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| Secrets of the Guide by Dr Micha Goodman |
How Maimonides might view us
Introduction
Part I examined the reception of Maimonidean thought in rabbinic Judaism. Part II now turns the focus on its head and examines, theoretically, how Maimonides might view contemporary Judaism as we know it.
We begin with an overview of the essence of Moreh
Nevuchim (Guide for the Perplexed) in an attempt to understand what
it means by ‘secrets.’
‘Secrets’
There are two bodies of knowledge that Maimonides describes as Maaseh Bereishit and Maaseh Merkavah, which together form the Pardes (Orchard of esoteric wisdom) into which the four sages entered (b. Chagiga 14b). This knowledge (yeda), he maintains, once existed among the prophets and sages until a tragedy occurred, and that knowledge was lost. Maimonides understands a real prophet as—not someone who experiences visions—but rather as a composite of perfected intellect, ethics and ability to imagine (Goodman 2015:39). Maimonides believed that the greatest loss to Judaism was not the destruction of the Temple or its rituals, but the loss of knowledge. Maimonides (Introduction to Moreh Nevuchim, section 3) writes that he managed to re-establish the hidden secret that our Masoret (Tradition) had lost. He did this, not through revelation or prophecy but through the capacity of the mind.
Maimonides was now faced with a paradox: If he reveals the secret by committing it to writing, it will no longer be a secret, and if he withholds it, it will be lost again. He resolved this conundrum by writing in a series of layers, so that only an exclusive audience yearning for such knowledge could be worthy of it. This is how he created an elitist reading audience (Goodman 2024:3).
[A note on the use of the word ‘secret’ in this context: It is possible to understand it as literally a ‘secret,’ especially considering that Maimonides swore the readers of his Guide for the Perplexed to secrecy. It is similarly possible to understand it as an ancient secret and esoteric body of knowledge that had been lost. But I think it is also possible to understand ‘secret’ in a more subtle sense, as in his reluctance to reveal matters that would upset sensitive religious people. Ibn Ezra had famously also used the word ‘secret’ when he wanted to introduce—and hide—his early form of his historical-criticism to some biblical texts (See: Kotzk Blog: 184) IBN EZRA’S ‘SECRET’ THAT IS ‘NOT FOR AVERAGE PEOPLE’:, and Kotzk Blog: 347) ABRAVANEL’S HYPOTHESIS:). Menachem Kellner (2011) notes that it is not “likely that we will ever see Artscroll editions of the Guide,” also alluding to the uncomfortable and controversial nature of the work in the eyes of the mainstream.]
Methodologies for hiding the ‘secrets’
Faced with the paradox of wanting to openly reveal the ‘secrets’ but still needing them to remain partially hidden and only accessible to a select reading audience, Goodman proposes how Maimonides adopted several methodologies to this end:
1) Clues: Maimonides did not expound on the knowledge (yeda) in its entirety, but only revealed kernels, chapter headings, or beginnings (reshit), which he dispersed among the layers of his writing. His reading audience was expected to then take these chapter headings or clues and apply their minds to develop them further and thus restore the essence of the ancient knowledge. This way, the reader of Moreh Nevuchim becomes an active reader, if not a co-writer of Moreh Nevuchim. The reader only needs to be exposed to the ‘chapter headings’ (reishit), and by applying their mind, they can know the ‘entire chapter,’ and grasp the principles of the greater concept being alluded to. This is the first protective layer of hiddenness.
2) Intentional disorder: The second hidden layer is that Maimonides did not place these clues in any particular order, but dispersed them seemingly randomly throughout his work, as he notes in his Introduction. In this sense, Moreh Nevuchim (Guide for the Perplexed) is an associative—if not chaotic—work, with so many readers over the past eight hundred years trying to unravel the contents. A student[1] and close adherent of Maimonides, Shmuel Ibn Tibbon, who later translated the Moreh Nevuchim from the original Arabic to Hebrew, said that Maimonides expected the astute reader to restore order to the disorder of the book and not only be an ‘active reader,’ but serve as ‘editor’ as well, extracting its various underlying themes (Goodman 2024:7).
Some might argue that perhaps Maimonides was simply a confused and unskilled writer who was incapable of writing coherently. This is, however, unlikely because the track record of his earlier writing is one of immense order. He was the systematic Jewish writer par excellence—as evident from his Mishneh Torah—where for the first time, he turned the previously unresolved dialectics of Talmudic debate into an extremely well-structured and orderly work, with a Table of Contents and practical Halachic conclusions. Maimonides draws attention to this in his Introduction, by stating that—despite the apparent disharmony of the Moreh Nevuchim—every word is in its place.
3) Inner contradictions: The third hidden layer is that, within the clues or chapter headings, there are contradictions. Some sections (I:57, I:58 and I:59) say that G-d is transcendent and above knowledge and understanding, while other sections (I:67, I:68) suggest that G-d is actual knowledge and understanding. This anomaly and dichotomy should alert us to listen with caution whenever something is quoted from Moreh Nevuchim, because Maimonides might say the exact opposite somewhere else in the book. Maimonides cannot be understood in singularities, but only as a composite when his different teachings have a conversation with each other. The Moreh Nevuchim has many voices. Scholars have always deliberated over which of these voices is to be regarded as the dominant theme of the Moreh Nevuchim.
4) Conclusions: There is a particularly fierce debate on which voice Maimonides used to conclude his book. There are at least three possibilities:
a) Moral society: Chronologically, in the last chapter of the Moreh Nevuchim, Section III:54, Maimonides writes that the ultimate aim of philosophy is to go back into society and perfect it (perhaps alluding to a form of social development like politics?). -This may have been in keeping with the classical philosophers who generally taught that ethics and morality were the corollaries of intellectual pursuit.
b) Mystical society: Section III:5, however, suggests that the ultimate purpose is to isolate one’s mind from society (perhaps a form of mysticism or Neoplatonism?).[2] -This may have been the path chosen by Maimonides’ son, Avraham, who initiated a multi-generational movement of Jewish Sufism in Egypt.[3]
c) Halachic society: Then, Section III:52 seems to suggest something far more pragmatic than engagement or disengagement with society. Accordingly, the ultimate purpose of the book, despite its windy theological journey, is to encourage observance of Talmudic law or Halacha (religious law). -This may have been Maimonides’ way to draw the reader back to his earlier work on the codification of Talmudic law, the Mishneh Torah.
Each of these three options could be interpreted as different grand endings—and objectives behind—the Guide for the Perplexed. Goodman refers to this as “a pluralism of endings,”[4] and the students must choose their own endings and literally draw their own conclusions. This heterogeneity may relate to the notion of Maimonides’ sometimes Socratic[5] approach, not to solve any questions, but to teach the student how to live with the questions (Goodman 1015:20).
5) Oath of secrecy: A fifth hidden layer is when one has applied these previous methodologies and discovered the ‘secret,’ Maimonides binds the reader with an oath not to reveal it to anyone else. Ever since then, everyone expounding on the Moreh Nevuchim has effectively violated the Maimonidean oath (Goodman 2024:12). [See: Kotzk Blog: 360) Why was The Guide For The Perplexed intended to be a secret document?].
Maimonides built all these layers into his book and ultimately bound the reader with an oath not to reveal the knowledge because he did not want the work to be taught rigidly, as one would within the framework of a formal course. He did not want people to write books on Moreh Nevuchim, either. He wanted the work to be studied only on a one-on-one basis. This was in keeping with the rabbinic dictum to only discuss the secrets of Torah one-on-one, and not in groups.
Goodman’s notion of Maimonides revealing the ‘secrets’ in his Guide for the Perplexed is not hyperbole. Even his critic, Menachem Kellner, speaks in similar terms about the smartest of Jews over the centuries, all trying to:
“crack the code of a book whose author informed us explicitly in his introduction that he wrote it esoterically” (Kellner 2011).
Kellner also observed that these ‘codes,’ entrenched within
the Guide for the Perplexed, are so effective that those attempting to
decipher Maimonides have alternatively described him as ranging from a Kabbalist,
a rationalist, an eastern European-style Rosh Yeshiva, and—according
to Leo Strauss—an
Aristotelian epikoros (heretic).
Maimonidean views in tension with contemporary Judaism
Theoretically speaking, Maimonides could find many issues with contemporary Judaism. What follows are some examples of how Maimonides might view the popular Judaism of today:
1) The contemporary trend toward mysticism
Maimonides rejected ancient rabbinic inclinations toward anthropomorphic descriptions of G-d—yet the Kabbalistic and mystical Jewish traditions popular today speak in a language of Divine emanation (Sefirot) and embodiment.
2) Resurrection of the dead
Maimonides had a nuanced approach to bodily resurrection after death, and he even wrote a volume, titled Maamar Techiyat haMetim, on the matter—yet modern Judaism treats resurrection as an unnuanced and core (Maimonidean!) belief.
3) Intellect is G-dliness
Maimonides considered broad, general and even secular intellectual perfection as a prerequisite to spirituality—yet today’s communities emphasise a range of regulated religious study, various forms of mysticism, simplicity (as in Breslov) and immersive and emotive experientialism as the gateway to spirituality. In more recent times, we could even add the growing use of substances to enhance spiritual awareness.
Genesis 1:26 describes man as created in the ‘image’ of G-d. According to Maimonides, this is a reference to the intellect. If ‘image’ is intellect, it's not a human intellect because it's the ‘image/intellect’ of G-d. This means that the entity that makes one human is a G-dly entity. In other words, the human intellect is G-dly. So, to draw near to G-d, one does not need to escape humanness or elevate above humanness, but bring that humanness to G-d. And if one’s humanness is the intellect, then to draw near to G-d, one does not need to ignore the intellect or try to reach above the intellect, but simply to use the intellect (רק באמצעות השכל). The intellect is the means to unite with G-d. This is one of the great revolutionary contributions (וכאן המהפכה) of Maimonides because it goes against intuitive and common religious beliefs of the past and present, which tend to overshadow Intellect by Belief (Goodman 2024:20).
4) Messianism
Maimonides had a complex view of messianism that he would not recognise in the contemporary adoption of urgent and imminent messianism.
5) Ethnocentrism
Maimonides’ views on non-Jews and the world were more universal than the trend towards exclusivism and ethnocentrism we find today.
6) G-d does not speak despite “And G-d said to Moses…”
Maimonides, as is well-known, was opposed to anthropomorphisms (giving G-d human characteristics). For Maimonides, this included speech as well. The first chapter of Mishneh Torah in Sefer haMadah (never mind the Moreh, which deals with this as well, as one might expect), discusses the idea that G-d does not speak. Regarding the notion of Sinai—where the popular perception is that G-d is understood from the Torah to have literally spoken to the people—Maimonides writes that G-d does not speak. The implications of this are astounding—almost subversive—because how do we now understand the idea of the Torah being the product of G-d’s speech? (Goodman 2015:43).
7) Halacha is Jewish norm - not Jewish excellence
In Section III:51 of Moreh Nevuchim, Maimonides uses a radical metaphor of the Palace where G-d is the King. People who observe Halacha only reach the outskirts of the Palace, but they do not enter the Palace. To enter the Palace, one must—not negate Halacha, but—go beyond it. According to Maimonides, Halacha should never hold such a monopoly over the religious world, where a good Jew observes Halacha, but a better Jew observes stricter Halacha.
According to the metaphor, however, the better person— the one who gets closer to the King—is the one who lives close to certainty (bekirvat vadeut), and who realises they have not fully attained certainty. In other words, living one’s religious life—not in the security of the answer—but, rather, in the honesty of the question. This may be the meaning behind the title Moreh Nevuchim—the Guide for the Perplexed—to encourage sincere seekers to live confidently in a state of perplexity.
There are different English translations of Moreh Nevuchim: either Guide to the Perplexed, Guide for the Perplexed, or Guide of the Perplexed. The Guide to the Perplexed seems to imply a way out of the perplexity, whereas the Guide for/of the Perplexed implies a way to live with perplexity as a virtue. On our reading, the latter interpretation may be closer to the original thought of Maimonides, who encouraged perpetual perplexity and curiosity.
This allows for a fascinating approach to religion where, instead of Relativism (where all truths and moralities are equal), one can still be sure of a truth—and live according to the dictates of that truth—but not absolutely sure. That person—rather than the absolutely certain observer of ritual—enters the Palace.
In Section I:32, The Moreh interprets the Talmudic story of the four sages who entered the Pardes (Orchard of esoteric wisdom), mentioned above. Ben Azzai died, Ben Zoma became mad, Acher became a heretic, and only R. Akiva “entered in peace and left in peace” (b. Chagiga 14b).[6] Peace, or shalom, can also mean shleimut or perfection. This perfection that R. Akiva achieved was that “שידע לעמוד בםקום הספק —he knew how to stand in the place of doubt” (Targum Michael Schwarz 2002). In this case, shleimut (perfection) does not mean certainty but the ability to retain doubt. In the intellectual and spiritual realm, “certainty is the seduction” (Goodman 2015:1:02)— yet greatness and perfection are not to be found in certainty but in the ability to hold doubt and perplexity.
8) Guidance for living in a state of perplexity
Goodman (2024:54) makes this idea of perplexity more palatable by drawing attention to the Talmudic notion of the famous debates between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. We know that the law usually follows Beit Hillel, even though there is the principle that “these and those are both the words of G-d”. This means that neither party is really ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ However, as a construct, the Halacha still generally follows Beit Hillel. One reason why Beit Hillel was favoured was that they were occasionally able to accept the view of Beit Shamai. Beit Shamai, however, was never able to accept the view of Beit Hillel, not even once. Beit Hillel, therefore, is favoured, not because they are more right—as both are equally conceptualised as “the words of G-d”—but because they knew they were not always right. Beit Hillel remained somewhat ‘perplexed,’ and open to other options, operating close to certainty (bekirvat vadeut), but not absolutely as Beit Shamai was.
Both ‘Fundamentalism’—where only one way is right, and everything else is wrong—and ‘Relativism’—where all truths and moralities are equally valid—have one thing in common: the lack of curiosity. Maimonides’ notion of living in intellectual perplexity, close to a truth but not absolutely, is the ultimate expression of perpetual curiosity. Living close to certainty provides for a structure and a framework of a truth—it allows for a strong belief system—but it does not shut the mind to other ideas or options (Goodman 2015:56). As a friend of mine puts it, “One does not need to leave one’s mind in the car when one goes to Shul.” A sakran (curious person) is higher than a chacham (wise person). Perhaps in this instance, Maimonides is again closer to Socrates, who believed in the power of questioning and shied away from providing absolute answers.
9) Would Maimonides call today’s popular Judaism
heretical?
Much of contemporary Judaism advocates the power of the individual to change G-d. Many methodologies are employed to that end, such as reciting Psalms, learning extra, giving charity and even baking challah. None of these popular activities fit the Maimonidean model at all. Even the liturgy of the high holidays promotes the idea that Repentance (Teshuvah), Prayer (Tefilah) and Charity (Tzedakah) remove a negative Heavenly decree. These ideas suggest that humans can change G-d’s mind. In Maimonidean thought, though, these actions would be regarded as theurgy, superstition and magic. In fact, these standard ideas would be considered by Maimonides to amount to Kefira or Heresy! These beliefs would fall under the forbidden categories of Shinuy haKel and Haflaat haKel (Changing G-d)! According to Maimonides, a G-d that can be changed is not G-d, because some other being can change Him into a better version of Himself (Goodman 2024:30).
10) Take truth from wherever it is found
Maimonides cannot be placed in a specific philosophical or theological box or category. He was clearly influenced by Socratic curiosity, Aristotelian rationalism and even mystical Neoplatonism. Sometimes he would reveal his sources, and other times he would hide them, because he believed we must take truth from wherever it is found (ושמע האמת ממי שאמרו).[7] In Maimonides’ Introduction to his Shmoneh Perakim, he writes that he has taken ideas from a vast array of sources, not much of the work is original, and he will not reveal exactly what he took from whom. He did this because he knew that if he revealed his sources, many people would be repelled even before they opened his book.
Still, Maimonides held fast to the idea that if truth is found in certain Socratic, Aristotelian or Neoplatonic sources, they remain true, even for Jews. But the corollary is even more dramatic. Maimonides often criticised certain rabbinic sources, and Goodman points out that where he believed the rabbis were mistaken, he openly said so. He took truth from wherever it is found and rejected the idea that any one group held a monopoly on the truth, and— by extension—G-d (Goodman 2024:26).
A criticism of Micha Goodman by Menachem Kellner
Menachem Kellner challenges Goodman’s emphasis on Maimonidean perplexity and notes:
“For Goodman, Maimonides no longer guides the reader out of perplexity; rather, he accompanies the reader on the route to perplexity” (Kellner 2011).
Kellner also suggests that Goodman leans too close to a mystical portrayal of the Guide for the Perplexed:
“He uses terms such as eros, sod, pardes, maskil, and expressions, such as the ‘redemptive character of knowledge,’ and ‘spiritual journeys,’ all of which mean very specific (and limited) things in a Maimonidean context, but which to a contemporary reader carry with them heavy overtones of Kabbalah” (Kellner 2011).
Kellner objects to this semi-mystical interpretation adopted by Goodman in his book, Sodotav shel Moreh haNevukhim (Secrets of the Guide of the Perplexed), and suggests that portraying Maimonides in this “mildly Kabbalistic” manner may be part of the explanation for Goodman’s success, particularly in contemporary Israeli society:
“Anyone familiar with Israel today is struck by the huge variety of alternative ‘spiritualities’ on offer. These reflect a deep yearning for meaning on the part of many Israelis. Some satisfy this need by dropping out in Southeast Asia; others through adoption of Jewish Orthodoxy, including the eccentricity of Bratzlav; and yet others through the many varieties of non-standard religions which now dot the Israeli landscape… Goodman's Maimonides—skeptical, almost agnostic…and therapeutic—taps into this yearning” (Kellner 2011).
Kellner’s sharp criticism of Goodman highlights their different approaches to Maimonides. Kellner—a foremost scholar on Maimonidean thought—declares that “Micah Goodman's Maimonides is not my Maimonides.” Goodman might respond that for Maimonides, there is no one conclusive way of reading him. Maimonides, according to Goodman, left three possible ways for readers to ‘choose’ their conclusions of the Guide for the Perplexed (societal, mystical, or upholder of Talmudic law):
“There is no definitive
interpretation of his works, and one can probably never be produced…Maimonides
contradicts himself both across and within his many writings—at
times purposefully, which inevitably leaves his readers perplexed” (Harris
2014:154-5).
Goodman would argue that Maimonides encouraged and expected his readers to understand him differently, and (literally), to come to their own conclusions.
Bibliography
Goodman, M., 2024,
Online source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2izQrXkLAwo&t=632s
Goodman, M., 2015, Online source:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=giNYxHEo71w
Harris, J.M., 2014, Review:
Maimonides Meets Modernity: Contemporary Lessons from Judaism's Greatest Sage,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 93, no.2, 154-160.
Kellner, M., 2001, Review of Micah Goodman, Sodotav
shel Moreh ha-Nevukhim [Secrets of the Guide of the Perplexed],
H-Judaic, H-Net Reviews.
Lamm, N., 1965, ‘The Religious Implications of
Extraterrestrial Life,’ Tradition 7 (1965): 25-30, 35-36.
Shapiro, M.B., 2015, Changing the Immutable: How
Orthodox Judaism Rewrites Its History, Littman Library of Jewish
Civilization, Oxford.
Shapiro, M.B., 2023, ‘Maimonides and Orthodox
Judaism’, in David Sclar, ed., The Golden Path: Maimonides Across Eight
Centuries, Liverpool, 168-172.
Schwarz, M., 2002, Moreh Nevuchim leRabbeinu Moshe
ben Maimon, (Hebrew translation from the Arabic), Tel Aviv University
Press.
[1][1] In his
famous letter to Shmuel Ibn Tibbon—where Maimonides describes his busy
schelude to his friend who wanted to make a sea journey to visit him in Fostat—Maimonides
refers to him as his pupil: https://www.jewishhistory.org/maimonides-letter-to-a-friend/
[4]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=giNYxHEo71w.
[5] Socrates (d.399BCE) is famous for his questions, knowing that he knew nothing. Plato (c.427-347BCE) was his student, and Plato’s student was Aristotle (384-322BCE). Plato, an idealist, emphasised abstract reasoning and posited the existence of eternal, perfect Forms beyond the physical world. Aristotle, by contrast, was an empiricist who grounded knowledge in observation and experience, focusing on the physical world as the true locus of reality. Despite these differences, there is considerable overlap in their approaches, especially in the ancient context, where the boundaries between mysticism and rationalism were far more fluid than they are today. Five centuries later, the teachings of Plato were reinterpreted and expanded by Plotinus (c.205-270CE), giving rise to Neoplatonism—a school of Platonic thought that leaned more heavily toward mysticism and spiritual metaphysics [see: Kotzk Blog: 527) Neoplatonic echoes in Chassidic Mysticism].
[6]“The
Rabbis taught: Four entered the Pardes. They were Ben Azzai, Ben Zoma, Acher
and Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva said to them, "When you come to the place of
pure marble stones, do not say, 'Water! Water!' for it is said, 'He who speaks
untruths shall not stand before My eyes'".
Ben Azzai gazed and died. Regarding him the verse states, 'Precious in the eyes
of G-d is the death of His pious ones'. Ben Zoma gazed and was harmed
(also trans. went mad). Regarding him the verse states, 'Did you find honey?
Eat only as much as you need, lest you be overfilled and vomit it'. Acher
cut down the plantings. Rabbi Akiva entered in peace and left in peace” (b. Chagiga
14b).
[7]
“Know, however, that the ideas presented in these chapters and in the following
commentary are not of my own invention; neither did I think out the
explanations contained therein, but I have gleaned them from the words of the
wise occurring in the Midrashim, in the Talmud, and in other of their works, as
well as from the words of the philosophers, ancient and recent, and also from
the works of various authors, as one should accept the truth from
whatever source it proceeds.”
See: https://www.sefaria.org/Eight_Chapters%2C_Introduction.1?vhe=hebrew|The_Eight_Chapters_of_Maimonides_on_Ethics,_by_Joseph_I_Gorfinkle&lang=bi
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