Introduction
Many people, including rabbis, are surprised to discover that the concept of a rationalist Maimonidean Judaism exists. Maimonides’ thought is not the Maimonides of the Mishna Torah compiled around 1180 which many are familiar with (and which, by Maimonides’ own description, was just his summary of the Talmud) - but rather the philosophical Maimonides of the Moreh Nevuchim or Guide of the Perplexed, compiled later in 1190. The personal hashkafa or worldview of Rambam can only be seen in the latter work. Although Rambam passed away about eighty years before the Zohar was first published in 1290, he presented a strong rationalist worldview and deeply opposed the mystical thought that was brewing during his lifetime. The mystics repressed his rationalist ideology during the following few centuries when Kabbalah became dominant (and they continue to do so today), and his rationalist thought was essentially eradicated from Judaism.
Astoundingly,
in our lifetimes, eight centuries later, through the writings of modern
scholars such as Rabbi Dr Natan Slifkin, Dr Avi Harel, Professors Marc Shapiro,
Menachem Kellner and Rabbi Kapach, we now gain an insight into this lost and
often censored Maimonidean thought. Whether one agrees with Maimonidean thought
or not, these scholars have done ground-breaking work in restoring, if not
returning, another jewel to the crown of Judaism.
[See Kotzk Blog: 255) THE 'LOST RELIGION' OF MAIMONIDES:]
It is my
contention that no serious study of Judaism can be undertaken without this
basic, fundamental and core understanding of the distinction between mystical
and rationalist Judaism. Mysticism, for centuries has been presented as the raison
d'être of Judaism and as its only and deepest layer of theological thought, but
history shows otherwise.
We must
remember that around and immediately after the period of Maimonides,
rationalist thought was, in many circles, the dominant ideology. Missing that
point, makes everything else a montage, if not a blur, albeit a comfortable and
reassuring one, living and thinking within the neat categorisations of the
hierarchical structures of the spiritual and mystical realms without an
awareness that an alternative system of Orthodox Jewish rationalist thought may
exist.
Whichever side
of the mystical/rationalist debate one chooses to take, to be fair, one still needs
an acute awareness of this differential, and the spiritual tension and angst
that follows in its wake.
In any
theological system, foundational concepts such as ‘angels’, ‘demons’ or a
‘supernatural messiah’, for example, either exist or they do not. Mystical
Judaism and Kabbalah claim they do - rationalist Maimonidean Judaism
claims that angels are perceived in the imagination only and do not manifest as
reality, and the messiah and messianic age are natural progressional
developments and not supernatural revelations. The outcomes and consequences of
these two systems are fundamentally different. This must be clear no matter
which system of theology one chooses to subscribe to.
Aryeh Kaplan, a
rabbi and a nuclear physicist, who researched Kabbalah from original
texts, similarly shares his discovery of the same polarity of theological haskafa
that we are addressing. He writes that as a result of his immense research
into old texts:
“I gradually realized that Jewish philosophy [i.e. rationalist
thought and philosophy][1]
almost comes to an abrupt end in the 14th and 15th
centuries. And from there on, almost all of Jewish thought and theology is
dominated by Kabbalah” (Kaplan 2017: n.p.).
James Robinson
similarly identifies the fifteenth century as the period when the abrupt demise
of rationalist Jewish philosophy occurred. He identifies even further just
which specific rabbinic writings and commentaries came to signify the end of
rationalist Maimonidean thought:
“…with [Yitzchak] Arama [1420-1494] and [Don Yitzchak] Abarbanel
[1437-1508][2] we
can recognize the beginning of the end for philosophical exegesis”
(Robinson 2011:475)[3].
It is,
accordingly, quite evident that Jewish rationalist thought as championed by
Maimonides had been all but obliterated from theological discourse by the
fifteenth century leaving mystical Judaism as the only viable option. Mystical
groups like the sixteenth century Safed and Lurianic Kabbalists
as well as the seventeenth century Sabbatians flourished in such a theological
environment, perhaps in part, because no rationalist alternatives were
available.
This trend
continued - bar for a small group of Yemenite Maimonidean rationalists known as
Talmidei haRambam who claimed that the Zohar was a forgery -
until relatively recently when scholars began re-examining the lost
philosophical and rationalist thought of Maimonides.
[See Kotzk Blog: 086) A TRADITIONAL SCHOOL OF YEMENITE RATIONALISM:
and Kotzk Blog: 245) R. YOSEF KAPACH - THE SUPPRESSION OF A RATIONALIST
TRADITION?]
This article,
based extensively on the research by Professor James Diamond[4] looks
at how, Yitzchak Arama, one of the leading rabbis of the fifteenth century, began
to subtlety subvert Maimonidean rationalist thought. It is fascinating to see
how scholars are able to almost freeze moments in history which went on to
influence future ideologies and eradicate others.
Yitzchak Arama
closes the rationalist era
Arama’s
strategic style
Yitzchak Arama (1420-1494)
did not challenge Maimonides (1135-1204) directly. Instead his attack, two and
a half centuries after Maimonides, was far more subtle and delicate but
effective nonetheless. Diamond describes his work as a nuanced attempt at
creating a perceived:
“balance between what he considered a foreign Greek body of
rational knowledge on the one hand, and a supra-rational revealed knowledge
native to Judaism’s prophetic tradition on the other…”
Yet he was not
content to remain with a balance of mystical and rationalist ideology because
his ultimate aim was:
“to close the chapter on
Jewish philosophical exegesis which Maimonides spearheaded” (Diamond
2016:201).
Arama could do
this because, as Mark Saperstein[5]
suggests, he was:
“the most influential
preacher in the generation of the expulsion from Spain.”
Arama’s fear of
rationalism assumes biblical proportions
Although Arama
is respectful to Maimonides, he believes Maimonidean rationalism will have
disastrous consequences for believing Jews as it will distort their pure faith.
The title of his work, Chazut Kasha[6],
or nightmarish vision taken from Isaiah 21:2:
חָז֥וּת קָשָׁ֖ה הֻגַּד־לִ֑י הַבּוֹגֵ֤ד ׀ בּוֹגֵד֙ וְהַשּׁוֹדֵ֣ד ׀ שׁוֹדֵ֔ד
“A harsh [grievous or nightmarish] prophecy has been announced
to me: the betrayer is betraying and the raveger ravaging…”
It is quite
apparent just who Arama is alluding to when he uses the term “betrayer”
and “raveger”. He is forewarning the world in a prophetic-like manner of
the nightmarish dangers of Maimonidean rationalism.
Prophecy
In rabbinic
literature, the expression Chazut (chazon) indicates the most
catastrophic of all visons:
עֲשָׂרָה לְשׁוֹנוֹת נִקְרֵאת, נְבוּאָה, חָזוֹן, הֲטָפָה, דִּבּוּר,
אֲמִירָה, צִוּוּי, מַשָֹּׂא, מָשָׁל, מְלִיצָה, חִידָה. וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא קָשָׁה
שֶׁבְּכֻלָּן רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמַר חָזוֹן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה כא,
ב): חָזוּת קָשָׁה הֻגַּד לִי[7]
Already we see
the subtle nuances at play. Arama knows that Maimonides has issues with
spiritual visons and prophecy from above and generally prefers to explain these
visions as some form of “intellectual apprehension…and not sensory
apprehension,”[8]
or as Diamond (2016:205) paraphrases Maimonides:
“an awareness that crystallizes in the realm of thought rather
than a visual sighting.”
Maimonides is
clear that these visions and revelations are not to be taken literally:
“the words to see [ra’oh], to look at [habbit], and to vision
[hazoh] are applied to the sight of the eye and that all three of them are also
used figuratively to denote the grasp of the intellect…Know this.”[9]
Yet Arama
intentionally emphasises the most catastrophic and powerful of these visions, “chazon”,
in very real and concrete terms that are not to be minimised or rationalised
away. For Arama, prophecy is real and direct and any other explanation is a
betrayal of Judaism.
Arama writes
that the Maimonidean interpretation of prophecy has ripped out a fundamental
component from Judaism, to the extent that these rationalist ideas have:
עד אשר נפתה לב העם בכלל לגרש האמונה האלהיית מלבם ולהחליש בה כחם
יותר מכל העמים
“seduced them to banish their divine faith and weaken them more
than any other nation in the world.”[10]
The Torah
speaks in the language of the sons of man
Another matter
regarding which Arama crossed swords with Maimonides concerned the
interpretation of the Talmudic adage:
דִּבְּרָה תוֹרָה כִלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם
“the Torah speaks in the language
of the sons of man”.[11]
Typical of Maimonides’ rationalist approach,
is his explanation that the messages of the Torah are often directed towards
the “lowest common denominator” (Diamond 2016:206) of human society.
This is where Maimonides makes his (in)famous distinctions between the upper
(intellectual=philosophical) elements of Jewish society and the lower elements,
which he also refers to as the “ignorant masses”. For the most part,
according to Maimonides, the Torah directs its teachings at the latter segment
and speaks to “the imagination of the multitude” in order to reach the
largest audience.
This is why the Torah speaks in
anthropomorphisms (where G-d is described in human or corporeal terms such as
G-d’s hands, voice, etc.):
“…inasmuch
as the multitude cannot at first conceive of any existence save that of a body
alone…For this reason it behooves us to explain the matter to those
whose souls grasp at human perfection…to put an end to the fantasies that come
to them from the age of infancy.”[12]
Maimonides expects sophisticated readers of
the Torah to understand this principle and to pierce through such false
narratives.
“In a
sense, scripture is a text that can only be preserved by its overcoming”
(Diamond 2016:207).
Maimonides explains in words that don’t sit
well on the modern ear but make the point that the Torah is designed:
“to make it
possible for the young, the women, and all the people to begin with it and to
learn it.”[13]
Arama again subverts this rather elitist understanding of Maimonides and introduces a different interpretation of the anthropomorphic passages found in the Torah. Arama insists that the Torah must depict G-d in human terms to emphasise a concept that Maimonides was rather ambivalent about, namely, Providence. By ascribing human characteristics to G-d, G-d become a kind and caring being concerned about His creation.
According to Arama, the Torah text is not "preserved by its overcoming", but specifically by its literal intent. Again, Arama is subverting Maimonides by claiming that the human language and characteristics ascribed to G-d in the Torah are good for people because they will see that G-d cares, provides, judges and even gets angry – and this all bodes well for religious behaviour. To achieve this end, the Torah is even prepared to sacrifice ‘philosophical technicalities’ such as believing that G-d has a material form or body of sorts.
שההישרה האלהי לא תקפיד אל טעות ההמון בצר מצדדי הגשמות לא כהקפדתה אל טעותיה בהעדר הידיעה ומיעוט ההשגחה וסילוק היכולת שזה מביא אל שיבוש דעת לבד וזה מביא אל כפירה גמורה
Arama maintains that the Torah text cares less about possible technical confusion as to corporeality and the make-up of G-d (which is what bothered Maimonides), and cares more about theological errors concerning G-d’s “omniscience, providence, and omnipotence, since the former involves only confusion while the latter involves heresy.”
ובאמת רצה השם
ית׳ בצדקת נפשם יותר מבפלפולם אם שניהם כאחד לא יכילם דעתם
For Arama, it is the religious experience that
trumps theological accuracy which he disregards as mere “pilpul”, or meaningless
debate. For Maimonides, believing that G-d has a body is not just a debatable
subject but a heresy. Arama inverts Maimonides and suggests, instead, that
believing Maimonides’ notion that G-d’s providence is unknowable and
transcendent is what amounts to heresy.
[See Kotzk Blog: 074) THE NOTION THAT G-D HAS A 'BODY' - In Early and Modern Rabbinical Writings:]
What is the ‘soul’?
According to Maimonides it is the sechel
or intellect that distinguishes humans from animals. Arama believes,
instead, in something higher that the intellect. The intellect dies when the
person dies. But for Maimonides, it is only the intellect that actually
survives the body:
“the
rational soul…[is all] that remains of man after death.”[14]
Adam’s sin
According to Maimonides, Adam’s sin was
abandoning rationalist thought. Adam rejected his human sechel, or intellect,
became concerned with the mundane, and the consequences were that he became
more animal-like in his need to acquire food and sustenance. Arama believes,
instead, that it was Adam’s very embrace of rationalist thought (eating the
tree of knowledge) that brought his downfall. Thus, according to Arama:
“when he
[Adam=man] veers away from that path [of revelation][15] and
tends toward the speculative (ʿiyuni) which denies revelation…then surely the
earth will be cursed.”[16]
Job
According to Maimonides, Job was an inferior
human being specifically because of his simple faith. Job is described as a “tam”,
a simple person. Maimonides bemoans:
“the fact
that knowledge is not attributed [to Job]. . . only moral virtue and
righteousness in action are ascribed to him…for if he had been a ḥakham
[wise person][17], his situation would not
have been obscure for him.”[18]
And once again, Arama subverts and undoes
Maimonides by emphasising simple faith over rationalist philosophy:
שלא הגיע שלמות
האדם בכל מה שהתפלסף והתחכם להתנהג על גזירת השכל האנושי לבד רק במה שיכנע לשמוע
אל השכל האלקי בכל מעשיו
“…perfection
is not acquired by philosophizing and rationalizing in order to conduct oneself
exclusively in accordance with reason, but rather in submission to the dictates
of the divine intellect in all his actions.”[19]
Akeida – the binding of Isaac
According to Maimonides, Abraham did not
suspend judgement when he agreed to sacrifice Isaac. Diamond (2016:219)
explains that:
“Abraham
acted, not contrary to but in consonance with, the dictates of reason after
three days of ‘thought, correct understanding, consideration of the truth of
His command, love of Him, and fear of Him.’[20]”
Arama, of course inverts that Maimonidean
notion and as Diamond (2016:218) explains:
“Abraham
graduates from the philosopher who loves God to the faithful servant who fears
God and is willing to perform a divine commandment ‘even when it is contrary to
reason and when it is abhorrent in the extreme to one’s will.’[21]”
Maimonides’ rationalism is Abraham’s mistress
Hagar
Arama’s “nightmare” is that Hagar,
Abraham’s secondary wife, who, in his (Arama’s) view represents Maimonidean
philosophy and rationalism, might become so powerful that it becomes Abraham’s
primary wife instead of Sarah (who represents prophecy and simple belief).
“Hagar’s
subsequent belittlement of Sarah, as a result of her newly gained advantage and
putative superiority, indicates the ever-present danger of philosophy’s
mounting arrogant confidence in its self-sufficiency for the attainment of
perfection without revelation” (Diamond 2016:209).
It is as if Arama is suggesting that
Maimonidean rationalist thought be banished from the house of Israel just like
Abraham banished Hagar from his house when he threw her out into the wilderness.
Conclusion
Yitzchak Arama was part of a concerted effort to rid the Jewish world of Maimonidean rationalism. He challenged Maimonides on every level because Maimonides was too removed and too rational for a sustained religious engagement by the popular society, particularly the generation of the Expulsion from Spain that was not looking towards rationalism for spiritual support. On the contrary, it turned more towards mysticism.
Arama particularly disliked Maimonides’ definition of G-d who should be a loving, caring G-d who hears our every prayer, and actively engages in divine Providence to benefit us, but instead is coldly depicted by Maimonides as a mere “First Being” who:
“if
imagined to be non-existent, then nothing else could possibly exist, and if it
were imagined that that all other beings were non-existent, He alone would
still exist.”[22]
The G-d of prophecy, revelation and simple Hashgacha
Peratit (individual divine Providence) was a better model for sustainable
religion.
[See Kotzk Blog:
097) 'A LEAF FALLS FROM A TREE' - ACCIDENT OR PROVIDENCE?].
These types of writings during the fifteenth
century spelt the end of the era of Maimonidean rationalism. With balance, one can understand why there
was objection to rationalism and one can reciprocate by also understanding why
Maimonides objected to an oversimplification of religious beliefs.
What is difficult to understand is why
Maimonidean thought - which had a rightful place for centuries amongst various
other theologies including Kabbalah - had to be totally obliterated and
eradicated to the extent that most people today are unaware of basic Maimonidean
theology while remaining quite conversant with the underlying tenants of basic mystical
theology.
[For more on Yitzchak Arama see Kotzk
Blog: 270) THIRTEEN QUESTIONS – NO ANSWERS:]
[1] Parenthesis mine. Rationalist Maimonidean thought is frequently
referred to as ‘philosophy’ and Maimonides (1135-1204) is referred to as haPilosoph,
the Philosopher, as he was influenced by Aristotelian (384-322 BCE)
thought.
[2] Parentheses mine.
[3]
Robinson, J. T., 2011, ‘Philosophy and Science in Medieval Jewish Commentaries
on the Bible’, in Science in medieval Jewish cultures, Edited by Gad
Freudenthal, Cambridge University Press, New York, 454-475.
[4]
Diamond, J., 2016, ‘Isaac Arama’s “Nightmare:” Closing the Philosophical
Exegetical Chapter Maimonides Opened’, in European Journal of Jewish Studies
10, Brill, 201-222.
[5]
Saperstein, M., 1989, Jewish Preaching 1200–1800: An Anthology, Yale
University Press, 17.
[6]
Isaac ben Moses Arama, Chazut Kasha, ed. Chaim Yosef Pollak (Pressburg,
Czechoslovakia: Victor Kittseer, 1849), issued as vol. 5 of Akedat Yitzchak.
[7] Bereshit
Rabbah 44:6. See also Shir haShirim Rabbah 3.
[8]
Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, I:44.
[9]
Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, I:4.
[10] Akedat Yitzchak,
Bereishit, 7.
[11] b.
Nedarim 3a.
[12]
Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, I:26.
[14]
Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, I:41.
[15]
Parentheses mine.
[16] Chazut Kasha 25a-b.
[17]
Parentheses mine.
[18] Maimonides, The Guide
of the Perplexed, III:22
[19] Chazut
Kasha 5b.
[20]
Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, III:24.
[21] Chazut
Kasha 6b.
[22]
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, “Laws Concerning the Basic Principles of the Torah,”
1:1.
Because the two are irreconcilable.
ReplyDeleteThey certainly are but that never stopped irreconciliatory views from being expressed in Torah. ‘Hilkach Nimrinhu leTarvaihu'...Therefore let us express both (world-views)!
DeleteWe have chassidim and misnagdim, and we have religious zionists and religious anti-zionists. Some would argue that the position of Erets Yisrael in hashkofa is a make or break issue, yet both schools exist.