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| Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz 1937-2020 |
Introduction
This article traces the thought of four rabbinic figures—spanning from the sixteenth century to the modern writings of R. Adin Steinsaltz—who identify and exemplify a strikingly universalist approach within Jewish tradition. It highlights how these thinkers engaged with non-Jewish doctrines, religions, and ideologies not with hostility or indifference, but with a rare openness that challenges conventional boundaries of theological discourse.
1) R. Natan Nata Shapira (1585-1633)
R. Natan Shapira of Kraków, also known as the Megaleh Amukot (Revealer of Secrets), was a student of Lurianic Kabbalah from the school of R. Yisrael Sarug and was responsible for the dissemination of the teaching of the Ari Zal. He saw the need to extract good from the non-Jewish world as a necessary precursor to the messianic age.
“[R. Natan Nata Shapira]
clarified the mission of Judaism, in light of kabbalistic historiography, as
one that aims to gather up the holy sparks scattered among gentiles in order to
bring redemption nearer” (Rachel Elior in Yivo Encyclopedia).
2) R. Menashe ben Yisrael (1604-1657)
R. Manoel Dias Soeiro, better known as Menashe ben
Yisrael, was related to the famous statesman, philosopher and biblical
commentator, R. Don Yitzchak Abravanel (1437-1508). Menashe ben Yisrael was a
foremost Kabbalist and authored an eclectic work
entitled Nishmat Chaim on the immortality of the soul, and
also deals with surprising issues like the Church Fathers and Muslim
theologians (Nadler 2018:147).
Menashe ben Yisrael created a Jewish-Christian partnership, together
with a Dutch theologian who had broken away from the Dutch Reformed Church,
Adam Boreel (1602-1665). Adam Boreel promoted a path for Christians known
as sola scriptura, which only included the Bible and rejected all
other forms of Christian dogma. Adam Boreel was also interested in
reconstructing the Jewish Temple.
Adam Boreel and Menashe ben Yisrael worked together on a major literary
project to translate the entire corpus of the Mishna into
Latin. They were going to create a singular religious school for both Jews and
Christians:
“The Mishnah would be used as the curriculum for a Jewish-Christian college, educating youth of both traditions… This would prepare them to take their place as leaders of the (presumably combined) community in the End Times” (Goldish 2018). [see: Kotzk Blog: 503) Sebastianism: Crossover messianism that predated Sabbatianism].
3) R. Elia Benamozegh (1823-1900)
Elia Benamozegh, the rabbi of Livorno (Leghorn), was an outspoken defender of Kabbalah and also a great philosopher. He saw not only mysticism in the Zohar, but also philosophy. The Zohar—he maintained—brought out crucial elements of philosophy that could be used to unify humanity. It could build bridges between all religions, particularly Christianity. Benamozeg’s understanding of mysticism was unusually expansive and inclusive. His magnum opus—titled Israel and Humanity—emphasised a universalist theology rooted in Jewish mysticism, that he believed could bring all peoples together. He used the Zoharic notion of the synthesis of unity and diversity, and applied it to the different religions. He emphasised Noachide ethics (the universal Seven Laws of Noah) as a foundation for his vision of a universal form of religion. These seven laws are seen by Jewish tradition (b. Sanhedrin 56a) as the ethical minimum required of all people to be considered Righteous Gentiles. In his view, Judaism did not have to remain a closed and select theological system, but a hierarchical beacon to all nations. He showed how some aspects of Christianity could be reconciled with Zoharic mysticism. Benamozegh’s work did not go unnoticed in the non-Jewish world, and just decades after his passing in 1900, his influences were positively seen in the Second Vatican Council’s more open stance toward Judaism with its “Nostra Aetate” declaration of 1965 (Seidler 2018:242-263).
As might be expected, Benamozegh’s universalist outlook has occasionally led some to question the depth of his orthodoxy. Yet Steinsaltz offers a firm corrective, reminding us:
“Benamozegh was after all chief rabbi of Venice and in every respect Orthodox” (Steinsaltz 2005:47).
Benamozegh upheld the notion of dialogue with other religions, and in a late nineteenth-century letter to R. Shmuel David Luzzatto, he reiterated the urgency of such dialogue:
“Polemics with Christianity do not please you. It is certainly more convenient not to conduct them. But they are necessary for the fate of future humanity” (Benamozegh, 1863, Lettere, 57-74). [see: Kotzk Blog: 522) Italian letters: The battle over the Zohar].
4) R. Adin Steinsaltz (1937-2020)
In a fascinating article written in 2005, R. Adin Steinsaltz builds his universal vision of religion, squarely upon the worldview of R. Elia Benamozegh. He cites Benamozegh, who had radically claimed that "Christianity is but a distorted Kabbalah," and he uses this as a support for his own system of universalism. Steinsaltz observes that monotheistic religions, despite their spiritual aspirations, often contribute to global discord. This paradox—where belief in a single, unifying G-d instead becomes a source of division—reveals the deep challenge of reconciling absolute truth claims among diverse peoples:
“Every religion makes claims to truth that cast doubt on the claims made by other religions, but in monotheist religions those claims tend to be absolute and exclusive… ‘toleration’ is a concept very hard to apply in the context of monotheism… A polytheism[, however,]…can tolerate more than one claim to truth, even when those claims in some degree conflict… [But] monotheism is an obstacle to tolerance” (Steinsaltz 2005:41).
Steinsaltz goes on to state, however, that Judaism is unlike other monotheisms because it was never meant to be a universal religion. Therefore, although a monotheistic religion, it can tolerate (at least in theory) the beliefs of others. Steinsaltz quotes Elia Benamozegh as a rabbi who was “most open toward [and] most appreciative of, Christianity and Islam” (Steinsaltz 2005:47). Benamozegh advocated for a mystical universalism, rooted in Kabbalah, that included Christianity and Islam. Steinsaltz observes that Benamozegh viewed the relationship between Judaism and other religions in hierarchical terms—where Judaism remains the mother religion, acting as a beacon to the nations.
R. Steinsaltz’s radical theology must not be lost on us:
Steinsaltz writes:
“[B]y the standards of the Noahide laws, the doctrine of the Trinity is not an idolatrous belief to which Judaism can express an objection” (Steinsaltz 2005:45).
Steinsaltz’s essay is a heavily nuanced reflection on how Judaism navigates religious diversity—not through liberal interpretation or tolerance, but through structured differentiation and mutual respect. Nevertheless, he maintains that we, in the modern era, are at a juncture that is vastly different from earlier times:
“The interactions that are possible between Jews and non-Jews in modern times are fundamentally different from those of any previous era in Jewish history…[because] Jews and non-Jews meet each other in civil society on an equal footing” (Steinsaltz 2005:41).
Steinsaltz is not naïve, as he simultaneously acknowledged (already twenty years ago) that:
“[O]ur times are plagued by religious fanaticism and hatred” (Steinsaltz 2005:41).
And, as noted earlier, this fanaticism is especially the case concerning monotheisms:
“Belief in a unique and omnipotent God who lives beyond the limitations of time, who created the universe and has revealed truths through his prophets, makes it difficult to account for alternatives. A significant proportion of all warfare, ancient and modern, has resulted from the uncompromising beliefs of the monotheist faithful” (Steinsaltz 2005:4).
Steinsaltz emphasises the counterintuitive yet poignant distinction between ‘intolerant monotheisms’ and ‘tolerant polytheisms’:
“A polytheism…can tolerate more
than one claim to truth, even when those claims in some degree conflict.
Polytheist…religions are in this way like the humanities: they make room for,
even if they do not thrive on, diverging points of view. The opinions and
interpretations of others are taken to be valid…
But in the natural sciences,
there is a distinction between truth and falsehood (or at least, between
falsified and unfalsified results). The idea of falsehood is at the core of any
science—and of each monotheism. There is a true God and there are false gods.
The truth of the one God is absolute and exclusive. However desirable religious
toleration may be, the basic nature of monotheism is an obstacle to tolerance.
I do not believe that there is a definitive solution to this problem (Steinsaltz 2005:42).
Steinsaltz, however, cautiously suggests that there may be “partial solutions about which not enough has been said” (Steinsaltz 2005:42). He maintains that this partial solution may not be found in ‘dogmatic’ Judaism, but rather in a “side of Judaism” that “tends toward openness” (Steinsaltz 2005:42).
This ‘open’ dimension of Judaism is evident in its rejection of the need to convert people of other faiths to Judaism, and therefore, its recognition of religious plurality. It is this dimension that offers a subtle yet significant departure from the exclusivity often associated with monotheistic traditions. Importantly, this is not liberalism or reformation, but rather a principled stance of Orthodoxy that allows space for other faiths. Even in its ultimate messianic projections, Judaism believes that the diverse peoples of the world will not need to embrace Judaism. This portrayal is expressed by Maimonides, who subtly describes the messianic era as one of peace, but not one of uniformity of faith:
“At the end of days, the different peoples of the world will not become less different” (Steinsaltz 2005:42).
In other words, when wolves lie down with lambs, wolves will still be wolves and lambs will remain lambs. Yet, Steinsaltz insists that:
“…each religion will come to share with all the others a small set of fundamental truths” (Steinsaltz 2005:42).
Steinsaltz does not see the complicated Christian doctrine of the Trinity as an obstacle to this worldview. Neither does he view the many gods of Hinduism as an obstacle either:
“In the ancient religions grouped under the name of Hinduism, there are many gods and local shrines, but the theological principles…assume that all the deities revered in India or elsewhere are forms of, expressions of, or names for, one ultimate reality or God” (Steinsaltz 2005:44).
As for Buddhism, Steinsaltz questions whether it is even theistic at all, but he does not consider it to be atheistic either. Ultimately, these issues do not matter because:
“[b]y the standards of Jewish law as applied to Jews, Hinduism and Buddhism do not count as monotheistic traditions. However, the essential point of the Noahide laws is that the standards of Jewish law do not apply to non-Jews… [because] pure monotheism is expected by Judaism only from Jews” (Steinsaltz 2005:44).
Steinsaltz reminds us that Jewish law or Halacha, by its very nature, is never overriding singular:
“The idea that certain laws of Judaism do not apply to all is an essential feature of the halakha. Special standards of religious practice apply to men, while women are exempted from all commandments that must be practiced at a fixed time. The people of Israel are not bound by the special obligations incumbent upon the priesthood: kohanim…And the priesthood is not bound by the same rules of purity that must be observed by the high priest, who cannot attend the funeral of even his own parents and children… Different standards apply to different groups even within the Jewish community” (Steinsaltz 2005:46).
Steinsaltz concludes by emphasising again that these views are not a liberalisation of Judaism but a reflection of its Orthodox core. In his view, Judaism is not making concessions. These are fundamental Jewish beliefs about the nations of the world. He emphatically insists that these views are not “liberal” but rather “illiberal.” He presents a vision of what is “most promising about the Noahide model.” It is a model that allows most religions to maintain and not relinquish or even modify their meanings of “true and truth”:
“It provides a basis for
conversation among religions without the expectation of compromise between or
reconciliation of claims. It requires no concession to objectionable beliefs
and practices... The Noahide approach, in other words, is a formula for no more
than peace. But then, peace is in itself among the very greatest of religious
values” (Steinsaltz 2005:47).
Bibliography
Goldish, M., 2018, ‘Could Early Modern Messianic
Movements Cross Religious Boundaries?’, Journal of the Economic and
Social History of the Orient, vol. 61. nos.1-2, 124-146.
Nadler, S., 2018, Menasseh ben Israel, Rabbi
of Amsterdam, Yale University Press, New Haven, 223.
Seidler, M., 2018, ‘Eliah Benamozegh, Franz
Rosenzweig and Their Blueprint of a Jewish Theology of Christianity’, Harvard
Theological Review, vol. 111, issue 2, 242 – 263.
Steinsaltz, A., 2005, ‘Peace without conciliation: The
Irrelevance of “Toleration” in Judaism’, Common Knowledge, vol. 11, no., 1.
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