midrashim, like Rashi did in his commentaries, because he did not want to be ridiculed by Christian scholars and by Jews who had been baptised. He also authored Piskei Halachot, the first code of law to be produced in Italy. Interestingly, he derives the Halachot primarily from the Mishna and not the Gemara and emphasises the Jerusalem Talmud over the Babylonian Talmud. Although he often cites his grandfather—whom he refers to as מז"ה (Mori Zekeini haRav)—he does not shy away from criticising him for his Aristotelian views, which he claims are against the Torah.[2] Maimonides—who was greatly influenced by Aristotle—was included in his criticisms as well, and it is to those disparagements that we now turn.
Riaz as a sharp critic of
Maimonides
Riaz emerges as one of the notable rabbinic voices who resisted Maimonides’ attempt to define Judaism through rigid philosophical dogma. While Maimonides sought to anchor Jewish identity in his Thirteen Principles of Faith, Riaz rejected all such creeds. Judaism, he argued, should not be reduced to abstract propositions accessible only to philosophers, but must remain rooted in Halachic practice and experiential and lived tradition. Riaz thus positioned himself as a counterweight to Maimonides’ rationalist project, ensuring that Judaism retained its accessibility by ordinary people. But he was not a mysic—he was a Halachic pragmatist.
Corporeality
One of Maimonides’ famous principles was that G-d has no body or corporeal form:
חֲמִשָּׁה
הֵן הַנִּקְרָאִים מִינִים... וְהָאוֹמֵר שֶׁיֵּשׁ שָׁם רִבּוֹן אֶחָד אֲבָל
שֶׁהוּא גּוּף וּבַעַל תְּמוּנָה
“Five are called heretics (minim)… One who says there is One Master, but He has a body and a form” (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Teshuvah, 3:7).
This was one of Maimonides’ central dogmas, yet this was one of the first to be dismantled by Riaz. In this regard, Riaz—although he does not cite him— sided with R. Abraham ben David of Posquières (known as the Raavad, 1125-1198), who was one of the earliest and most important critics of Maimonides. Raavad’s critiques are embedded as glosses (Hasagot) in the margins of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, and he writes that “many greater and better (rabbis) than he (Maimonides),” believed G-d had some form, and they should not, therefore, be branded heretics. Raavad also opposed the Maimonidean project of codification of the law. He criticised Maimonides’ omission of sources because it gave the impression that Maimonides’ word was final, undermining the pluralism of Halachic discourse.
Riaz similarly counters that the Torah does not mandate a rejection of belief in Divine corporeality. Astonishingly, this means that one could affirm some form of bodily existence for G-d and still remain within the bounds of Torah. According to Riaz:
“[I]f one thinks that the Holy One...has a form, the Torah is not insistent about this. There were a number of holy sages of the Talmud, from whom Torah goes forth to Israel, who did not focus on the matter of the Divinity, but understood the [Torah] verse[s] in their simple sense…[T]hey thought that the Holy One…has a body and form… God forbid…we should regard [them] as heretics…” (Piskei haRiaz le Rabbeinu Yeshaya Acharon).[3]
Muktzeh
Riaz’s argument is simple. If the Talmudic Sages discussed minor issues such as muktzeh (the prohibitions against touching items that are not to be used on Shabbat), but not G-d’s incorporeality, then the matter of ascribing a form to G-d is not a problem. The fact is, Riaz presents a very good argument because if Maimonides was correct, then many Talmudic Sages would have to be branded as heretics (Shapiro 2022:364). Riaz writes:
“Regarding some light prohibitions such as muktzeh and similar things, the Sages composed numerous halakhot and added many details to establish them firmly. Yet this matter [divine incorporeality], upon which [correct] belief entirely depends, and [rejection of it] carries with it karet in this world and in the World to Come, how is it that the Sages did not openly rule about this? It must be that they were not insistent about this matter. Rather, let each person believe in [God’s] unity in accordance with his intellect, and even the women in accord with their limited intellect, for Moses said, Hear, O Israel the Lord our God…Hear is the language of ‘tradition’ and of ‘reception,’ as through received tradition one believes this matter and it was through the path of [simple and personal] faith and tradition that Moses gave the Torah to Israel. The sages…did not at all require people to investigate the matter of divinity or other areas of philosophy” (Piskei haRiaz le Rabbeinu Yeshaya Acharon).
Riaz thus presents a model of Judaism as a type of folk religion that is easily accessible to the common people. Everyone becomes equidistant to G-d. It has a ring of the future Chassidic movement and the Baal Shem Tov, centuries later, although Riaz was not promoting mysticism.
Messiah
Belief in the Messiah is a Maimonidean principle of faith. Yet the Talmud tells of a certain R. Hillel, who believed that the Messiah had already come in the days of Hezekiah (b. Sanhedrin 99a). In this case, too, the Sages do not condemn R. Hillel as a heretic for denying the future arrival of the Messiah. In other words, according to Riaz, R. Hillel may have erred in his understanding of the Messiah, but such an error did not amount to a denial of any fundamental principle of Jewish faith.
Philosophy
As evident from his writings, Riaz was totally opposed to any form of theological or philosophical inquiry whatsoever. He writes:
“[T]he early sages of Israel were careful not to write any book [about these matters]. That which they knew of these things, it was all by tradition which individuals received. It was not from books written by wise men of the nations of the world [a biting allusion to Maimonides being influenced by Aristotle], for they are all inclined to heresy…They also think that the world is eternal [and was never created]” (Piskei haRiaz le Rabbeinu Yeshaya Acharon).
Providence
Riaz was a firm believer in Providence (Hashgacha), where G-d directs every detail of the universe. He attacks Aristotle and Maimonides for denying the notion of Providence:
“Aristotle, who was the teacher
of the philosophers, whose waters they drink and whose books they focus on, his
words are words of heresy, for he says that the Holy One…does not exercise
providence over people, as Maimonides cites in his name in the Guide [of the
Perplexed][4]…[Maimonides]
also wrote that that Aristotle thinks all the various things you see that occur
with humanity are due to sheer chance. This is complete heresy…[and] are the
books of heretics, and Rabbi Akiva states that the one who studies external
books has no share in the World to Come” (Piskei haRiaz le Rabbeinu Yeshaya
Acharon).
One notices that accusations of heresy were exchanged between both the rationalist and traditionalist camps, each branding the other as transgressors of faith. Maimonides, as noted, condemned those who affirmed any corporeal conception of G-d as heretics. Riaz, by contrast, directed the charge of heresy against those who denied Divine Providence, thereby underscoring his conviction that Judaism’s core lay not in abstract philosophy but in the lived assurance of G-d’s governance.
The claim that Maimonides was rejected by the Sages
Riaz goes so far as to assert that Maimonides’ views were rejected by none other than the greatest Sages of Judaism:
“[Maimonides] was suspect in the eyes of great sages in Israel” (Piskei haRiaz le Rabbeinu Yeshaya Acharon).
In making this claim, Riaz sought to undermine Maimonides’ authority by aligning himself with the weight of tradition, suggesting that the most eminent rabbinic figures did not accept the binding nature of Maimonides’ dogmatic formulations. For Riaz, simple Halachic observance and fidelity to tradition constituted the sole legitimate path for Jews. In his view, Judaism was not defined by dogma or philosophical speculation, but by the daily rhythm of concrete Halachic practices and inherited commitments:
“[The] great men of the world and all Israel…valued the wisdom of Torah exclusively…the Holy One…cares only about the wisdom of Torah… [T]he Torah of Moses and all the books of the prophets reprove and encourage and teach only concerning the Torah and mitzvot…Those who walk a crooked path sometimes find contradictory verses and they turn them to what they want…to heresy” (Piskei haRiaz le Rabbeinu Yeshaya Acharon).
Secular studies
Maimonides regarded ‘non-Torah’ studies, such as science and philosophy, as essential elements for religious growth and expression (Shapiro 2022:372, n.21). Riaz considered these subjects to be heretical:
“The great saintly men who serve God from love do not do so through other [non-Torah] studies, as Maimonides [did]…but through their continuous involvement in Torah and mitzvot until the ways of God have become firmly established in them, and they have no intention for anything else” (Piskei haRiaz le Rabbeinu Yeshaya Acharon).
Allegorical biblical readings
Maimonides has a rather rich array of biblical interpretations that he strips of their literal meanings and chooses to understand as allegorical. One such example is the Garden of Eden. According to Maimonides it was not a place but an allegory or metaphor. Riaz took exception to this:
“I heard those who say that Maimonides also followed this path [interpreting the Garden of Eden as a metaphor]. It is very difficult in my eyes that a holy mouth would say such things, for the Torah testified about it and gave it markers and borders…If someone can come and say that this [Garden of Eden] is only metaphorical. [with this approach] we can say that the entire Torah and all the commandments are also metaphorical…Yet the sages of the Torah said that a [biblical] verse does not depart from its simple meaning…and it is the truth… [Maimonides’ interpretation] is a great heresy…and whoever says that the Torah is not from Heaven, even one verse or a single point (dikduk), he has no share in the World to Come. One who interprets biblical verses as metaphors and removes them from their meaning is a heretic and abolishes the entire Torah. He is similar to one who says the Torah is not from Heaven… [I]t is proper to say ‘May God forgive him’” (Piskei haRiaz le Rabbeinu Yeshaya Acharon).
Rid and Riaz: Between inquiry and tradition
Riaz was far more rigid than his maternal grandfather, Rid, who was a Tosafist. The two are often confused as they go by the same name, Yeshaya of Trani. Rid, however, was quite critical of rabbis like Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam, and “condemned the ritualistic rigor of the teachers of France and Germany.”[5] Ironically, as opposed to his grandson, Rid seems to have been more moderate in his interpretation of Halacha.
Together, the grandfather and grandson represent the two poles of medieval Italian Judaism: Tosafot Rid’s dialectic theory and intellectual inquiry on the one hand—and Riaz’s accessible Halachic simplicity on the other. This reflects Italy at the crossroads between the scholastic traditions of German and French Ashkenaz, with their intricate Talmudic dialectics, and the Mediterranean emphasis on inherited practice and communal fidelity—vacillating somewhere between the Rid’s inquiry and Riaz’s tradition.
Analysis
It is arguable that Riaz’s success inadvertently curtailed the broader development of Judaism, rendering much of its trajectory a casualty of his triumph. Put differently, much of Judaism’s future became the victim of Riaz’s success. Practical Judaism often remained committed to a focus on the lowest theological common denominator: observance and practice without philosophy (although most Jews came to accept the creed of the Thirteen Maimonidean Principles). There certainly were historical exceptions along the way, but the popular acceptance of Riaz’s approach may also have limited Judaism’s theological horizons. Riaz championed the religion of “simple believers” (Shapiro 2022:364) and rejected a more sophisticated approach to theology and philosophy:
“[A]s far as R. Isaiah is concerned, Judaism does not require people to engage in theological investigation” (Shapiro 2022:365).
Riaz’s insistence on a path defined exclusively by biblical literalism, fidelity to tradition rather than inquiry, and the simplicity of mechanical Halachic observance ensured that Judaism remained accessible to the masses. In his framework, no Jew was excluded for failing to think, question or master abstract philosophy. Riaz’s model safeguarded communal inclusion, allowing even the simplest of Jews to belong.
The question that remains is whether Judaism’s future was
enriched by Maimonides’ daring rationalism or narrowed by Riaz’s Halachic
simplicity—a debate and tension that continues to shape the contours of Jewish
thought to this day, leaving the possible approaches to the tradition suspended somewhere between
accessibility and depth.
[1]
Shapiro, M. B., 2022, ‘Rabbi Isaiah of Trani and His Anti-Maimonidean
Conception of Faith and Dogma’, in Torat Moshe: Essays in Honor of Rabbi Moshe
Shamah's Eightieth Birthday and the Jubilee of Sephardic Institute, Edited by Richard
Hidary, 363-374.
[2] See Jewish Encyclopedia: ISAIAH (BEN ELIJAH) DI TRANI (the Younger).
[3]
This follows the translation of R. Abraham Joseph Wertheimer (Jerusalem 1994).
[4]
Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, III:17.
[5]
See Jewish Encyclopedia: ISAIAH (BEN MALI) DI TRANI (the Elder; RID).
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