501) Were some early Spanish Kabbalists defending a Maimonidean position?

An image believed to be that of R. Yitzchak the Blind occupied with the Sefirot

Introduction

This article ꟷ based extensively on the research by Professor Tzahi Weiss[1] ꟷ examines an interesting and unusual approach to understanding how thirteenth-century Kabbalah suddenly emerged in Provence (southern France) and Catalonia (northeastern Spain). With this emergence, there was now a rapid interest in, and wide reception of, the notion of Sefirot (Divine emanations). Although the term ‘Sefirot’ was used in the earlier mystical work of the Bahir, it suddenly took on a specific meaning in thirteenth-century Spanish Zoharic Kabbalah. 

Weiss, a professor of Jewish mysticism, offers a unique interpretation as to why the Spanish Kabbalists reworked and redefined the older existing notion of Sefirot.  While the Spanish Kabbalists are usually depicted as radical mystics in direct conflict with Maimonidean rationalism ꟷ Weiss fascinatingly sees these Kabbalists as having more in common with some aspects of Maimonides’ Halachic writings (Mishneh Torah) and his philosophical writings (Moreh Nevuchim or Guide for the Perplexed) than usually imagined!

 

Two theological complications arise after Maimonides

Weiss’ hypothesis, as we shall see, is that this urgent focus on Sefirot was in direct response to two theological issues arising ꟷ indirectly ꟷ out of Maimonidean rationalist philosophy which preceded the emergence of Spanish Kabbalah by just decades. Maimonides passed away in 1204 and the Zohar was first published in 1290. The two problems were as follows: 

1) Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed (Moreh Nevuchim) was interpreted by certain rabbinic Aristotelian writers and translators (correctly or incorrectly) as proclaiming that there is no Hashgacha Peratit, or individual Divine providence (certainly not the way it is popularly understood today where G-d actively directs every minuscule nuance of existence). The problem with this interpretation was that if there is no direct providence, then why was there a need to pray to G-d to direct his providence towards the individual? This led immediately to the second problem: 

2) If it did not help to pray to G-d, then instead of not praying at all (which was a difficult position for many to adopt), it was deemed necessary to pray ꟷ not to G-d ꟷ but to angels instead. In Provence and Catalonia at that time there was indeed, historically, a turn to the worship of angels and other ‘mediators’ instead of to G-d. This seems to have been a result of those who interpreted Maimonides as claiming that there was no individual providence. 

Maimonides, who openly drew upon many Aristotelian ideas, would have never known that his writings were to be interpreted by some Aristotelian rabbis so soon after his death, in such a way as to threaten the institution of Jewish prayer; and, as a further unintended consequence, transfer the subject of prayer away from G-d to the angels.

 

Maimonides on Divine providence

The fact is that while Maimonides’ Halachic rulings are clearly laid out in Mishneh Torah, it is not always a simple matter to interpret Maimonides’ rationalist and philosophical positions from the Guide for the Perplexed. The Guide[2] stipulates that individual Divine providence (Hashgacha Peratit) extends solely to human beings and not to the rest of creation. Furthermore, the providence dispensed to the human being depends on the intellectual capacity of the individual. The greater the sechel or intellect, the greater the providence. The rest of creation draws from a general providence (Hashgacha Kelalit) where the species as a whole is maintained but not each specific individual member of that species. 

However, it’s not as simple as that, because Maimonides’ Aristotelian translators and interpreters operating under R. Shmuel ibn Tibbon (d. 1232) claimed that Maimonides only intended to soften and hide his ‘true’ position from the masses. Really, they alleged, Maimonides’ view was far more radical than that. He believed that there is no providence whatsoever, even for humankind, no matter how great the intellect or the righteousness of the individual. On this interpretation, even exceptional human beings are therefore subject to the same chances of success and misfortune as everybody else: 

“The only thing that can be said is that true believers, who have attained intellectual knowledge of God are free from material distractions and hence are indifferent in regard to material events” (Weiss 2022:4). 

This interpretation of providence ꟷ which may or may not reflect the true position of Maimonides ꟷ had unintended and very serious theological consequences. It seems that this ‘revelation’ of Maimonides’ ‘real’ position on providence by Shmuel ibn Tibbon became well-known and well-accepted; and it led to people becoming less observant of Halacha and more neglectful of the daily prayers: 

“If there is no individual providence, there is no justification for observing the commandments, no system of reward and punishment and the personal connection between the believer and God, manifested in daily prayer, is thwarted” (Weiss 2022:4). 

Shmuel ibn Tibbon seems to have followed this position himself and had theological issues with the notion of prayer. The situation became so dire that even staunch Maimonidean rabbis and supporters spoke out vehemently against such laxity in Jewish practices.

 

R. Yakov Anatoli

One such Maimonidean rabbi who had spoken out against Shmuel ibn Tibbon’s approach (advocating that Maimonides truly held that there was no hashgacha or providence at all) was R. Yakov Anatoli (d.1256). Ironically, Yakov Anatoli was related to Shmuel ibn Tibbon being either his son-in-law or brother-in-law. Yakov Anatoli tried to undo the damage caused by Shmuel ibn Tibbon’s ‘disclosure.’ He counterclaimed that Shmuel ibn Tibbon’s ‘disclosure’ was not accurate and that Maimonides meant what he originally wrote ꟷ there is individual providence for human beings ꟷ and, therefore, people should go back to praying to G-d and keeping the commandments. Yakov Anatoli writes rather sharply against those who interpreted Maimonides as advancing the notion that there is no providence: 

לא כדברי הכופרים הרעים האומרים עזב ה׳ את הארץ

“[Maimonides’ actual position is fundamentally] unlike the words of the wicked heretics who say that the Lord has forsaken the earth” (Yakov Anatoli, Malmad haTalmidim, 1866: 64b-65a). 

Clearly, Yakov Anatoli disagrees with his “wicked heretic” relative Shmuel ibn Tibbon who interpreted Maimonides as denying the existence of providence.

 

R. Meir ben Simone (haMe’ili)

Another Maimonidean rabbi, Meir ben Simone of Narbonne, also known as heMe’ili (d.1270), similarly objected to the way Maimonides’ alleged view on providence was being portrayed by those following Shmuel ibn Tibbon. haMe’ili was an interesting character because, on the one hand, he was a serious opponent of the emergent mysticism and Kabbalah around his lifetime ꟷ but on the other hand he strongly upheld the principle of G-d’s providence over human beings. 

In his Sefer Meshiv Nefesh, heMe’ili writes in a similar tenor to that of Yakov Anatoli: 

אך דעתו ז"ל [=הרמב"ם] בזה כי כל אדם לפי שיהיה חכם ונבון ונלבב לבעל השכל תהיה עליו ההשגח[ה] לטובה אם הוא טוב או לרעה אם הוא רע...על כן ראוי לכל אדם ירא אלקי[ם] להחזיק בתפלת בקר וערב

“However, his [Maimonides’s] opinion… was that every man, to the degree that he is intelligent and wise and beloved of the Lord of the intellect, will be subject to providence for better if he is good, for worse if he is bad … Therefore it is fitting that every God-fearing man maintain the morning and evening prayer” (haMe’ili, Meir ben Simone, Sefer Meshiv Nefesh, MS Moscow Guezenburg, 146a-148a). 

HaMe’ili is again reinforcing the classical understanding of Maimonides, according to the text of the Guide for the Perplexed, that individual providence applies only to humans; and that according to the degree of intellect (sechel) of the human, so is the corresponding degree of providence (hashgacha) bestowed by G-d. heMe’ili, like Yakov Anatoli, completely disputes the ‘disclosure’ of Shmuel ibn Tibbon that Maimonides only wrote that to appease the conservative masses, but that he never meant it. 

Both HeMe’ili and Yakov Anatoli express their concern that people may start to believe Shmuel ibn Tibbon that ꟷ if there is no providence (even in proportion to the capacity for sechel) ꟷ the result would be a mass move away from religious observance and prayer.

 

The Kabbalist schools

Needless to say, the Kabbalists ꟷ who strongly promoted the belief in not just providence for human beings but for all of existence, even the realm of the inanimate ꟷ certainly rejected the interpretation of Shmuel ibn Tibbon.

 

R. Asher ben David

Representative of the emerging schools of Kabbalah was R. Asher ben David (13^th c) who was a nephew of R. Yitzchak the Blind (Saggi nehor), the son the Raavad (R. Avraham ben David of Posquières). Asher ben David criticised those who studied Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed (let alone the radical interpretation of Shmuel ibn Tibbon) because he said it led to a breakdown in religious observance. 

יש כתות בעולם נבוכים בדעתם מרוב עומק מחשבתם ומעמיקים שאלות על עלת העלות...למנוע מהם התפילות 

“There are…sects in the world, people whose exaggerated depth of thought brings them to perplexity, and they delve into inquiries regarding ʿIlat haʾIlot [the Cause of Causes], thus preventing humans from praying” (Asher ben David, Kol ktvav veiyunim bekabalto, 1996:135).[3] 

This is quite a sharp attack on the “sect” (כת can also mean a ”cult”) of the Maimonideans. There is also a play on the word “perplexity” (as in Guide for the Perplexed, נבוכים), another allusion to the Maimonideans. The upshot of this is that these Maimonidean ideas are driving people away from religion and “preventing humans from praying.”

 

R. Yakov ben Sheshet Gerondi

Another Kabbalist from the thirteenth century was R. Yakov ben Sheshet Gerondi. Yakov ben Sheshet was a strong advocate of mysticism and wrote an apologetic work, Meshiv Devarim Nichochim, in defence of Kabbalah.[4] In another of his works, Shaar haShamayim, he accuses Maimonides of blasphemy and claims that the Maimonideans only regarded prayer as having a social and psychological value: 

ובעונותינו שמענו שיש אנשים בישראל פורצי גדר ומחיצה, בודים דברים מלבם ... חשבו

 מחשבות [יר׳ יא, יט] למצא להם סבות, למען עשות את כל התועבות [יר׳ ז, י], תעו אחר

 חכמת היונים ויהיו לאחור ולא לפנים [יר׳ ז, כד] ... וכדי לרמות את ההמון כתב משה

 בתורה, בראשית ברא [בר׳ א, א] ואין השגחת הבורא מגלגל הירח ולמטה לא להיטיב ולא

להרע ... ואין צורך לתפילה רק לטהר המחשבה

“And we have become aware that due to our transgressions there are among the people of Israel those who breached the bounded and segregated, fabricated from their hearts falsehoods … ‘devised devices’ [Jer. 11:19] to find causes ‘only to go on doing all these abominations’ [Jer. 7:10], who followed erroneously after the wisdom of the Greeks and ‘went backward and not forward’ [Jer. 7:24] … [They claim that] for purposes of deceiving the masses Moses wrote in the Torah: ‘In the beginning God created’ [Gen. 1:1] – while God’s providence does not reach out beneath the sphere of the moon, for either betterment or worsening, … and that there is no purpose to prayer short of purifying the thought…” (Yakov ben Sheshet, Shaar haShamayim).[5]

 

Nachmanides (Ramban)

Nachmanides (d.1270), known as the father of Jewish mysticism, also vehemently opposed the rationalism of the Maimonideans, particularly their ambivalence toward G-d’s providence (hashgacha). He writes: 

כי יאמרו אין לבורא חפץ ורצון, אין לפניו בין עורף כלב לטובח הצאן

“Since they would say that the Lord hath no interest and will, for he does not differentiate between the decapitator of a canine and the slaughter of a lamb” (Chavel 1963: 1:355).[6] 

In other words, Nachmanides vociferously alleges that according to the radical Maimonideans who he claims do not believe in providence, there is no significance in any of the Mitzvot. Thus, the strict laws of slaughtering kosher meat (shechita), for example, are as meaningless ꟷ from a religious point of view ꟷ as the act of the decapitation of a dog. Nachmanides goes so far as to say that anyone who holds these beliefs that negate individual providence (at least), has no share in the world to come. 

Nachmanides reiterates that the principle of providence is a basic and fundamental belief required of every Jew: 

דבר ברור וידוע, כי האמונה בידיעת הקל יתברך מני השפלים ואישיהם והשגחתו בכללם

 ובפרטם, פנות גדולות מתורת משה רבינו ע"ה, כי הכופר אשר יאמר, כי אין

 הבורא יודע אישי השפלים והשגחתם, כופר בתורה בכללה...אבל צריכים אנו להאמין

 שהקל יודע האישים כלם ופרטיהם, העליונים והתחתונים, מעשיהם ומחשבותיהם, העובר

 וההוה והעתיד

“It is clear and known that the belief in the blessed God’s awareness of the various mundane species and their individuals and his providence on them universally and particularly are fundamental issues in Moses’ Torah. Since the heretic that says that the creator does not know of and does not watch the inferior humans denies the whole Torah…. But we are obliged to believe that the Lord knows all the species and their individuals, of upper and lower, their deeds and their thoughts, the past and the present and the future” (Chavel 1963: 1:17-20). 

One notices how carefully Nachmanides distances himself from all the streams of Maimonidean thought by specifying that G-d’s providence applies to both the species as a whole as well as the individual entities within the general species. 

In Nachmanides’ view, there is no distinction between general providence (hashgacha kelalit) which maintains the species as a whole (i.e., G-d maintains the beehive in general but does not necessarily look after each and every bee) ꟷ and individual providence (hashgacha peratit) which maintains each component of the species separately (i.e., G-d maintains not just the general hive, but each specific bee: מני השפלים ואישיהם והשגחתו בכללם ובפרטם).

 

Kabbalists for (the ‘genuine’) Maimonides

What we notice from all these Kabbalistic sources around the thirteenth century, ꟷ in the immediate aftermath of Maimonides (d. 1204) ꟷ is that they are all particularly concerned with how Maimonides’ position on providence was understood. They were concerned because they saw a real breakdown in religious belief and observance by people who were quoting Maimonides. Ironically, many of these Kabbalists had no issue with what Maimonides had actually written. Their objection was to how the likes of Shmuel ibn Tibbon interpreted, expounded and ‘disclosed’ what Maimonides ‘really’ meant ꟷ namely, that there was no providence; and that Maimonides only referenced providence as applying to those of greater intellect because he hid his real view from the conservative masses. However, there were, indeed, significant Kabbalists who defended what they claimed was the ‘genuine’ Maimonides. 

Nachmanides was one of these Kabbalists who agreed (at least partially) with Maimonides who had written that the intelligent are more susceptible to divine providence: 

לא יגרע מצדיק עיניו [איוב לו, ז] זה הכתוב מפרש ענין גדול בענין ההשגחה ... כי אנשי התורה והאמונה התמימה יאמינו בהשגחה כי הקל ישגיח וישמור אנשי מין האדם ... ומן הטעם הזה ישמור את הצדיקים, כי כאשר לבם ועיניהם תמיד עמו, כן עיני ה׳ עליהם מראשית השנה ועד אחרית השנה [ע"פ דב׳ יא, יב...] והענין הזה בארו הרב זצ"ל ביאור יפה בספר מורה הנבוכים

“‘He does not take his eyes off the righteous’ [Job 36:7]. This verse interprets an important matter regarding providence…because the people of the Torah and the innocent faith believe in providence, [namely] that God exerts his providence and protects the people of humankind … and for this reason he protects the righteous, since to the extent that their heart and eyes are always with him, so ‘the eyes of God [are] always on them from the beginning of the year to the end of the year’ [according to Deut. 11:12] … and this issue was well interpreted by the rabbi [Maimonides] blessed be his holy memory, in the book ‘Guide of the Perplexed’” (Chavel 1963: 1:108-109). 

This is an astonishing endorsement by Nachmanides of Maimonides regarding the notion that the righteous/intelligent are more susceptible to providence. [I suspect, though, that Nachmanides may have been slightly critical of Maimonides’ emphasis on ‘intelligent’ and rather wanted to emphasise ‘righteous’]. 

Weiss intriguingly suggests that most early Kabbalists similarly accepted certain aspects of Maimonidean philosophy while rejecting the extreme Aristotelian interpretations thereof: 

“I think that most of the early Kabbalists – at least with regard to the subject under discussion – can be defined similarly. They did not simply reject an Aristotelian attitude toward divine providence but saw themselves as trying to defend Maimonides from his radical interpreters… The Kabbalists…accepted, in one way or another, Maimonides’s impersonal view of God” (Weiss 2022:10).

 

Prayer moves away from G-d and towards angels

The Maimonideans were not a small fringe element. It seems they were larger in number and influence than is generally recognised. The Maimonidean Conflicts continued for two to three centuries after Maimonides’ passing so there must have been a significant number of followers. These Maimonideans would ꟷ just like every other movement ꟷ have ranged from mild to moderate to extreme rationalism. 

We have noted how certain extreme Maimonideans acted on their 'background information' about the non-existence of divine providence as promoted by Shmuel ibn Tibbon. If there was no providence, why pray to G-d? But human nature is such that if G-d is removed from the subject of prayer, the human cannot easily refrain from prayer altogether. So, what happened was that some began to turn their prayers to 'mediators' and angels instead: 

“It seems, however, that as a result of the rise of the apophatic [i.e., indefinable, unknowable and inconceivable][7] image of God and the 13th-century debate over divine providence, the worship of angels increased, leading to the need [for] various Jewish sages, including Kabbalists, to guard against it” (Weiss 2022:11). 

An anonymous thirteenth-century text adds to the sources that corroborate this trend towards praying to angels, particularly the angel called Metatron: 

ויש טועים בהויתו שמתפללין לומר כי בעבור היותנו טמאים ושפלים איך ימצא בדעתינו להתפלל לעילת העילות. וכיון שהשר הזה מורשה על כל ענין העולם לו נתפלל. ודבריהם דברי רוח תפח רוחם של העושים כן כיון שנתברר לנו שהשגחת הקב"ה מצויה בפרטים ובכללים מבני אדם והוא ית׳ רב חסד למה יאמרו אלו הארורים שלא נתפלל אליו

“And some err regarding his essence when they pray [to him], saying that being impure and inferior, praying to the ʿIlat haʾIlot [Cause of Causes] would be unthinkable. And given that this prince [i.e., Metatron] is in charge of all of the mundane matters – let us pray to him. And these words are a phantasm; may the spirit of those who act in this way expire, since it has become clear to us that the providence of the holy one, blessed be he, is found in the particulars as in the universals alike, in what regards men, and he, blessed be he, is plentiful of grace, so why would those damned ones say that we ought not pray to him” (Weiss 2018b: 204, according to MS. Jerusalem 8a).[8] 

Thus, because some of the more radical Maimonideans had turned G-d into an entirely unknowable G-d who had nothing to do with the world, they compensated by substituting Metatron for G-d.

 

Maimonides defines worshipping angels as idolatry

This study is full of interesting ironies and here is another irony. Prayer to (or through) angels was quite acceptable to some rabbis (cf. Machnisei Rachamin) but repulsive to Maimonides who went so far as to define it as outright idolatry: 

“On the one hand, Maimonides, and especially his radical interpreters, pushed Jews to worship mediators by introducing a radical, impersonal image of God who does not supervise individuals. On the other hand, Maimonides determined that the worship of angels is nothing less than the worst religious transgression – idolatry” (Weiss 2022:12).

 

haMe’ili objects to angelic references in the prayers

Within this context of the thirteenth-century and the apparent popularity of angel worship at that time, the Maimonidean rabbi, haMe’ili writes: 

נוכל להוכיח מזה שאין לקרא לשום מלאך בעת צרה...ועל זה נהגו ברוב המקומות שאין אומרים מכניסי רחמים הכניסו רחמינו וכו׳...  לכך יש לכל אדם להשתדל ולמחוק מסדרי התפלות כל שם מלאך בבקשה...שכתבום אנשים חסרי דיעה...או אפשר שכתבום תחלה בעלי הכתות מן האמונות שאינן נכונות והטעו בהם רבים מהמון העם המוצאים אותם כתובין ואין בהם דעת נכונה להבחין בין האמת להפכו

“[W]e can conclude from this that it is forbidden to pray to any angel in a time of distress…and therefore in most places it is customary not to recite [the piyyut] ‘Ushers of mercy invite mercy etc. [Machnisei Rachamim]’[9]…Therefore every man should make an effort to erase from the prayer books any name of an angel in the request…written by thoughtless people…or, alternatively, perhaps they were composed at first by members of the sects of the erroneous beliefs, thus misleading many from among the masses, who find them written, and lack the right mind to distinguish between the truth and its opposite” (Sefer Milchemet Mitzvah, MS. Parma Palatina 2749 [De Rossi 155], 234b–235b).

 

R. Yakov Anatoli objects to angelic prayers

Yakov Anatoli, another Maimonidean,  noted that G-d does not receive prayers directed through angels or any other entities. Prayers can only be directed to G-d: 

מה שנהגו בקצת מקומות לומר מכניסי רחמים הכניסו רחמים עלינו וכו׳ לא טוב המנהג ההוא...לא המלאכים ולא זולתם ראוי לפגוע בהם [=להתפלל אליהם] שלא יקבלם אלוק

“The custom practiced in some places to recite ‘Ushers of mercy invite mercy upon us etc. [Machnisei Rachamim]’: That is not a good custom…[N]ot the angels nor anything else is appropriate to beseech in prayer, since the Lord will not accept those [prayers]” (Yakov Anatoli, Malmad haTalmidim, 1866: 65b).

 

R. Yakov ben Sheshet Gerondi rejects angelic prayers

In a similar sense, R. Yakov ben Sheshet Gerondi, a thirteenth-century Kabbalist,  also warned against prayer to angels: 

עבד מלך מלך ושלוחו של אדם כמותו... וצריך אזהרה שלא לטעות באמצעיים 

“[Despite the well-known injunction that] ‘the servant of a king is a king,’ [b. Shavu’ot 47b] and ‘the delegate of a person is like himself’ [b. Chagiga 10b] a warning is [still] necessary so as not to err regarding [praying to] the mediators” (Chavel 1963: 2:415–416).

 

R. Asher ben David

R. Asher ben David, another emerging Kabbalist, similarly objected to praying to angels: 

ועל כן אין האדם רשאי לבקש צרכיו משום כח או משום מלאך 

“And therefore, man is not allowed to seek his needs from any power nor from any angel” (Asher ben David, Kol ktvav veiyunim bekabalto, 1996:120).

 

The Sefirot are presented as an alternative to angel worship

As we have seen, it is most significant that both Maimonidean and early Kabbalist rabbis all spoke with one voice against the trend towards angel worship. This again indicates that it must have been of tremendous and universal concern. Unfortunately, it seems to have unwittingly stemmed from radical Aristotelian interpretations of Maimonides (beginning with R. Shmuel ibn Tibbon) and led to the assumtion that Maimonides privately believed that there was no Divine providence at all. 

Weiss suggests that the early Kabbalists came up with an ingenious solution to the unintended Maimonidean theological fallout that resulted in angel worship. Instead of praying to angels: 

“[t]hey adopted and developed the sefirotic system that allows for a connection with the transcendent God in a graduated manner and without damaging his unity. In the sefirotic system, the uppermost part of the godhead, the ein-sof, is distant, but by virtue of the sefirot to which the Kabbalists address their prayers, their prayers can reach God… According to this text, because of humankind’s limited nature, prayer can be directed only to what is itself limited, that is, the sefirot. However, in this way, and through the divine thought that is part of God and not a separate entity, individuals can elevate their prayers to the ein-sof, the transcendent part of the godhead” (Weiss 2022:16-17). 

This notion of addressing the prayers to the Sefirot and thereby gradually approaching the Infinite One without (apparently) disrupting G-d’s unity is described in the Commentary on Sefer Yetzira attributed to R. Yitzchak the Blind: 

אין דרך להתפלל אלא על ידי הדברים המוגבלים, אדם מתקבל ומתעלה במחשבה עד אין סוף 

“There is no way to pray, but only by way of the limited matters, [thus] a man is admitted and risen in thought unto the ein-sof” (Scholem 1970:6).[10] 

Herein lies the resourcefulness of this new Kabbalistic approach to the Sefirot to solve the dual problems of the question of divine providence (as the early Kabbalists also subscribed to the notion of an apophatic and transcendent G-d); and the common practice of angel worship: 

“Like angels, each of the sefirot has certain qualities, symbols, characters, and specific designations. In this system, believers can address their prayers to a specific sefirah that represents their needs. Therefore, it would not be far from the truth to say that the sefirot are angel substitutes that do not contradict Maimonides’s ruling that worship of mediators is idolatry” (Weiss 2022:18). 

 

Opposition to the new Kabbalistic model of Sefirot

Of course, not everyone agreed with this theological reconciliation. haMe’ili, for example simply challenged the new Kabbalistic model as an adaptation of the Christian rhetoric about the trinity, and therefore rejected it: 

ואמרו להתפלל ביום לאל אחד נברא ובלילה לאל אחר למעלה ממנו אבל הוא נברא כמוהו, ובימי הקדש לאחר...כי אוי לאלהות הרבה ואמרו בחסרון דעתם כי כולם דבוקים זה עם זה והכל אחד 

“And they said that one ought to pray to a certain created God during day time, and during the night to another God, who is more elevated than him, albeit created like him, and on holy days, to yet another [God]…For they have chosen many gods, and they say in their unreason that they are all stuck to one another and all is one” (Sefer Milchemet Mitzvah, MS. Parma Palatina 2749 (De Rossi 155), 230a–231b).

 

Conclusion

According to Weiss, Kabbalah rose to a position of authority during the thirteenth century because ꟷ through the innovation of the sefirotic system ꟷ it was able to solve the two pressing issues of the day: 1) the question of the existence and extent of an apophatic and transcendent G-d’s providence; and 2) the spread of angel worship. 

The mystical Kabbalists agreed with the rational Maimonideans that G-d is apophatic (an unknowable and unreachable entity). They also agreed with Maimonides that angel worship was to be classified as idolatry. Furthermore, they tried to protect Maimonides from what they considered to be the reckless rationalist interpretations from those like Shmuel ibn Tibbon who claimed that Maimonides did not personally believe in providence. 

Fascinatingly, this explanation shows remarkable and unexpected similarities between the early Kabbalists and Maimonides. This is in stark contrast to the more common notion that Kabbalah rose in antithetical defiance of Maimonidean rationalism.

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[1] Weiss, T, 2022, ‘The Emergence of the Kabbalah: Early Sefirotic Theosophy as a Response to Contemporary Theological Challenges’, NUMEN 69, 1-27.

[2] Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed 3:17, 18, 51.

[3] Abrams, D., 1996, Asher ben David: Kol ktvav veiyunim bekabalto [R. Asher ben David: His Complete Works and Studies in his Kabbalistic Thought], Cherub Press, Los Angeles.

[4] See JACOB BEN SHESHET GERONDI - JewishEncyclopedia.com. See also HebrewBooks.org Sefer Detail: משיב דברים נכוחים -- יעקב בן ששת, גרונדי.

[5] Gabay, N., 1989, “Y’akov ben Sheshet – Sha’ar haShamaim” [Jacob ben Sheshet – Gate of Heaven], MA dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 115-117.

[6] Chavel, C. B., 1978. Ramban (Nachmanides) – Writings and Discourses, Shilo Publishing House, New York.

[7] Square brackets are mine. “Cataphatic” prayer has content; words, images, symbols and theology, whereas “apophatic” prayer has no content. Maimonides did, indeed, speak of the value of silent prayer.

[8] Weiss, T., 2018b., ‘pulhan metatron” [The Worship of Metatron]’, Kabbalah: Journal for the Study of Jewish Mystical Texts, no 42, 193–208.

[9] In this hymn, often inserted into the Selichot service, the angels are tasked with the mission of transmitting the prayers to G-d.

[10] Scholem, G., 1970, haKabala beProvans [The Kabbalah in Provence], Edited by Rivka Schatz, Akademon, Jerusalem.