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| An early manuscript of Meirat Einayim by the 14th century R. Yitzchak of Acre |
This article—based extensively on the research by Professor Eitan Fishbane[1]—examines the rabbinic notion of the authenticity of a teaching or text being reliant on the perceived authority of its transmitter or originator. In other words, the greater the rabbi the more authentic the teaching, regardless of the independent status, nature and validity of the actual teaching itself.
As a test case, we analyse the writings of a fourteenth-century Kabbalist, R. Yitzchak ben Shmuel of Acre in his Meirat Einayim which is a supercommentary (i.e., a commentary on a commentary) on Nachmanides’ Commentary on the Torah. Interestingly, R. Yitzchak of Acre—who lived at the same time as R. Moshe de Leon who had claimed to have discovered the ancient Zohar—questioned the authenticity of Zohar being the work of the second-century Tanna, R. Shimon bar Yochai about a thousand years earlier.[2]
R. Yitzchak of Acre was a prolific writer of Kabbalah and as such he had to demonstrate his authenticity. He needed to do this to show the accuracy of the many earlier Kabbalistic teachings he had gathered (as Meirat Einayim serves as an anthology of previous mystical thought), but more importantly, to buttress his numerous innovative, original and creative teachings which are found in his work as well. This way he serves as a valuable test case because achieving both these ends requires a huge degree of perceived authenticity. We shall examine just how he set out to construct and demonstrate his authority in these matters. It must also be remembered that, after the passing of Nachmanides in Acre in 1270, R. Yitzchak of Acre was preceded by an era of great Kabbalistic activity with many other mystics producing copious amounts of esoteric literature, including R. Abraham Abulafia, R. Moses de Leon, R. Joseph Gikatilla, and R. Joseph of Hamadan. This accounts for his drawing from many eclectic mystical sources and also indicates why it was important for him to command a sense of authority. R. Yitzchak of Acre:
“sought to break down the boundaries among different kabbalistic schools and to offer a more pluralistic approach to kabbalistic meaning than we find in earlier sources” (Fishbane 2004:61).
Once more, R. Yitzchak could only achieve this by exerting an image of authority.
Mysticism or esotericism?
Although Kabbalah is usually described as Jewish mysticism, a far more accurate term might be esotericism. The word mysticism is adopted from the lexicon of Christian pietists. Instead, the Kabbalists referred to their work as ‘Torat haSod’ (secret teachings) and ‘Torat haNistar’ (hidden teachings):
“precisely because the essential nature of Kabbalah is that of extreme esotericism, which sought to preserve certain religious teachings under the control and purview of elite individuals and abhorred the idea that such sensitive teachings would become exposed to the public at large. Thus, in medieval culture Kabbalah was the furthest thing possible from popular religion or spirituality—a fact that has been almost inverted in modern times by popular appropriators of Judaism’s esoteric side” (Fishbane 2004:62).
A focus on transmission above doctrine
Unlike today, the original Kabbalists were not in the
business of purveying their secretive teachings to the general public, nor were
they interested in teaching and spreading their mysticism. They regarded the
secretive and exclusive transmission of their esotericism as a closely guarded
procedure. It may even be argued that they were more concerned with the meticulously
selective process of handing down their secretive teachings to appropriate
candidates than with the actual doctrines themselves. The word Kabbalah
(received chain of transmission), referred less to the content
and more to the exclusive process of selective transmission of the secret
teachings “one that is entirely predicated on the authority of the real or
purported transmitter” (Fishbane 2004:63). This is why establishing a
considerable degree of authority was key to the success of the Kabbalistic enterprise.
Tools that build authority in social settings
The mechanics of constructing perceived or real authority are similar in all social settings, cultures and religions:
“the policeman’s uniform, the physician’s stethoscope, the professor’s podium, and the clergy’s pulpit…serve powerful functions in the bestowal of legitimacy and authority on the speaker/actor in question. The receiver or audience more often than not accepts the authority of such persons in connection with (if not solely on the basis of) these objects and situations” (Fishbane 2004:63 citing Lincoln 1994:7-13).[3]
Similarly, Fishbane suggests that in early Kabbalistic circles, the “social constructions of legitimacy” involved the Kabbalists’ ability to project an image of an unquestionably reliable source operating within an unbroken chain of transmission reaching back to the beginnings of antiquity.
Nachmanides redefines the parameters of ‘understanding’
For Nachmanides (Ramban, 1194-1270), defining understanding and meaning had less to do with cerebral understanding and meaning, and more to do with a conceptualised authentic transmission relationship between an authoritative transmitter and a compliant receiver. Nachmanides writes in the introduction to his Commentary on the Torah:
“With a solid oath I hereby give sound advice to every person who looks into this book: He must not try to reason or think thoughts about any of the allusions which I write with regard to the secrets of the Torah. For I inform him reliably that none of these matters may be comprehended or known by way of the intellect and mental understanding, unless they are received from the mouth of a wise kabbalist into the ear of an understanding kabbalist...For only bad things can come from his reasoning (Nachmanides 1:7–8).
Fishbane sums Nachmanides’ position up as follows:
“Nahmanides here excludes human reason as a force capable of constructing meaning in and of itself—a position that seeks to establish what may be called a closed and exclusive sense of meaning, which is fully circumscribed within the legitimacy of the act of transmission” (Fishbane 2004:64).
Accordingly, reason and meaning are not the product of an independent mind but rather the result of an authentic transmission process from one selected human being to another. And it goes beyond reason and meaning because even establishing truth is similarly not an individual pursuit, but the outcome of an authentic transmission event facilitated by another:
“This stands irrespective of whether the exegesis makes any sense from a logical or rational perspective, given the fact that reason has no bearing on the construction of meaning” (Fishbane 2004:64).
Mirroring the scriptural proof model
There is very little difference between the authoritative transmission process of Kabbalistic ideas and the exegetical process of deriving Halacha (ritual law) from verses in the Torah scriptures. In many cases the:
“exegete is able to establish automatic validation for an asserted piece of interpretation simply by linking the insight to sometimes playful uses of the sacred canon, often no matter how far-fetched…[T]he words of the original paradigmatic text have the cultural power to validate simply through the act of invocation or creative citation” (Fishbane 2004:64).
Essentially the ‘proof-text’ serves the same hegemonic and authoritative function in determining Jewish law as the ‘proof-person’ serves in establishing the authoritative line of Kabbalistic transmission. Both transcend logic and reasoning.
R. Moshe de Leon (1240-1305) goes back to Adam and Sinai
R. Moshe de Leon—who some maintain was the writer/forger of the Zohar—was the first to publish the Zohar around 1290 [see Kotzk Blog: 087) MYSTERIES BEHIND THE ORIGINS OF THE ZOHAR:]. In his Sefer Shekel haKodesh, R. Moshe de Leon describes the origins of Kabbakah in exactly the same authoritative way as Mishna Avot 1:1 describes the origins of the rabbinic tradition known as the oral Torah:
“This is what is called ‘Kabbalah’ (reception), owing to the fact that it is a reception [traceable back] to Moses from Mount Sinai. Moses transmitted it to Joshua, and Joshua transmitted it to the elders, and the elders transmitted it to the prophets, and the prophets transmitted it to the men of the Great Assembly, according to the same process as the reception of the Torah. They transmitted this wisdom one to the next. In fact, this path of wisdom was given to the first man at the moment of his entrance into the garden of Eden. The secret of this wisdom was given to him, and it was with him until he sinned, and was expelled from the garden of Eden. After that, when the first man died, his son Seth inherited this wisdom. After that, this wisdom made its way to Noah the righteous, and he transmitted it to his son Shem, [and this continued] until Abraham our father inherited it, and with this wisdom he worshipped his Creator. He transmitted it to Isaac, and Isaac to Jacob, and Jacob to his sons, [and this continued all the way] to the moment when the later generations stood at Mount Sinai and it was transmitted to Moses our master. From there it was transmitted and received orally, person to person (kibblu ish mi-pi ish), through all the subsequent generations. But in the exile this wisdom was forgotten, except for among the very few, and they reawakened this wisdom in each and every generation. For this reason, this wisdom is called “Kabbalah” (reception), transmitted orally from person to person. The entire Torah, the written Torah and the oral Torah, is grounded in this wisdom (Moshe de Leon, Sefer Shekel haKodesh, 17-18).
This is a good example of a Kabbalist’s “rhetoric of authority construction”:
“[Moshe de Leon’s] legitimacy and authority to transmit esoteric ideas and practices are entirely dependent on his ability to establish such a firm foundation for reception (Fishbane 2004:67).
R. Avraham Abulafia (1240-1291) goes one step further
Abulafia establishes his parameters of authority and truth of transmission even more radically. In his Sefer haCheshek he enumerates three legitimate ways of receiving the authentically transmitted Kabbalistic truths:
“I will transmit to you well-known traditions (kabbalot)—those that I received orally from the wise of this generation (‘she-kibbaltim me-chachmei ha-dor peh el peh); those that I received from the books which are called ‘books of the Kabbalah,’ which were composed by the ancient sages, the kabbalists…; and those which were revealed to me by God…in the image of a bat kol (a voice from God). These [divine revelations] are [the most] exalted kabbalot (Abulafia, Sefer haCheshek, 8).
Abulafiah does not hesitate to claim that in addition to the two standard sources of authority—reputable Kabbalists and reputable Kabbalistic books—he has also drawn directly from personal heavenly revelations. Thus, Abulafia through his self-endorsement, writes that he is now an accredited and authoritative Kabbalist, worthy of furthering the transmission of his ecstatic and prophetic style of Kabbalistic ideas to the next generations.
Let us now return to our test case of R. Yitzchak of Acre.
How R. Yitzchak of Acre constructs his authority in Meirat
Einayim
R. Yitzchak of Acre takes pains to show his direct line of transmission to the father of Kabbalah in Provence (Southern France), R. Yitzchak the Blind (Sagi Nahor, 1160-1235). Some claim R. Yitzchak the Blind was the author of the Sefer haBahir. The idea that R. Yitzchak the Blind’s teachers were said to have received their teachings directly from Eliyahu haNavi (Elijah the Prophet) helped seal the perceived authenticity of this line of Kabbalistic tradition that led to R. Yitzchak of Acre:
“for the interpretation…has been transmitted orally from person to person [ish mi-pi ish] back to R. Isaac [the Blind] … all the way back to Elijah the Prophet” (R. Yitzchak of Acre, Meirat Einayim, 62).
In another example of authoritative rhetoric, R. Yitzchak of Acre links one of his teachings directly to Nachmanides. Referring to a particular case, he writes that:
“[M]ost books are mistaken [with regard to] this language. There [are those] who add [to the words], and there [are those] who subtract [from the words]. But I have received this (kibbaltiv) from the mouth of [one who heard it directly from] the Ramban [Nachmanides]…and [I received it] from his book, which was copied from the manuscript of the Rabbi [Nachmanides]…[himself]. [I have also written the] clarification of his [Ramban’s] words as I received them from the mouths of reliable people [ka’asher kibbaltiv mi-pi anshei emunah]” (R. Yitzchak of Acre, Meirat Einayim, 203).
In other cases, R. Yitzchak of Acre frequently uses expressions like ra’iti (I have seen a source), matzati (I have found a source) and Kabalat emet (a true Kabbalistic source) which further bolster his writings with an aura of authenticity. These cases and the references to other ideas originating in Nachmanides seem more reasonable and plausible than the claim of their provenance in otherworldly sources.
What happens when two legitimate Kabbalistic sources
contradict each other?
When two authoritative texts that have equally legitimate Kabbalistic track records and go back to impeccably reliable sources, R. Yitzchal of Acre finds no problem whatsoever. This is because, in his view, all the contradictions can be neutralised and “he should make peace between the different receptions” and strive “to reconcile each and every word by the Way of Truth.” It is clear that R. Yitzchak of Acre was:
“faced with a crisis of diverse [and ‘authentic’][4] traditions. If kabbalistic meaning was locked into a single determinism, then how was he to explain the fact that multiple views from equally authoritative sources were in existence? Instead, he resolves that conflicting interpretations are all pieces of a single overarching Truth (emet)” (Fishbane 2004:73).
This way the Kabbalist could never go wrong as he had the best of both worlds. The traditions were impeccably authentic dating to antiquity if not originating in divinity—and when the collected teachings contradicted each other, they were not incongruities but facets of the same singular truth.
Reconciling Kabbalah with (Maimonidean) Philosophy
In addition to reconciling Kabbalistic textual paradoxes, R. Yitzchak of Acre went one step further. He proclaimed to have reconciled and integrated Maimonidean rational and philosophical matters with Kabbalah. This was no small claim considering the Maimonidean Controversies—which were the ideological persecutions perpetuated by the mystics on the rationalists and included the burning and banning of Maimonidean books—waged aggressively for as long as three centuries after Maimonides’ passing in 1204:
“Not only should the wise individual (the Kabbalist) make peace between the words of two different sages by the way of Truth (i.e. Kabbalah), but even with respect to matters of Philosophy, which seem to the masses as if they are opposed to our teachings (Kabbalah), the wise individual should make peace between them, and he should rectify the matter in his mind so that matters [of philosophy] are joined with matters of Kabbalah” (R. Yitzchak of Acre, Meirat Einayim, 55).
Fishbane (2004:73) points out that this is a remarkable stance for a Kabbalist of the fourteenth century to have taken and it was certainly not one adopted by most of R. Yitzchak of Acre’s predecessors:
“[T]he ‘intelligent kabbalist’ (the maskil)…must understand that these two seemingly different systems are ultimately capable not only of mutual toleration but of mutual integration as part of a single underlying structure of meaning and theological wisdom” (Fishbane 2004:74).
To R. Yitzchak of Acre, not only could contradictory Kabbalistic traditions be harmonised, but even rationalism could be incorporated within Kabbalah to form a seamless whole of truth. This openness led R. Yitzchak of Acre to allow people to swim together in different theological streams.
There is not only one authentic path
R. Yitzchak of Acre’s attempts at harmonisation allowed people to choose which ideological paths they wanted to pursue:
“Even though all the words of the Ramban [Nachmanides]…are the words of the living God, and his Kabbalah is strong, reliable and true in the eyes of all the wise Kabbalists, nevertheless you are permitted to adopt one path from among the [several Kabbalistic][5] paths” (R. Yitzchak of Acre, Meirat Einayim, 91-92).
Analysis
As a rule, we have noted that, at least in Nachmanidean Kabbalah, reason, meaning and even truth can be attained only through the authoritative source of “the mouth of a wise Kabbalist,” and not through individual endeavour or “intellect.” The problem, of course, is when we are confronted by contradictory teachings by multiple ‘wise Kabalists.” This was the same problem that R. Yitzchak of Acre had to face after the passing of Nachmanides and the subsequent explosion of new Kabbalistic ideologies. He resolved the matter by proclaiming that all the different schools of Kabbalah can and must be harmonised and amalgamated. Once he had taken that position, it seems it was just a small step to include combining a synthesis with rationalist Maimonidean philosophy as well. R. Yitzchak of Acre, therefore, may emerge as an exemplar of one of the greatest attempts at harmonising enterprises within rabbinic Judaism.
We are left with one pressing question for further
consideration: To what extent is Nachmanides’ radical notion that understanding,
meaning and truth are to be defined and determined exclusively by
the authoritative Kabbalist rabbi and not the individual, also reflected
in general Judaism? What are the parameters of the perceived authority vested in
the Rabbi, Rav and Rebbe in the individual’s search for understanding, meaning
and truth? In Kotzk, for example, these individualistic strivings were
held as sacrosanct.
[1]
Fishbane, E. P., 2004, ‘Authority, Tradition, and the Creation of Meaning in
Medieval Kabbalah: Isaac of Acre’s Illumination of the Eyes’, Journal of the
American Academy of Religion, vol. 72, no. 1, 59–95.
[2]
However, in another of R. Yitzchak of Acre’s works, Otzar haChaim, he
seems to assume that the Zohar was indeed written by R. Shimon bar
Yochai (Aryeh Kaplan, The Age of the Universe: A Torah True Perspective,
17).
[3]
Lincoln, B., 1994, Authority: Construction and Corrosion, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago.
[4]
Square brackets are mine.
[5]
Square brackets are mine.
I thank Dr Avi Harel for the following sources:
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