When talking
about Jewish practices to people who are not observant, they often ask whether
the matter under discussion is a ‘custom’ or a ’law’. Is it ‘Divine’ or ‘man
made’? This is quite intriguing because the distinction between Torah Law and
Rabbinical Law is often only drawn at quite an advanced level of Torah study.
The advanced observer may be looking to better understand the structure of the
Law (to ascertain whether extenuating circumstances may or may not allow the
Law to be flexible). The non-observer,
however, may be looking for a possible justification not to do something (since
it’s ‘only’ a Rabbinical Law). This is reminiscent of the Karaites of old, who
totally disregarded Rabbinical Judaism.
The question
is: How much should we allow this invisible dividing line, between both sets of
Law, to influence our observance?
From a purely halachic
point of view, there is no practical
distinction between them. One does not have the discretion or liberty to choose
one over the other. The distinction between them exists only on an academic and
theoretical level.
Part of the
reason why so much authority is given to classical Rabbinical Law, is because
the Torah itself instructs us to adhere to the ‘priest who will be in your
day’. Furthermore, as we all know, the Torah of Sinai was presented together
with an Oral (read Rabbinical) Tradition to support and supplement it. This gives
tremendous credibility to the Rabbinical Tradition, as its authority is rather
more primary than secondary.
Then there is
the third issue concerning the status of Custom or Minhag: Although the
concept of ‘minhag shtus’ (a silly or nonsensical custom) does exist - for the
most part, a well established custom is treated with as great a reverence as
the other two abovementioned components of our law. The fullness of
time seems to imbue the custom or practice with an earned sanctity of its own.
The Kotzker
Rebbe teaches that in more recent times, a fourth component appears to have
silently crept into our body of tradition. This fourth
dimension, he aptly calls ‘Frumkeit.’ ‘Frumkeit’ is
difficult to define, but you’ll know it when you see it. It doesn't have to be,
but sometimes is, a very visible display of ‘in your face’ Judaism. It’s more of a
social construct and peer driven than hallowed over time.
While we have
no effective discretion when it comes to the first three components of the Law
- Torah Law, Rabbinical Law and Custom - we may (at least according to the
Kotzker) exercise some agility with ‘Frumkeit’.
Says the
Kotzker Rebbe:
Frumkeit is not necessary for someone who is already ‘fixed’.However, it is sometimes valuable as a means to an end.
(Emet VeEmunah
p99, par 6)
I believe it is
with regard to this fourth component of ‘Frumkeit’ that our religious mettle
gets subjected to the most crucial of tests. How we handle this, defines who we
are. We humans are,
after all, social beings and need to know and show where we fit into society. But when
‘Frumkeit’ becomes an end in itself, instead of a means, we may have just
missed the mark. It may also be
an indication that we are not yet ‘fixed’.
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