507) The rise of contemporary Religious-Zionism

Torat haMelech: a work by a "fringe element," a "call to terror" or according to R. Dov Lior (a respected figure among many mainstream Religious-Zionists) “very relevant especially in this time”?

Introduction

This article—based extensively on the research by Professor Yoav Peled[1]—examines the rise of the Religious Zionist movement from relative non-dominance in 1948 to a position of unquestionable hegemony in the last decades. The Chabad movement is widely recognized for its messianic focus, yet the similarly fervent messianism of Religious Zionists often receives less attention. 

From Socialist-Zionism to a Labour-Zionism to Religious-Zionism

Two political scientists from Bar-Ilan University, Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya (1983:128-131),[2] show how two significant ideological shifts took place within two decades of the birth of the State of Israel in 1948. Both shifts profoundly influenced the so-called ‘civil religion’ or dominant mindset and worldview of the nascent Israeli society. 

After the establishment of the State of Israel, the new Israeli society had gone from its pre-1948 grassroots form of Socialist-Zionism (which concentrated on collective labour and agricultural settlement—to a more formal statist civil ‘religion’ known as Labour-Zionism (with an emphasis on the centrality of the secular state, the military and national survival as unifying forces). The predominantly secular Israeli state was elevated to an almost sacred status with Zionism serving as the new ‘religion.’ 

However, the success of the Six-Day War in 1967 marked a turning point and with its profound territorial, political, and ideological implications, things began to change. What was widely viewed as a miraculous victory fuelled an increased integration of Religious-Zionism into the national discourse. People began to question the previous hegemony of the secular state and became more open to a messianic ideology which was promoted by the Religious-Zionists who were now—for the first time since the birth of the State—in ascendance. 

“[T]his process is deliberately and actively led by an activist, Messianic sector that is dominant within Religious-Zionism and determined to become hegemonic over the society as a whole...and enhance the religious character of Jewish nationalism” (Peled 2022:129). 

The modern Hebrew language even produced a word to describe the promotion of national religiosity: ‘hadata’ or ‘religionization.’ (It would be interesting to compare 'hadata' to the 'hafotza' [spreading of Judaism] by Chabad, and the general 'kiruv' [drawing closer] of many Orthodox movements). After the victory of 1967, and the anguish over security issues after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Religious-Zionism began to make a concerted effort to unseat Labour-Zionism.  This second ideological shift, with its emphasis on nationalist messianism, is illustrated by a statement by R. Chaim Retig, the chairman of the organisation known as Zehut, which teaches Jewish identity in secular state schools: 

“For many years we [Religious-Zionists] felt like second class. For many years we wanted to be on the front line with the general public in leading the country, but we never thought or dared imagine that there could be a religious Chief of [the IDF] General Staff or a Prime Minister of our own. We always attached ourselves to others. But … we need to advance a stage and take a hold of the wheel and sail the ship of state in the right direction … towards the great horizon of building the Kingdom of Israel in the Land of Israel … The public has a duty to build the [Third] Temple” (R. Chaim Retig, 2014). 

A similar observation regarding the 'secondary status' of Religious Zionists in the early period of the modern State of Israel can be found in an entirely unrelated source (on the Aleppo Codex). Matti Friedman writes about Shlomo Zalman Shragai the Israeli Chief of Immigration responsible for "one of the twentieth centuries great movements of people" from Europe and Arab lands to Israel:

"[H]e was an Orthodox Jew, a rare specimen in Israel's ruling class, a leading member of a minority in Israel that had not replaced Judaism with Zionism but had instead combined the two" (Friedman 2013:101).[3]

The theory of cultural hegemony

Peled (2022:129) maintains that the ascendance of Religious-Zionism with its program of hadata, was not a spontaneous, organic or bottom-up phenomenon. Instead, it was a top-down approach, strategically driven by the leadership to reshape Israeli society. This contrasts with the common perception that this societal shift from Labour-Zionism to Religious-Zionism emerged naturally from the populace itself. 

The nascent Religious-Zionist class had to embed their values and interests into the fabric of everyday life so that it could secure widespread acceptance of their authority, even among those who did not subscribe fully to their ideology. 

Peled cites the political theorist Antonio Gramsci who developed a theory of cultural hegemony and power dynamics: 

“The fact of hegemony presupposes that account is taken of the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed—in other words that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporative kind” (Gramsci 2000:211-212).[4] 

In other words, a dominant social group (or class) maintains its control over society, or what Gramsci calls its ‘social-historic bloc’ (i.e., a significant sector of the population as opposed to just a political coalition of convenience) not only through coercion or force but also by gaining the consent of the subordinate classes through some form of compromise. 

Applying this theory requiring “a certain compromise,” to the ascendance of the Religious-Zionists, Peled suggests that: 

“Religious-Zionism indeed acquiesced, though reluctantly, in the loss of less crucial territorial assets – the Sinai Peninsula in 1979-82 and the Gaza Strip in 2005 – in order to maintain the historic bloc which would enable it to incorporate the vitally important West Bank into Israel. Moreover, these territorial concessions reinforced Religious-Zionism’s determination to seize control of the state and ensure that no territorial compromise will ever be worked out in that [West Bank] region” (Peled 2022:131). 

It is interesting to see that another (perhaps inadvertent and unlikely) 'political theorist' may have been R. Nachman of Breslov who spoke about a similar idea of compromise by the necessity of negotiating with the "kings" and "bargaining" for the Land of Israel. It is intriguing to consider how his spiritual insights might align with or illuminate modern political strategies (especially as some factions of Religious-Zionism have adopted many his other better-known spiritual teachings):

“Each of the kings will give him a present – or a country or a people. And some will give him a stipend and he will exchange with each of them until he receives through barter the Land of Israel. That is, he will give to each the country near his border and receive for this a country closer to the Land of Israel until he receives through barter the Land of Israel…and the Land of Israel will have room for all. Afterwards the Land of Israel will expand” (R. Nachman, Megilat Setarim, Section II, line 25). [See: Kotzk Blog: 463) The discovery of R. Nachman’s Secret Scroll]. 

This may correspond to the idea that through some process of compromise, the controlling class achieves ideological buy-in from the social-historic bloc. This is exactly what happened with the initial success of Labour-Zionism with their policy of cooperative agricultural settlement: The vast majority of Jews wanted their nationhood and livelihood, and the Labour-Zionists gave it to them. 

The Israeli neo-classical economist Ephraim Kleiman, duly notes that: 

“the founding fathers of [the] labor movement … became also the founding fathers of the country” (Kleiman 1997:159).[5] 

Essentially, between 1937 and 1973 most Jews believed that it was only the Labour-Zionists who could create and maintain a secure Jewish state. Religious-Zionists, while present, remained on the sidelines. There have been attempts to—what some might say—'reinterpret' history by tracing the origins of Religious-Zionism to the immigration of the Vilna Gaon's students in the early nineteenth century. [See: Kotzk Blog: 476) Did the Vilna Gaon’s Religious Zionism precede modern Secular Zionism?].

In any case, the Labour-Zionists adopted the ethos of the ideological ‘chalutz’ or pioneer that successfully captured the hearts and minds of the people. The chalutz was prepared to sacrifice whatever was necessary for the land and for the Histadrut, the Labour-Zionist labour organisation. In fact, the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 only served to strengthen the Labour-Zionists and their organisations (Peled 2022:133). The Histadrut’s military wing the Haganah was established for good reason in 1937. 

This way, the hegemony and authority of the Labour-Zionists were—counterintuitively—consolidated by revolts and disruption. To maintain their leadership position, they navigated political paradoxes with a blend of accommodation and compromise. They needed to maintain relationships with the wealthier Jews of the Diaspora as the latter provided support and financial assistance without which a state could not emerge. The Labour-Zionists also had to collaborate with some more centrist factions of Orthodox Jewry who were keen on establishing religious institutions in the new state. [See: Kotzk Blog: 505) Michtav Oz Shel Torah: A 1923 Anti-Zionist Polemical Letter by R. Yosef Yitzchak Schneerson]. 

The point is that the chalutz or pioneering ideology was inculcated into the very fabric of society.[6] With time, the Labour-Zionists had to compromise still further—and with the non-pioneering groups who were becoming more populous. Between 1948 and 1963, Israel tripled its population, and the new arrivals were not all pioneers or chalutzim. Ironically, it was the very success of the Labour-Zionists that brought about their downfall. 

Economically, the country was in recession, but this was temporarily overshadowed by the military victory in 1967 when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza. The Labour-Zionists were divided over what to do with the newly gained territories. Do they keep them or exchange them for peace? The economic problems reemerged after the 1973 war and its resultant oil crisis. This was compounded by security concerns. The older generation largely wanted to exchange the territories for peace, but the younger generation wanted to hold on to them. 

It was at this point of crisis that a new player emerged on the political scene, the Religious Zionists. 

The rise of Religious Zionism

Until now, the Religious-Zionists remained just a “junior partner” in the compromised historic bloc of the Labour-Zionists (Peled 2022:136). 

“This inferiority was not merely a matter of its small numbers. The Religious-Zionist movement was for the most part an urban middle class movement, removed from the spirit and activities of pioneering” (Peled 2022:136). 

This status quo, however, rapidly changed. The hallmark of nascent Religious-Zionism, as it grew into a formidable political entity from 1967, was its mystical-messianic component that was rooted in keeping and acquiring land as a precursor to the imminent arrival of the Messiah. 

“[T]he young guard of Religious-Zionism, spearheaded by Gush Emunim (see below), determined to ensure Israel’s rule over the territories captured in 1967 and [was] working to enhance the prominence of Jewish religion in the public sphere” (Peled 2022:135). 

Religion had never featured positively in the ideals of the Labour-Zionists. It was considered to be a retarding element and only reminded the ‘New Jew” of the dark days of the Diaspora. Until now: 

“Religious-Zionists were … self-conscious about their minimal contribution to the leadership and development of Zionism, and to the establishment and maintenance of the state” (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:202). 

Peled adds: 

“Religious-Zionists, practicing a modern-Orthodox version of Judaism, felt religiously inferior to the ultra-Orthodox, non-Zionist Charedim, with their more exacting observance of Jewish religious strictures. By the 1960s, however, the young, Israel-born generation of Religious-Zionists began to challenge their elders for their subservience to Labor and for their lukewarm religiosity and political moderation” (Peled 2022:136-7). 

Gideon Aran, in his ‘From Religious-Zionism to Zionist Religion,’ writes that the new vision of the Jewish state was to be that of a “Torah state,” encompassing both nationalism and religion. It required “full observance of the Torah of Israel” and a commitment to “nationalism and patriotism, dedication to the nation and loyalty to the state, [and] readiness to sacrifice for the sake of the nation” (Aran 1986).[7] Everyone understood that “Torah state” meant the Torah's sovereignty over the entire Land of Israel. 

Religious-Zionism went even deeper than that. Its mystical ideology required that religious fulfilment can only occur within the secular realm—specifically the realms of politics, settlement in the land, economics, culture and the military. Chassidism speaks of a similar fulfilment within the material realm, but its focus is expression within the general earthly and physical domains and not necessarily the spheres of politics or the military. Shlomo Fisher explains that in Religious-Zionism: 

“[t]he various institutional arenas of life: political, economic, cultural, military etc. were to be brought within an overall religious meaning and regulative system” (Fischer n.d.:351).[8] 

In this way, post-1967, the Jewish state shifted from a previous model of Israel as safe haven state, under Labour-Zionists to a national messianic state with the ascendance of the Religious-Zionists. With the new territories acquired during the war: 

“[f]or the first time in the history of political Zionism, they [the Religious-Zionists] asserted leadership in political and social fields – in their own settlement of the newly captured territories and in their political defense of Israel’s foreign policy” (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:203). 

According to Peled (2022:138), the Religious-Zionists now needed a more solid foundation for their political ideology (above merely being religious) and this is where their ideologue, R. Tzvi Yehuda Kook established his key position in the development of Religious-Zionist political theology. R. Tzvi Yehuda Kook was the son of Rav Kook (R. Avraham Yitzchak Kook) and he had also censored literally thousands of his father’s teachings. [See: Kotzk Blog: 225) WHAT THEY DIDN’T WANT YOU TO KNOW ABOUT RAV KOOK:]. It was R. Tzvi Yehuda Kook, the son, who became the movement’s spiritual leader, and according to him: 

“the victory of 1967 was an incontrovertible sign of a divine plan to return the entire Land of Israel to the People of Israel, as a major step in the process of messianic redemption [and] keeping the occupied Palestinian territories under Jewish sovereignty was a divine commandment” (Peled 2022:138). 

In R. Tzvi Yehuda Kook’s own words: 

“This land belongs not only to the three million Jews who are here but no less than that – to all the millions of Jews in Russia and the United States and the whole world. We have no permission even to consider … giving up these lands, under any circumstances! This is a positive command [mitzvat aseh] from the Torah – not to be transgressed even at the price of one’s life and no political calculations and complications, no government arrangements and no ministerial pronouncements of ours will change that” (R. Tzvi Yehuda Kook, cited in Etkes 1974:371).[9] 

What is noteworthy about this statement is not his political view—because people are entitled to hold whatever political views they choose to subscribe to—but his turning this view into an unequivocal "positive commandment of the Torah." 

The establishment of Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) in 1974, one year after the traumatic 1973 war, cemented the notion of a divine commandment to settle in the land. Significantly Gush Emunim: 

“displayed a vitality and persistence that had not been encountered in Israeli society since the end of the 1948 war” (Peled 2022:139). 

This vitality drew in support even from many of those of the older camp which was now seen as a stagnatory residue of the older order. As an example of this, Peled cites a non-observant left-wing writer who, in the mid-1970s, noted that in his heart: 

“as in the hearts of many, there is sympathy, or better yet, yearning or jealousy, for the enthusiastic youth of Gush Emunim. When you see the other side of our life in this country… the violence, the vulgarity… the gossip columns about the provincial so-called high society… the heart goes out to these young people whose national path is fed by the fire of religious faith” (Hanoch Bartov, cited in Barzel 2017:430).[10] 

In 1975, Chanan Porat, the leader of Gush Emunim clearly articulated how the new Religious-Zioinists had broken away from the old guard of Labour-Zionists: 

“The struggle [between Gush Emunim and the Labour government] results from different worldviews regarding the correct dimensions of Zionism. Does Zionism constitute a safe haven for Jews and we have to exert efforts for providing the certain number of Jews who are found here with a life of security, so they can succeed in holding their own and exist? Or maybe the process of redemption in its concrete sense – the redemption of the people, and the redemption of the land – and in its divine sense – the redemption of the godhead, the redemption of the world – is taking place?” (Porat 1975:8).[11]

Democracy and fair representation within an elected government system were soon challenged by some within the growing Religious-Zionist movement. In 1996, R. Elisha Aviner published a textbook on “Jewish Democracy” which claimed that the prevailing “democratic culture” of Israel had been designed to replace Judaism. 

Just like the earlier Labour Zionists had been prepared to compromise in order to attain a critical mass to form a historic bloc, so too the Religious Zionists were prepared to incorporate certain politically aligned non-religious groups under their political umbrella. Their policy of settlement even attracted some of the Labour-Zionist veterans who held tightly to their pioneering ethos (Peled 2022:141). 

In 1977 Likud’s electoral victory consolidated the historic bloc of the Religious Zionists. Once again, some concessions and compromises were made and the Sinai Peninsula was returned, peace was made with Egypt, and in 2005 there was disengagement from Gaza. The West Bank, however, was not up for negotiation. The reason for no compromise with the West Bank was not just strategic, but “more importantly, the messianic nationalist-religious worldview” as espoused by R. Tzvi Yehuda Kook and the Gush Emunim (Peled 2022:141). 

The political impact of the growing Religious-Zionist sector has been significant in terms of changes in the Israeli military. The liberalisation and economic prosperity within the general secular Israeli society have reduced interest in serving in career positions in the military. However, the Religious-Zionists seized this indifference as an opportunity, and: 

“the role of national religious youngsters in the IDF has steadily become more pronounced. Among men, in 2018, religious Zionists constituted nearly 18% of the new recruits, but 35% of the cadets graduating the infantry branch of the IDF officers’ school” (Peled 2022:143). 

The ratio of Religious-Zionist officers is disproportionate to that of the rest of the population and already in 2022 it was estimated that they made up forty per cent of the junior officer ranks (up to company commander) in combat units (Peled 2022:144). 

The problem from a military and strategic perspective is that as the army takes on an increasing role of defending—not just the state—but the 'G-d of Israel’ and fighting those “who defame the God of Israel” (col. Ofir Vinter, in Peled, Y., Peled, H.H., 2019:Appendix),[12] there is the danger of the soldiers defying military orders and instead obeying the ‘piskei halacha’ (religious rulings) of certain of their rabbis. 

In 1987, an important Religious-Zionist journalist published an article in the settler’s Nekudah periodical, calling on Religious-Zionists to join the military radio station in preparation for future careers, suggesting that “mass media was now the most important frontier for Religious-Zionism to conquer” (Peled 2022:144). 

Hillel Ben-Sasson poignantly notes that: 

“Israel is standing today in a fateful junction in front of the strategic move of the new Religious-Zionism [that is]…well-organized [and]…permeated with a feeling of historic deprivation, motivated by overbearing revolutionary zeal… suspicious of the legal authorities of the state…while the Zionist idea that had motivated the establishment of the state is today in a state of crisis” (Ben-Sason 2015:6).[132] 

The controversy over Torat haMelech

The extremely controversial 'Halachic' work, Torat haMelech—volume 1 published in 2009 and volume 2 in 2016—deals with instances such a case where a murderer seized a hostage while shooting at bystanders. It rules that it is permissible to kill the murderer even at the expense of the hostage (ch.3). Also, if the presence of gentiles endangers the lives of Israel, it is permissible to kill them (ch.4). In times of war, it is permissible, to attack enemy targets even at the risk of killing innocent civilians (ch.5). The government can force its people to go to war and if they refuse, they can be killed. Enemy children can also be killed "if they will grow up to harm us" (ch. 6). It must be noted that many rabbis condemned the book saying it did not conform to Jewish law, but the controversy remains because others condoned it. Obviously, not all Religious-Zionists subscribe to such ideas but there are elements who do.

Conclusion

Clearly, Religious-Zionism has become the current hegemonic social and political historic bloc of Israeli society (even while the majority may remain non-observant).  Religious-Zionism has outranked Labour-Zionism and the character of the Jewish state has dramatically changed in the past decades. 

For lovers of Torah, Jews and Judaism this seems like a welcome and historic political and spiritual development. We may do well, however, to remember that we are not just witnessing the ascendence of a religious movement but also the subtle hegemony of a messianic movement. Attempts at practical messianism (as opposed to a traditional belief in an ultimate messiah) have always been a constant reality throughout Jewish history—and still are, in its various contemporary manifestations. Practical messianism has a surprisingly long, largely untold and mainly forgotten history within Judaism. Usually, the records of these disasters are intentionally destroyed on the instruction of the leadership (as in the case of Shabbatai Tzvi). Nevertheless, it has always left a trail of physical, emotional and spiritual fallout in every single one of its previous incarnations.

Exploring religious, messianic, or political matters uncovers profound layers of complexity, particularly when these three dimensions intertwine into a singular messianic-religious-political framework as is found in Religious-Zionism. Since the processes we have analysed so far continue to unfold in real time, our interpretations and conclusions must necessarily remain adaptable to the evolving interplay of conflicting thoughts, perspectives and realities.

Further Reading

Kotzk Blog: 476) Did the Vilna Gaon’s Religious Zionism precede modern Secular Zionism?

Kotzk Blog: 457) “Religion – the greatest cause of wars” (Gersonides) 

Kotzk Blog: 172) ‘ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PAGES OF RAV KOOK HAVE BEEN WITHHELD FROM US’:

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[1] Peled, Y., 2022, ‘From Safe Haven to Messianic Redemption: The Ascendance of Religious Zionism’, Politics and Religion, vol. 16, no. 1, 127-155.

[2] Liebman, C., and Don-Yehiya, E., 1983, Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State, University of California Press.

[3] Friedman, M., 2013, The Aleppo Codex, Algonquin, New York.

[4] Gramsci, A., 2000, The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935, edited by Forgacs David, New York University Press.

[5] Kleiman, E., 1997, The Waning of Israeli Etatisme, Israel Studies, vol. 2, 1997, 146-171.

[6] A parallel inculcation of youthful exuberance corresponding to the young Zionist Chalutzim can be see the above referenced letter by R. Yosef Yitzchak Schneerson. He strongly opposed Zionism in an open letter and tried to create an enthusiastic youthful counter to Zionist enthusiasm by writing:

“[We are privileged] to see the youth of the Children of Israel wrestling bravely and intensely [this seems to imply a contrast with those who chose to rather ‘wrestle bravely, bigevurah atzumah,’ for the Land]

על לימוד התורה באהבה וחיבת הקודש כמסורת אבות

with the study of the Torah, with love and holy affection within [the framework of] the Mesora, or tradition of our fathers. 

הנה כל אחד נותן נפשו להחזיק את התורה

Every one of them gives his soul to strengthen the Torah [rather than sacrifice for the Land].

העומדים במשמרת הקודש יחי', וידינו מלאות עבודה, לחזק את ידי החרדים העוסקים בשארית כחם

These people stand in the holy service [of the Torah, not the Land]. Our hands are full of work [in the Torah, not the Land] and we strengthen the hands [again, emphasising the ‘hands’ engaging with Torah, not settling the Land] of the Chareidim who occupy themselves with all their strength… 

בהחזקת מוסדי התורה' כטהרתה וכנתינתה, לנחם את קהל התלמידים יחי', ולהרים רוחם ושאיפתם, לבבנו מלאות תקוה.

…to maintain Torah institutions [rather than secular or national Zionist structures] with purity as they should be. This [work in Torah] comforts the community of [Torah] students and lifts their spirits and their yearnings [and] our hearts are full of hope, tikva. [This also seems to be in contradistinction to the high spirits, yearnings and hope, tikva, the young Zionists were widely known to have exhibited].” 

[7] Aran, G., 1986, From Religious-Zionism to Zionist Religion: The Roots of Gush Emunim, Studies in Contemporary Jewry, vol. 2,116-143.

[8] Fischer, S., n.d., ‘Change or Continuity? Torah Regime, Citizenship and the Origins of Radical Religious-Zionism’, in: Points of Reference: Changing Identities and Social Positioning in Israel, edited by Zeev Shavit et al., Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Hebrew).

[9] Etkes, I., 2016, ‘Contours of the Image of Religious-Zionism’, in: Milestones: Essays and Studies in the History of the People of Israel, edited by Imanuel Etkes et al., Zalman Shazar Center, Jerusalem, 363-77.

[10] Barzel, N., 2017, “Redemption Now”: The Beliefs and Activities of the Jewish Settlers in the West Bank and Israeli Society, Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Tel Aviv (Hebrew).

[11] Porat, C., 1975, For They Shall See, Eye to Eye, the Lord Returning to Zion, Ptachim, no. 32, (Hebrew).

[12] Peled, Y., Peled, H.H., The Religionization of Israeli Society, Routledge, London, 2019.

[13] Ben-Sasson, H., 2015, “With Uplifted Eyes: The New Agenda of the National-Religious Leadership,” Molad: The Center for Democratic Renewal.