It’s commonly assumed that Jewish belief in G-d has remained consistent throughout history. In truth, Jewish perceptions of the Divine have been strikingly diverse, shaped and reshaped across centuries, cultures, and theological currents.
Many are familiar with the contrast between Maimonidean
philosophical rationalism—rooted in Aristotelian thought—and the mystical
worldview of Kabbalah which some maintain is rooted in Neoplatonic thought.[1]
Yet there is a third, often overlooked theological strand with ancient roots:
Jewish binitarianism. Emerging as early as Second Temple times, this approach suggests
a dual structure within the Divine, typically involving a transcendent G-d and
a mediating figure. Any serious discussion of Jewish theology must move beyond
the binary of rationalism and mysticism to include this third, lesser-known but
historically significant option. This discussion explores the theological
tensions of the thirteenth century surrounding the nature and definition of
G-d.
Most scholars have adopted a typically binary approach to the acute theological conflicts beginning in the thirteenth century—known as the Maimonidean Controversies—as a simple battle between Maimonides’ (1136-1204) rationalist philosophy and Kabbalah (with the first publication of the Zohar in 1290). Recent research by Tzahi Weiss, however, has challenged this simple binary approach. Weiss importantly alerts us to another theological influence that was still active in the thirteenth century, known as Jewish binitarianism. Recognising this third approach allows us to rethink the boundaries of Medieval Jewish thought and to explore the full spectrum of theological creativity that flourished during this formative era. The conflict was not just about rationalism versus mysticism—it involved a complicated interplay between rationalism, mysticism and binitarianism.
What is binitarianism?
Binitarianism is the notion of two personas—or two divisions—within one Godhead. It is still monotheism as it maintains the belief in one G-d. Binitarianism is, therefore, distinct from Bitheism, which is the belief in two gods. Binitarianism emerged around the second century BCE, and Second Temple literature about G-d “attests to a plethora of figures and agents that display powers and engage in acts, such as creation” (Teugels 2023:1).
Memra, Metatron, Shechina, Y-H-V-H
haKatan
Philo of Alexandria (20BCE-50CE), the first Jewish philosopher to engage with Greek philosophy and a monotheist, refers to the notion of the second aspect of G-d as deuteros theos, or the ‘second god.’ In Second Temple literature, Wisdom and Logos (Word) are both presented as the two components of the one G-d, and exist before the world was created. Although Logos (Word) is often associated with Christianity (as in “…the Word was G-d,” John 1:1), it is simply the Greek translation of the Aramaic Memra[2] (or Hebrew Maamar, or Dibbur), which all mean Word. The very concept of ‘word’ or ‘speech’ implies an interaction with an ‘other.’ The idea was that G-d had a form of dualism, a higher aspect, and a lower aspect that had more of a relationship with the world. Despite later Christian interpretations, this may be related to the plural expression concerning the creation of man, “Let us make man” (Gen. 1:26), even within a Jewish context. In fact, according to Daniel Boyarin, the early Christian movement did not constitute a break with Second Temple Judaism:
“the belief in an intermediary, a deuteros theos [second god], and even perhaps binitarian worship was common to them [early Christians] and other Jews” (Boyarin 2004:119).
Pre-Christian Jewish sources refer to various other agents
that are described as taking on a role in creation. These agents are sometimes
called Matatron or Enoch (חֲנוֹךְ). In 3 Enoch, also known as Sefer
Hechalot—although
a later text dating around the fifth century CE—Metatron, who is
identified with the biblical figure Enoch after his heavenly transformation, is
referred to as ‘the lesser G-d’ or ‘Y-H-V-H haKatan’.
G-d in the Targumim
In Targumic literature (i.e., Aramaic translations of the Hebrew Torah text), the Logos or Word component of G-d is simply the ‘Memra’ (or ‘utterance’). The Jewish Encyclopedia, under the entry “Memra,” describes the term as “used especially in the Targum as a substitute for ‘the Lord.’" Thus, “G-d said,” for example, often becomes “The Memra of G-d said in the Targumim.” Targum Neofiti is an example where one can see the original Aramaic maintaining Memra:
ואמר ממ(רא) [נ"א ממרה]
דיי
“And the Memra of God said: Let there be light…” (Targum Neofeti, Gen. 1:3).[3]
Targum Yonatan similarly employs the term Memra:
וְאִתְנְצִיב בְּמֵימְרָא דַיְ-יָ אֱלקִים גִינוּנִיתָא מֵעֵדֶן
“And a garden from the Eden…was planted by the Word [Memra] of the Lord God before the creation of the world” (Targum Yonatan, Gen. 2:8).
Targum Onkelos also makes copious use of Memra in relation to G-d:
“I shall be with you” (Exodus 3:12) is rendered by Onkelos as ‘במימרי יהי סעדך’ – “My Memra will support you.”
Moses brought the people “toward G-d” (Exodus 19:17) is rendered by Onkelos as ‘למימרא דה׳’ – “to the Memra of G-d.”
Jacob’s expression, “Hashem will be a G-d to me” (Genesis 28:21) is rendered by Onkelos as ‘ויהא מימרא דה׳ לאלקא’ – “the Memra of Hashem will be my G-d.”
A striking example, concerning the ‘brit’ or covenant between G-d and Mankind, is depicted in ‘impersonal’ and less than direct terms by Onkelos. The Torah describes G-d establishing His covenant ביני וביניכם, between “Me and you,” but Onkelos describes the union as ‘בין מימרי וביניכון’ – “between my Memra and you.”
Thus, we cannot escape the theology borne out by these texts and numerous other examples, that:
“[t]he Memra of God as presented in some Targumim seems to be attributed with independent agency, notably in creation but also as a mediator between God and humans” (Teugels 2023:2).
And in a similar sense:
“In the Targum the Memra figures constantly as the manifestation of the divine power, or as God's messenger in place of God Himself” (Jewish Encyclopedia).
Binitarianism and Trinitarianism
While Christianity formally rejected binitarianism in favour of trinitarianism—most notably at the Council of Nicaea in the fourth century—Jewish thought retained subtle traces of Divine duality. Binitarian motifs appear in Seder Eliyahu Rabbah (8th century), where G-d is portrayed as consulting the Torah during creation, suggesting an internal dialogue within the Divine. Similarly, twelfth-century mystical texts describe the Shechina as a feminine dimension of G-d, reinforcing a dual-aspect theology that echoes binitarian themes.
G-d in the Talmud
Talmudic literature (10–500 CE) engages with binitarian themes through its references to “two powers in heaven.” As Alan Segal (1977) argues, these were not reactions to Christian theology as some might assume, but rather expressions of theological currents within first-century Judaism (and Gnostic thought). Teugels (2023:4) similarly notes that such ideas reflect internal Jewish debates rather than polemics with external religions.
Identifying binitarianism in the Maimonidean
Controversies
In the thirteenth century, Provence (Southern France) and Catalonia (north-eastern Spain) emerged as key centres of theological conflict, sparking the Maimonidean Controversies—a centuries-long clash between Maimonidean rationalism and the rising influence of Zoharic mysticism and Kabbalah.
Weiss’ research is compelling because it introduces a third dimension often overlooked in the conventional framing of the Maimonidean Controversies as a simple clash between rationalism and mysticism. This third dimension is the widespread presence of binitarianism—which is neither rationalist nor mystical—which subtly permeated the theological discourse of the time. In fact, binitarianism was viewed with suspicion from both rationalist philosophers and mystics.
The theology of thirteenth-century binitarianism
During the thirteenth century, within the same geographical area in which the Maimonidean Controversies played out, a new form of Jewish binitarianism developed. This new theological school or movement retained the traditional binitarian Divine structure with upper and lower components, but the terminology changed. The Godhead was conceived as comprising a higher ‘Cause of Causes’ (Illat haIllot or Sibat haSibot) and a lower ‘Administrator of the World’ (Sar haOlam or Shechina).
Then, surprisingly, it went one step further and actively forbade the worship of the higher entity ‘Cause of Causes,’ because it was too aloof and impersonal. Instead, this formulation of bintarian theology directed prayer only to the lower entity of the Godhead, which was able to relate to humans and the world (Weiss 2021:2).
Weiss (2018:204) highlights a thirteenth-century text that strongly condemns what appears to have been a widespread practice at the time: the diversion of prayer from G-d to a subordinate figure or lesser being—referred to variously as Metatron, Enoch, or the Minister of the World. This critique not only reveals the presence of a significant Jewish group engaged in a form of binitarian theology, but also attests to the existence of a counter-movement that resisted such theological dualism.
Surprisingly, this text is not a mystical text. Rather, it seems to have emanated from the pro-Maimonidean camp. In other words, this is a rationalist text, or at least, it appears to have adopted a Maimonidean posture, advocating a direct approach to G-d without any mediators. It also suggests that G-d is not so aloof or indifferent to the affairs of humankind that He does not provide providence for human beings. On the contrary, the text declares:
“[I]t has become clear to us that
the providence of the Holy One, blessed be He, is found in the particulars as
in the universals alike, in what regards men, and He, blessed be He, is
plentiful of grace, so why would those damned ones say that we ought not pray
to Him? But He, exalted be He, hears prayers and becomes appeased in pleas and
refrains from judging according to the [stern] judgement. [ ... ] And following
the good path and the path of life [means] praying to the Master of All alone,
may He be exalted, who is Cause of all Causes [I‘Ilat kol ha’Ilot and Sibat kol
haSibot]” (cited in Weiss 2018:204).
Although this thirteenth-century text appears to originate from the Maimonidean camp, the Maimonidean concept of Divine Providence—particularly G-d’s involvement in human affairs—is far from straightforward. It remains a subject of interpretation and intense debate, which already began in the early thirteenth century.
Unlike the common perception today (particularly in the aftermath of the Baal Shem Tov’s emphasis on Hashgacha Peratit, or continuous individual Divine Providence over all beings and things at all times), in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed (3:17, 18, 51), he writes that G-d’s individual and specific providence may only apply to humans. And not to all humans, but particularly to those who apply their minds. This Maimonidean notion of providence, therefore, is a very minimalist and probably the narrowest interpretation of providence in Jewish theology.
For some Maimonidean followers, this minimalist interpretation of providence did not go far enough. Shmuel ibn Tibbon, who survived Maimonides by twenty-six years and translated his Guide of the Perplexed from the original Arabic into Hebrew in 1204 (the year of Maimonides’ passing), maintained that he knew Maimonides’ personal view of the matter of providence. He said that Maimonides was pressured by public opinion to officially submit to at least a minimalist acknowledgement of providence in his book, but that he himself never believed that to be true. He claimed that Maimonides held that for G-d, no form of individual providence existed, as He was too removed from this material existence—and that Maimonides had simply written that providence only existed for intelligent humans, to “delude the masses” and to keep his true personal views to himself.
The problem was that once Shmuel ibn Tibbon’s views became public knowledge, many Jews refrained from praying! Why pray to a G-d who is not interested in the affairs of this world? Understandably, Shmuel ibn Tibbon became the subject of much rebuke, not least from his own son, Moshe ibn Tibbon, and son-in-law, Yakov Anatoli, who, ironically, were also Maimonidean followers. They tried to stem the storm and encourage people to return to their prayers. Yakov Anatoli wrote:
“[Indeed] He casts His providence over the lower world…unlike the words of the wicked heretics who say that the Lord has forsaken the earth” (Yakov Anatoli, Malmad haTalmidim, 1866:64b-65a).
Interestingly, on this matter, the mystical Kabbalists and (some moderate) rationalist Maimonideans agreed. The early thirteenth-century Kabbalist, Asher ben David—acutely aware of the theological tension of his times—similarly wrote:
“There are yet other sects in the world, people whose exaggerated depth of thought brings them to perplexity [clearly referring to the radical Maimonideans under Shmuel ibn Tibbon], and they delve into inquiries regarding the Cause of Causes [I‘Ilat ha’Ilot], thus preventing humans from praying” (Abrams 1996:135).
Other thirteenth-century Kabbalists, like Ramban (Nachmanides), Azriel of Gerona and Yakov ben Sheshet, are also concerned about the growing philosophical trend at that time to turn away from prayers, and they were quick to blame Aristotelian (read rationalist Maimonidean) philosophy for this.
Jewish binitarianism
Despite their differences, early Kabbalists and Maimonidean rationalists found common ground in opposing a third theological force often overlooked by scholars: Jewish binitarianism. As Weiss argues, this group—neither philosophical nor mystical—advocated worship of a Divine intermediary like Metatron, bypassing G-d entirely. As mentioned, far from novel, their ideas trace back to Second Temple Judaism and surface in fourth-century Targumic literature through frequent references to the Memra (Divine Word).
Maimonideans would have rejected binitarian theology because they believed that one approaches G-d directly without the agency of any intermediaries (like Memra, Metatron, etc.). These would be regarded by Maimonideans as forms of idolatry (Kellner 2007).
Kabbalists would have regarded binitarian theology as heretical, most importantly because it denies providence; and secondly, because (certainly according to many early Kabbalistic schools) it demanded praying to a separate entity, even if that entity comprised of angels—something the early Kabbalists would have opposed:
“[T]he [early] Kabbalists of Provence and Catalonia in the first part of the thirteenth century were very cautious with regard to God’s unity” (Weiss 2021:5).
The vast majority of these early Kabbalists, although not all of them, believed that the Sefirot were emanations from G-d and not separate creations.
Conclusion
Weiss’ research changes the historical landscape. According to him, there were not just mystics and rationalists at the time of the emergence of the Kabbalah in the thirteenth century. There were also binitarians, and they were not a marginal group at all (Weiss 2021:6).
Weiss offers a compelling and necessary expansion of our understanding of the Maimonidean Controversies. Until now, scholarship has largely framed the debate as a binary clash between rationalist philosophy and emergent Kabbalah. Binitarianism—though occasionally noted—was often misread as a form of quasi-mysticism. This confusion is understandable, given the theological overlap: post-1290 Zoharic Kabbalah developed a more autonomous conception of the Shechinah, bringing it closer to binitarian themes. Conversely, some binitarians, influenced by thinkers like Samuel ibn Tibbon, abandoned prayer to the Cause of Causes in favour of worshipping a mediator.
As Scholem (1987:3) rightly observed, the early 13th century
remains “the most difficult in the history of the Jewish religion after the
destruction of the Second Temple.” By identifying binitarianism as a third
theological force, Weiss moves us beyond the simplistic binary of mysticism
versus rationalism, offering a more nuanced lens through which to view this
formative period; and more importantly, contributes to a deeper understanding
of the complexities in Jewish perceptions of G-d. Jewish theological
conceptions of G-d were never simple and certainly never consistent nor
definitive over history.
Appendix
How two important documents may have previously been
misread
Before this research by Weiss, scholars (such as Gershom Scholem) believed that there was opposition to the unexpected emergence of Kabbalah in the thirteenth century because of a document written by the Provencal Talmudist, Meir ben Shimon of Narbonne (d. 1270), known as haMe’ili. Most scholars assumed that this document expressed concern for what it called heretical beliefs of the Sefirot or G-dly emanations. But other scholars (including Herskowitz (1974), Goshen-Gottstein (2004), and Weiss (2018) have noted that haMe’ili is not directing his objection to the Sefirotic system, but rather to a general celestial system of spheres that corresponds to the beliefs of Jewish binitatians! This reading is borne out in haMe’ili’s text, where he opposes—not Kabbalistic Sefirot—but traditional Jewish binitarianism:
“[O]ne ought not relinquish the greater [God] [lifrosh min hagadol] and pray to the lesser one” (haMe’ili cited in Weiss 2018:337).
With an understanding of the existence of a significant body of Jewish binitarians—a veritable binitarian movement—it is now easy to see how binitarians could be confused for Kabbalists (even though they were not technically mystics or rationalists). This possible fundamental misrepresentation of Jewish history is understandable when one considers:
“…the dominancy of the two categories—'philosophy’ and ‘Kabbalah’, which guided scholars in their research…[T]he latter were unable to discern and recognize the essence of haMe’ili’s attitude and the object of his criticism…[which] seemed to be an objection of Meir ben Simone to the ‘Kabbalah’” (Weiss 2021:7).
Weiss brings additional evidence from another document—a letter by Yitzchak the Blind (Yitzchak Sagi Nehor, d. 1235), the uncle of Asher ben David—from the same time and geographical location as haMe’ili, which was also mistakenly interpreted (this time as an inner Kabalistic polemic about esoteric or exoteric Kabbalah). Possibly it was an inner Kabbalistic debate between early and latter Kabbalists on the degree of independence of the Sefrot. In any case, Weiss again asserts that the letter reads better in the context of the existence of a significant group of Jewish binaterians (this time in the city of Burgos) is taken into consideration:
“[The] people from Burgos…openly speak in the marketplaces and in the streets, in confused and hasty discourses, and from their words it is clearly perceptible that their heart has been turned from Upper Cause [ha’Elionah] and that they are cutting the shoots, whereas these devarim [sefirot] are united as the flame is bound to a coal, for the Master is one and has no second…” (Letter from Yitzchak the Blind, Weiss 2021).
Yitzchak the Blind, according to Weiss (2021:8), feared that
Jewish binitarians—possibly influenced by radical Maimonideans who were historically
welcomed in Burgos—who abandoned the Cause of Causes to worship intermediaries,
might misread emerging Kabbalistic theosophy as theological backing for
their binitarian views.
Further Reading
Kotzk
Blog: 284) THE BAVLI ON ‘TWO POWERS IN HEAVEN’:
Bibliography
Abrams, D., 1996, R. Asher ben David: His Complete
Work and Studies in His Kabbalistic Thought, Cherub Press, Los Angeles.
Boyarin, D., 2004, Border Lines: The Partition of
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Goshen-Gottstein, A., 2004, ‘The Triune and the
Decaune God: Christianity and Kabbalah as Objects of Jewish Polemics, with
Special Reference to Meir ben Simeon of Narbonne’s Milhemet Mitzva’, in Religious
Polemics in Context, Edited by Theo L. Hettema, Royal Van Gorcum,
Assen,165–98.
Herskowitz, W. K. ,1974, Judaeo-Christian Dialogue in
Provence as Reflected in “Milhemet Mitzva” of R. Meir ha-Meili, Ph.D. thesis, Yeshiva
University, New York, NY, USA.
Kellner, M., 2007, Maimonides’ Confrontation with
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Segal, A. F., 1977, Two Powers in Heaven:
Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism, Leiden.
Teugels, L. M., 2023, ‘Binitarianism’ in Encyclopedia
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the Uppermost: Rethinking the Boundaries of ‘Kabbalistic Literature’ and the
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Weiss, T., 2021, ‘Beyond the Scope of Philosophy and
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Weiss, T., 2021, ‘The Letter of Isaac the Blind to
Nahmanides and Jonah Gerondi in its Context’, in Journal of Jewish Studies
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